}
}

Nietzsche POParts

Aren’t words and notes

like rainbows and bridges
of semblance,

between that which is
eternally separated?

Nietzsche

POP

arts

Nietzsche

Sind

nicht

Worte

und

Töne

Regenbogen

POP

und

Scheinbrücken

zwischen

Ewig-

Geschiedenem

arts

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Timely Blog on Nietzsche’s Insights

"Thou goest to women? …"

A Conversation about Nietzsche and Erotic Female Dominance with the Dominatrix MissTPart I: In the Dungeon of the "Somatrix"

"Thou goest to women? …"

‍

A Conversation about Nietzsche and Erotic Female Dominance with the Dominatrix MissT

Part I: In the Dungeon of the "Somatrix"

13.11.26
MissT & Paul Stephan

"Thou goest to women? Do not forget thy whip!"1 – Hardly any sentence by Nietzsche is more famous – and more frequently misunderstood. Our editor Paul Stephan met with professional dominatrix MissT to discuss the "other" interpretation of the quote and her work. To what extent can Nietzsche's insights inspire a woman like MissT in her profession? Is there an affinity between BDSM practices, female dominance, and Nietzsche's philosophy of Dionysian transgression, the intertwining of pleasure and violence, and the affirmation of the body? Who are MissT's clients, and what does she learn in her line of work about masculinity, femininity, power, and eroticism that might be relevant to us all? Could erotic female dominance be understood as applied Nietzscheanism – and serve as a source of inspiration for contemporary feminist practice? And what about Nietzsche as a person?

In the first part of this three-part interview, read about how Paul Stephan came to meet MissT, who she is, and what motivates her.

"Thou goest to women? Do not forget thy whip!"1 – Hardly any sentence by Nietzsche is more famous – and more frequently misunderstood. Our editor Paul Stephan met with professional dominatrix MissT to discuss the "other" interpretation of the quote and her work. To what extent can Nietzsche's insights inspire a woman like MissT in her profession? Is there an affinity between BDSM practices, female dominance, and Nietzsche's philosophy of Dionysian transgression, the intertwining of pleasure and violence, and the affirmation of the body? Who are MissT's clients, and what does she learn in her line of work about masculinity, femininity, power, and eroticism that might be relevant to us all? Could erotic female dominance be understood as applied Nietzscheanism – and serve as a source of inspiration for contemporary feminist practice? And what about Nietzsche as a person? In the first part of this three-part interview, read about how Paul Stephan came to meet MissT, who she is, and what motivates her.

0. An unusual workshop in Leipzig

I was quite surprised when I happened upon a large poster on the bulletin board at the Leipzig Academy of Fine Arts, where two women were advertising a workshop titled "Female Authority & Consensual Kink." The English term "kink" has also become established in German to describe unusual sexual preferences, particularly those within the fetish and BDSM scene (which stands for: Bondage & Discipline, Dominance & Submission and Sadism & Masochism). My curiosity piqued, I followed the QR code on the poster. I quickly realized that MissT and Anja could be interesting interview partners for our magazine, as there are, as will become clear, more connections between the topics of "Nietzsche" and "Femdom" (another term from the BDSM scene, which simply stands for "female domination") than might appear at first glance. One thing led to another, and MissT not only agreed to the following interview, but the two also allowed me to attend the workshop, which was actually intended only for women; men were only admitted as companions.

It took place on a mild summer evening in a backyard apartment in the center of Leipzig. You can imagine that, despite the friendly preliminary talk with Anja, I was very nervous. In fact, there were only four men present and about 15 participants, most of them in their early to mid-30s. As I entered the bright room, the scent of incense sticks, which I otherwise only knew from Buddhist meditation centers, immediately hit my nose—and fittingly, there were several Buddha statues standing around the room. Yoga silks dangled from the ceiling.2 The only hint that this might be about BDSM was the outfits of the hosts: MissT wore a tight leather bodysuit with nylon stockings underneath, and Anja wore a purple, low-cut dress. The participants wore comfortable everyday clothing. It could just as easily have been a completely "ordinary" self-discovery workshop.

And indeed, the workshop began with some physical warm-up and breathing exercises, which were primarily about arriving in the space and getting a feel for one's own body. This was followed by the actual core of the workshop: a 45-minute BDSM session with MissT in the dominant role and Anja in the submissive role. Just to avoid any misunderstandings: nudity and touching of the genitals were excluded from the outset. Basically, very little happened. After a short preliminary discussion about her boundaries and the agreement of a "safe word" and a traffic light system, as is common in the BDSM scene, Anja was tied up by MissT, blindfolded, and then "worked on" in various ways, very measuredly—sometimes tenderly, sometimes painfully, using various impact implements. Nevertheless, an incredible erotic tension emerged that was hard for the audience to escape. With small gestures, MissT managed to put Anja into an ecstatic state of intoxication that also captivated the audience. While Anja surrendered to her sensory stimuli, MissT visibly enjoyed observing and controlling Anja's sensations, guiding her into an increasingly relaxed state, which manifested in physical twitches and deep, audible breathing. She never appeared brutal, but rather very loving and tender. MissT reminded me of Nietzsche's "playing child," and Anja of a Dionysian bacchante, an enraptured servant in the retinue of the god so highly esteemed by Nietzsche—whom the Greeks called Dionysus and the Romans Bacchus—whereby Nietzsche highlights the innocent pleasure in cruelty in both the case of the child and the bacchante, in one case active, in the other passive.3 But mind you, a cruelty that has nothing to do with brutality or "sadism" in the ordinary sense, but rather has something maternal and, indeed, childlike about it.

After the performance ended, both sat with us, visibly deeply relaxed and with glowing eyes, describing their feelings during the performance and answering questions about its sequence and generally about MissT's work as a "somatrix." Here, MissT herself emphasized that her sessions are not about her own sexual arousal, but about the pleasure of the power she has over the other; a pleasure in herself reflected in the relaxed, happy, sometimes tear-filled gaze of the "sub." Sexual dominance, then, as pedagogy and initiation in a peculiar collapse of altruism and egoism on the part of the Domina? "To be with oneself in the other" is how Hegel defines love—though he certainly could not have had such practices in mind. Nietzsche, who wrote repeatedly about the connection between pleasure, power, and cruelty during the times when Leopold von Sacher-Masoch was a celebrated author,4 perhaps more so. Is Femdom, then, a kind of lived Nietzscheanism, and is a woman like MissT a "mistress" after Nietzsche's own heart? But does that not contradict everything Nietzsche (seemingly) writes about the relationship between man and "woman" and how it ought to be?

Enough food for thought for the conversation documented below, which I was able to have with her on the morning of the following day in Anja's apartment in the west of the city. The nervousness had now clearly given way to anticipation, because I now knew that what Anja, who was present at the meeting, had told me in our preliminary talk was true: "We only bite when we are paid to do so." I was ready to learn something new: about a fascinating form of eroticism, about Nietzsche, about the complexity of the phenomenon of "power," about modern feminism—and perhaps even about myself and my own prejudices...

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Figure 1: The poster for MissT and Anja's workshop on the "black" board at the HGB Leipzig (Photo: Paul Stephan).

I. Who is MissT? What is a "Somatrix"?

Paul Stephan: MissT, let's start from the very beginning: Who are you, and what is your connection to the topic of erotic female dominance?

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MissT: Well, professionally, I go by "MissT." I describe myself as a "Somatrix," a term I coined by combining "dominatrix" with5 somatic work. As perhaps became clear in yesterday's workshop, the somatic aspect—the bodywork I perform when I dominate someone—is crucial to me: breathing, the nervous system, sensory perceptions. These are usually far more important for achieving a result with pain. It’s not about pain for pain’s sake, but about the somatic work with the body.

For me, female dominance didn't start as BDSM or kink in a sexual sense. From a very early age, people always said about me: "She always has the last word," "She's always the ringleader..." And in the socialization we’ve experienced as men and women, that’s generally something that wasn't encouraged in girls and young women, or later on. My whole life, I was told that what I was doing was wrong: I was too loud, too much, too bossy. It wasn't until my professional life that I realized this female leadership quality, paired with empathy and self-embodiment, is actually a great asset. It helped me a lot in the political education work I do, and later in local government work in New Zealand, especially when dealing with men. I now know how to use what I have. I don't want to be manipulative, but I can guide people so that they ultimately do what I want them to do. However, for me, this is always about governance for the common good—don't get me wrong, Paul—so that I can, for example, secure funding to make a difference for the community.  

In my professional life, I learned that: leadership,change management – those are the corporate wordsthat people use – and what you learn there is something I can combine very well with my sexuality and my sexual preferences. I first figured that out for myself personally and then eventually started performing it at private parties. People eventually said, "You've been doing this forever, haven't you? You're really good at it. You could actually charge money for this." So, I thought, why not give it a try? It was received quite well, and quite quickly, so I thought: Okay, now you have your two or three regular clients, now you need to find a dungeon6 ... And so one thing led to another.

So, this feminine dominance or authority didn't come from me waking up one morning and deciding I wanted to be a dominatrix. There is a long process of socialization behind it, and above all, a rebellion against the socialization that keeps us all, as women, small. And this whole narrative—male, female; women are like this, men are like that: What do we do with that now?—is a huge problem and a massive topic today.

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PS: So, is your work as a Somatrix a side job?

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MissT: Yes, you could say that. A lot has changed for me in the last year and a half. Last May, I left my job in New Zealand, where I had worked for the local government for eight years, and returned to Europe. I actually wanted to travel a bit and have a good time, and during that time, I started charging more for my dom work. When I got stuck in Lisbon, Portugal, I delved deeper into it, made more contacts, found a dungeon that I share with other dominatrixes, and did this work full-time for a while. Of course, it was just enough to keep me afloat, and now that I'm in Europe, I'm working in educational policy for NGOs, drawing on the experience from my old jobs in Germany.

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PS: Interesting. One would think—though this is obviously a stereotype—that you would make an incredible amount of money as a dominatrix...

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MissT: You can make anything an incredible amount of money.

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P.S.: Fair point, I’m sure there are philosophers who are millionaires too…

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MissT: I recently took part in a kind of "matriarchal" business course. It was hosted by a friend of mine who has been offering these kinds of courses for years and makes a lot of money doing it. She’s really great at it, and her modules focus a lot on that feminine presence, which she also radiates as a person. And that’s when it hit me: If you have a good idea and stay firm in your values and vision, you can make an incredible amount of money. You just have to be an authentic person. You have to sell yourself as the person you actually are. The only question is: Do you do it? Do you put in the time, the energy, and the work it takes—and we’re not just talking about Instagram, marketing, newsletters, and all that; there is so much behind it to really build it up, and I’m still in the early stages. I’ve been doing it a bit more intensively for about six to nine months now. But it takes time. I’d rather play it safe for now and do my political education work; I know the money comes in there, and I can slowly build up the rest in parallel.

And sure, there are dominas—you can easily find them on Instagram—who make thousands of euros a month because they’ve positioned themselves so well that they offer real added value, serve a specific niche, and offer something unique. They don’t sell themselves short, either. It’s not about a foot fetish session for €80 anymore; nobody does that. You really have to position yourself so that you only get the people you want, who are also willing to pay the appropriate price for it.

In that regard, I’m unfortunately poorly positioned in Portugal because the purchasing power here is so low. You have the wealthy expats—Russians, Ukrainians, Americans, Brits, a few Germans—who have money, but the Portuguese, not so much. The minimum wage is currently around €8 an hour, so you can imagine what they earn a month… And at €150 an hour, how are they supposed to afford that? So that’s my biggest problem. And in Berlin… It’s so oversaturated in my view, so I’m not even interested in that. Sure, I can find spaces there that I can book as a domina, but then I need clients who specifically request me on that day—and that’s just way too exhausting for me again… So you have to position yourself, but you do that in every profession if you’re freelance and "self-employed and constantly working."

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PS: Yes, I know what you’re talking about… But would your dream be to be able to live off it exclusively?

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MissT: Well, social justice has always been extremely important to me. Everything should always be as ethical and morally defensible as possible, and that brings a lot of pressure regarding what you expect from yourself and what you want to put out into the world… In the political education work I did for over ten years, I always felt: Okay, you’re doing something here, you see the result, how people develop, how they shed their racism… I held so many workshops on stereotypes, privilege, racism, and so on, where I always realized: Awesome, this is what I want to do for the rest of my life. And then I slipped into this other track, and I’m realizing: Hmm, that doesn’t actually contradict it at all; it overlaps quite well. I can have one leadership role here and the other there, and both work so well for me because they each serve things I need, and I wouldn’t want to choose between them now. I want to keep doing both and make money with both. That’s what matters to me.

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Figure 2: It was clear to Paul Stephan beforehand that he didn’t need to worry about the whip when approaching women. However, he definitely shouldn’t forget his copy of the Zarathustra! (MissT; Photo: Anja)

II. Male vs. Female Power // In Search of Intensity

PS: Yes, the topic of "power"—we’re slowly heading toward Nietzsche here. I once heard a professional psychological lecture where a model of different personality types was presented: achievement-oriented, relationship-oriented, power-oriented. And the subject of the research was really the "power person." That’s a very negatively charged term at first, but the psychologist argued quite convincingly back then that people often have a wrong idea about it. A "power person" could also be Mother Teresa or the Pope, because in this understanding, "power" initially just means that you influence other people—which can mean you harm them, but it can just as easily manifest in the opposite way.

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MissT: "Power" is a very interesting term because you can look at it from so many different angles. Let’s look at political power, like Donald Trump. Is that power? Is that powerful? Yes, of course, he is one of the most powerful men in the world, but does he do anything good with it? Probably not, at least from my perspective. Then you just mentioned Mother Teresa, although she is highly controversial now, too. She really exploited the women who followed her; they had to give up their whole lives to follow this one person. A structure like that very quickly takes on cult-like traits—and religion always has that negative aftertaste of: "We are all following this one guru, this one leader, because they are doing something so great, something so good for the world." But the followers are actually the ones who suffer greatly under this pressure and under the way they are groomed; there are endless examples of that.

When I look for a counterexample, for an example of a positive exercise of power, I always like to take Jacinda Ardern, who was Prime Minister of New Zealand from 2017 to 2023, when I lived there. For me, she is the epitome of how power can be used in a positive, responsible way. She held a powerful office, but led the country with so much empathy, with so much outward vulnerability… She was always transparent about how she was doing, why she was finding something difficult, why things had to happen a certain way. She went through three huge catastrophes. We had a volcanic eruption, we had the 2019 terrorist attack on two mosques in Christchurch, we had Covid—and all that while she was pregnant and holding a baby! So this woman really achieved something! And in the end, she still said: "Okay guys, I’ve been doing this for five years now, it’s been an exhausting time, I have to stop now because I don’t have the necessary support from my own parliament after Covid, and I notice there’s too big a rift in society. I just don’t think I can do it anymore." – Which male politician would say: "I’ve been in power for 30, 40 years"—I’m thinking of Putin—"I don’t think I’ve got it anymore, I’m going to step down now." Who does that? Nobody! Women do that. Because women reflect, because women know the emotional side of themselves, because women value things other than power-hunger and that dynamic—and if you combine all that into one big whole, then you’re also a good domina.

So this connection of empathy, of my own body awareness, paired with an understanding of the other person’s body, of moral and ethical sensitivity—What am I doing here? How do I want to do this right?—and reflexivity: constantly going back and forth in the learning process. For me, it’s not like: I’ll do it this way, and that’s a routine I follow that always works. For me, it’s always also: What is happening with this body right now? What is it bringing with it? Where was it today? Where am I today? Where do I stand? Yes, and then also this cyclical nature, seeing it as women: Oh God, yes, when I’m ovulating, and then it’s a full moon too… My energy is so wild then; that’s a day where I sit down, I write for three hours, and I think I’m putting the coolest things in the world on paper. Then I definitely want to do a dungeon session that day because I think: Today they’ll get the most out of me. Then I usually want to go party afterward, and I’m completely wiped out afterward because I’m drawing from such an energetic wave: Everything is on, everything is turned on. And this turned that’s one way of looking at it, I suppose: If you’re turned on by yourself and by life itself, that's the powerful thing to harvestright? If you’re turned on by yourself and by life itself—that’s the powerful thing you can draw strength from.

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PS: That sentence could almost have come from Nietzsche. The idea that you should affirm life and yourself is a very Nietzschean concept; it might even be his core philosophy, I’d say.

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MissT: Didn't he always have this intense craving for intensity? Everything had to be intense: taking risks, trying new things, everything had to be extreme so that you could transcend yourself. Which is something we still do today. Nobody says: "I'm learning new things while sitting here on the sofa." That’s my comfort zone—you push yourself out of that a little bit, and then you realize: "Hey, that was great, I learned something." I think philosophers recognized that very early on, but bringing that into the mainstream—well, good luck with that.

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To be continued.

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Article imageMissT; photo by Anja

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"MissT" studied cultural work in Potsdam and is currently employed (alongside her work as a somatrix) as an educational policy advisor for a German NGO in Lisbon. She lived in New Zealand for a long time, where she worked in community management (community management) and the events sector at the local government level. She has been involved with dance and singing since childhood, which is also where her somatic bodywork has its origins.

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Footnotes

1:Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Old and Young Women. Thomas Common's translation. Ed. note: It's important to note that in the German original, there's a slight lingual nuance in this famous text which is hardly translatable. In the title, Nietzsche uses the term "Weiblein" to refer to women, in most parts of the speech "Weib". In this famous sentence, the vocabulary switches, however, to "Frauen". "Weib" is the traditional word for woman and is etymologically linked to the term "wife". In Nietzsche's days, it used to be a neutral term, in modern German, it's considered pejorative. "Weiblein" is the diminutive form of "Weib", thus meaning something like "little women". "Frau", however, used to be a more polite word, referring specifically to women of social status, i. e. women worthy of respect. One could translate it as "lady". This often overlooked nuance is a key element of Paul Stephan's interpretation of this sentence. It's an indicator that the whip could be considered a tool of the "lady", not of the man who fears her power. This interpretation will be discussed in more detail in the Interview's third part.

2: A perhaps amusing side note: I mistook these suspension devices for bondage equipment. Anja kindly pointed out my error.

3: In The Birth of Tragedy , Nietzsche speaks of a "Dionysian phenomenon" that "reveals to us again and again the playful construction and destruction of the world of the individual as the outflow of a primordial joy, in a similar way to how Heraclitus the Obscure compares the world-building force to a child who playfully sets stones here and there and builds sandcastles only to knock them down again" (sec. 24) and considers the "mixture of lust and cruelty," "that phenomenon where pain awakens pleasure, where the jubilation of the breast tears agonizing tones from it," to be the defining characteristic of the pleasure of "Dionysian revelers" (sec. 2).

4: Cf. my previous remarks on this in the interview I conducted with Andreas Urs Sommer for our magazine (link).

5: Ed. note: The term "Domina," from the Latin for "mistress" (often "Dominatrix" in English, from the feminine form of dominator, "ruler"), refers to an erotic service provider in the femdom sector—though most dominas do not offer "sex" in the conventional sense; on the contrary, they value their "untouchability" and focus entirely on various BDSM practices ranging from role-playing (mistress/slave, doctor/patient, teacher/student...) to physical discipline and bondage.

6: Ed. note: In the BDSM scene, a "dungeon" refers to a specially equipped facility, usually consisting of several rooms, that can be rented for "sessions."

"Thou goest to women? …"

‍

A Conversation about Nietzsche and Erotic Female Dominance with the Dominatrix MissT

Part I: In the Dungeon of the "Somatrix"

"Thou goest to women? Do not forget thy whip!"1 – Hardly any sentence by Nietzsche is more famous – and more frequently misunderstood. Our editor Paul Stephan met with professional dominatrix MissT to discuss the "other" interpretation of the quote and her work. To what extent can Nietzsche's insights inspire a woman like MissT in her profession? Is there an affinity between BDSM practices, female dominance, and Nietzsche's philosophy of Dionysian transgression, the intertwining of pleasure and violence, and the affirmation of the body? Who are MissT's clients, and what does she learn in her line of work about masculinity, femininity, power, and eroticism that might be relevant to us all? Could erotic female dominance be understood as applied Nietzscheanism – and serve as a source of inspiration for contemporary feminist practice? And what about Nietzsche as a person?

In the first part of this three-part interview, read about how Paul Stephan came to meet MissT, who she is, and what motivates her.

Public Enemy and Beacon of Hope

Nietzsche in the Soviet Union Part I: Official Censorship and Reinterpretation

Public Enemy and Beacon of Hope

‍

Nietzsche in the Soviet Union

‍

Part I: Official Censorship and Reinterpretation

‍

7.11.26
Vitalii Mudrakov

The October Revolution, which took place on November 6 and 7, 1917, according to the Western calendar, was one of the most pivotal events in world history. For the first time in history, one of the world's largest nations was to not only establish a republic but also end the era of private ownership of the means of production and the soil and build a completely classless society. In "A Sixth of the World"—the proud title of a 1926 Soviet film by Dziga Vertov that celebrates the Soviet Union's achievements and showcases its diverse peoples—socialism was to prevail, and a "new man" was even to be created.

It was an experiment that failed, yet it shaped the history of the 20th century like no other and remains a subject of debate to this day: Was it doomed to fail from the start? Was the price of the undeniable, gigantic successes of this vast empire too high? At what exact point did it take a wrong turn?

Nietzsche would likely have chosen the first answer—and conversely, he was, to put it mildly, not exactly the most popular philosopher in the Soviet Union. He was considered a bourgeois reactionary and a mastermind of fascism; his writings were removed from libraries and censored, and academic engagement with his work was virtually impossible. At the same time, individual motifs of his philosophy lived on in revolutionary culture, in literature, and in the vision of a "new man"—often without ever mentioning his name.

In this two-part series, Ukrainian philosopher Vitalii Mudrakov provides an overview of the reception of Nietzsche in the country where he was born, which has long since ceased to exist. The first part examines the official attempts to censor Nietzsche's thought and interpret it solely through the lens of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The second part will focus on the unofficial, subversive reception of Nietzsche.

The October Revolution, which took place on November 6 and 7, 1917, according to the Western calendar, was one of the most pivotal events in world history. For the first time in history, one of the world's largest nations was to not only establish a republic but also end the era of private ownership of the means of production and build a completely classless society. In "A Sixth of the World"—the proud title of a 1926 Soviet film by Dziga Vertov that celebrates the Soviet Union's achievements and showcases its diverse peoples—socialism was to prevail, and a "new man" was even to be created. It was an experiment that failed, yet it shaped the history of the 20th century like no other and remains a subject of debate to this day: Was it doomed to fail from the start? Was the price of the undeniable, gigantic successes of this vast empire too high? At what exact point did it take a wrong turn? Nietzsche would likely have chosen the first answer—and conversely, he was, to put it mildly, not exactly the most popular philosopher in the Soviet Union. He was considered a bourgeois reactionary and a mastermind of fascism; his writings were removed from libraries and censored, and academic engagement with his work was virtually impossible. At the same time, individual motifs of his philosophy lived on in revolutionary culture, in literature, and in the vision of a "new man"—often without ever mentioning his name. In this two-part series, Ukrainian philosopher Vitalii Mudrakov provides an overview of the reception of Nietzsche in the country where he was born, which has long since ceased to exist. The first part examines the official attempts to censor Nietzsche's thought and interpret it solely through the lens of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The second part will focus on the unofficial, subversive reception of Nietzsche.

The Philosophical Party Membership Card or New Rules for a New Philosophy

Friedrich Nietzsche is one of those figures in European intellectual history whose presence is impossible to overlook and who cannot simply be dismissed or overruled by political decree. While his texts could be removed from bookstores, libraries, and curricula, his ideas continued to circulate in the intellectual sphere, shaping language, imagery, ways of thinking, and cultural concepts. For this reason, Nietzsche’s position and role in the Soviet Union are of great interest, both to researchers studying the history of his influence and the specifics of his reception, and to those seeking to understand the functional mechanisms of a totalitarian culture.

In the early years of Soviet rule, philosophy had not yet been definitively reduced to a uniform party canon, but the direction of its future realignment was already becoming apparent very early on. A telling example of this is the definition of the tasks for the journal Under the Banner of Marxism1 by Lenin in March 1922, in language that left little room for academic innocence: the journal was to become a "militant organ" and engage in the "relentless exposure and persecution" of representatives of contemporary philosophical reaction, who, following Josef Dietzgen, were labeled "diplomaed lackeys of clericalism."2 In the same year, this "persecution" took on a literal meaning: Berdyaev, Lossky, and other leading thinkers, including attentive readers and interpreters of Nietzsche, were expelled from the Soviet Union. Among them was Semyon Frank (1877–1950), a representative of religious philosophy who had already published the study Fr. Nietzsche and the Ethics of 'Love for the Furthest' in 1902.

The expulsion of philosophers was only one method of organizing the new intellectual space; according to the authorities, it was also necessary to put books in order. As early as 1923, the Main Committee for Political Education (Glavpolitprosvet; or Glavlit for short), led by Nadezhda Krupskaya, issued the Instruction for the Review of Library Book Collections and the Removal of Counter-Revolutionary and Artistically Inferior Literature3. It not only regulated the procedure for purging libraries but also established normative categories for undesirable literature, leaving local authorities enough leeway to continue the culling process according to the prescribed ideological criteria. The following year, the "Model Lists of Books for the Instruction on the Purging of Libraries"4 appeared—lists also known as "Krupskaya’s blacklists"—in which Nietzsche was included among the undesirable philosophical literature. Maxim Gorky provided an almost ironic commentary from a contemporary on this concern for proper reading: in a letter to Vladislav Khodasevich dated November 8, 1923, which the latter later published in his memoirs, the writer indignantly listed the banned authors: "Plato, Kant, Schopenhauer, Vl. Solovyov, Taine, Ruskin, Nietzsche..."5.

A continuation of the general "intellectual education" of the working class, which was also to extend to philosophical work, was the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) of January 25, 1931. This now demanded that the journal Under the Banner of Marxismbe a "militant organ of Marxism-Leninism," consistently implement the "Leninist principle of partisanship in philosophy," engage in "merciless criticism of all anti-Marxist" positions, and train "philosophical cadres hardened in the Bolshevik spirit."6 From then on, philosophy was to possess a kind of party membership card : The right to think remained, but its validity depended on conformity with the party's general line. In 1938, Stalin formulated this construct with extreme brevity: "Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist party."7

However, Soviet library policy later developed a far more subtle instrument than the mere disappearance of a bookthe SPEZCHRAN (special collection). An undesirable text could physically remain in a large library while simultaneously ceasing to be a book for the ordinary reader; Glavlit’s secret order No. 10 of October 25, 1938, already explicitly regulated the establishment of these "special collections"8, their registration, storage, and use.9 The ban thus transformed into a gradation of access: the decisive factor was no longer just what one was allowed to read, but also who was permitted to do so. This possibility was open to only a few. With regard to Nietzsche’s fate in the USSR, literary scholar Elmar Schenkel aptly describes this process as a "renaissance of the poison cabinets."10

The space created in this way—cleansed of a portion of independent interpreters, disciplined by the principle of party-mindedness, and equipped with a single, supposedly correct worldview—obviously left little room for the open development of Nietzsche’s thought. But if the repressive apparatus could control publications and names, was it also capable of controlling the movement of ideas and their implicit or, in a sense, subterranean development? This is what we must now clarify by focusing our analytical lens on the identification of possible forms of the philosopher’s presence in the USSR .

Of course, it would be quite an undertaking to track down the entire Nietzsche in the entire Soviet Union —a task for which even several five-year plans would likely not suffice. We therefore make no claim to an exhaustive reconstruction of his Soviet fate, but merely propose a possible perspective for its interpretation: the distinction between official and unofficial forms of Nietzsche’s presence, which we intend to illustrate using a few selected, telling examples.

The first of these forms is the emergence of an official Nietzsche—an ideologically constructed image of the thinker who was allowed to be mentioned primarily so that he could be unmasked in accordance with the directives of party leaders. Less obvious is another form, the contours of which emerge from our question regarding the possible forms of his presence: Does Nietzsche remain present in hiding—that is, do his concepts, motifs, and intuitions enter into new cultural and ideological constructions of the Soviet space in altered form, without necessarily referencing their source, or do they persist in intellectual milieus that were suppressed by Soviet ideology? These very questions will serve as our roadmap for the path ahead—for without them, in the thicket of Soviet bans, appropriations, silences, and reinterpretations of Nietzsche, it is all too easy to mistake the traces of his presence for proof of his absence.

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"The Official Nietzsche" or "Five Years Without Nietzsche—in Four Years!"

If one could remove Nietzsche’s books from library shelves, a more difficult problem remained: what was one to do with Nietzsche himself if, given his extraordinary influence, one still had to speak about him? At the beginning of the 1930s, the answer to this question was by no means clear. The case of the Ukrainian philosopher Petro Demchuk (born 1900) is revealing here. At first glance, he read Nietzsche entirely in line with the course set by the Soviet authorities—within the framework of the ideological confrontation with contemporary "bourgeois philosophy." Yet within this framework, there remained room for a far less unambiguous reading. In his essay "The Philosophical Wisdom of the Contemporary Bourgeoisie," published in 1930 in the journal The Red Path11 veröffentlichten Aufsatz „Die philosophische Weisheit der gegenwärtigen Bourgeoisie“12 For Demchuk, Nietzsche appeared not only as a subject for ideological debunking but also as an important source of newer European intellectual currents: citing the Baltic German writer Eduard von Keyserling, he characterized the philosopher as the "savior of the West" and the "first and greatest prophet of a new world rising."13 The fate of Demchuk himself showed just how narrow the line between required criticism and dangerous independence had become. As contemporary researchers note, engaging with Nietzsche became "literally dangerous, even from ideological positions." The case of Demchuk is considered particularly telling: "In his essay 'On the Philosophy of Fascism (Using the Example of the "Philosophy of Life" by Leopold Ziegler)'14 he traced the origins of Nietzscheanism. This was presumably one of the reasons he was accused of an uncritical understanding of the relationship between theory and practice, and in 1937, he was deported to a concentration camp and executed as a 'representative of Ukrainian national fascism.'"15 Admittedly, it would be an exaggeration to attribute the repression against Demchuk directly to his study of Nietzsche: it may have been merely one of several pretexts within a much broader mechanism of political persecution, to which the philosopher himself eventually fell victim. The Demchuk case highlighted the real problem: it was not enough to decide whether one was allowed to talk about Nietzsche or not—one also had to determine how he was to be read.

The Soviet nomenklatura found an answer quite quickly: the dangerous Nietzsche had to be issued a proper passport . One of the first clear attempts at such a classification can be found in the eighth volume of the official Literary Encyclopedia16 from 1934. The extensive article "Nietzsche" was written by Georg Lukács and Boris Mikhailovsky: the former provided a general characterization of the philosopher and his influence, while the latter examined the reception of Nietzsche in Russia separately.17 And this was by no means a randomly chosen forum: the multi-volume Literary Encyclopedia, which appeared within the institutional framework of the Communist Academy and the Soviet Encyclopedia18 publishing house, claimed to be an authoritative reference work on literature and culture. Including Nietzsche in its pages meant that the broad Soviet reading public was not simply presented with one of several possible interpretations, but rather a portrait of the philosopher in the name of official culture . Thus, the article "Nietzsche" in the Literary Encyclopedia served a very clear political function: the spread of Nietzscheanism in the USSR was linked to the increasing activity of "counter-revolutionary social groups," while his philosophy was interpreted from the perspective of its social function for the bourgeois reaction.

In the same year, Lukács summarized this interpretation in another essay, the title of which left the reader with little room for suspense: "Nietzsche as a Forerunner of Fascist Aesthetics"19: "There is not a single motif in fascist aesthetics that does not go back directly or indirectly to Nietzsche."20 Even before the "Nietzsche-Fascism" connection became one of the most persistent Soviet clichés, the fundamental coordinates of such a reading were already on the map: class origin, reaction, counter-revolution, fascism.

It is significant that this interpretation of Nietzsche did not remain merely a collection of individual ideological elaborations, but took on an institutionally developed form. As recent research21 Based on archival materials from the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Institute's editorial board worked specifically from April to December of the following year, 1935, on an anthology dedicated to the critique of fascism and racism. As part of this work, Ber Bernadiner's essay "Nietzscheanism in the Ideology of Fascism" was22 discussed, which became another model interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy for that era.23 Its fundamental interpretive framework reduced Nietzsche's doctrine primarily to the will to power and declared the politics of German and Italian fascism to be its practical realization. Knowledge was interpreted as an instrument of power, the critique of reason as an apology for instinct and illusion, hierarchy as a justification for subjugation, and the eternal recurrence as a denial of social progress and even as an expression of racism. It was therefore no longer merely a matter of banning or negatively evaluating Nietzsche, but of establishing a specific normative interpretive framework that determined the form in which Nietzsche could be portrayed in official Soviet discourse.

This interpretive framework was not limited to a single text or a single author. Researcher Julia Sineokaya reconstructs the formation of what she calls the Soviet "anti-Nietzsche" and traces its further development in the writings and lectures of a whole series of Soviet philosophers—including Abram Deborin and Boris Bychowski.24 In the following years, this perspective was refined and supplemented, as if adjusting the way in which Nietzsche was to be visible to the Soviet reader. The aforementioned researcher points out that in a lecture in April 1935, Deborin explicitly rejected the possibility of any rapprochement between Nietzsche and Marx, socialism, anarchism, or materialism, and characterized his perspectivism as "absolute voluntarism and optical illusion."25 This perspective took on an even clearer political character during the war. In his essay "Nietzsche and Fascism," published in 1942 in the journal we are already familiar with, Under the Banner of Marxism published essay "Nietzsche and Fascism"26 Boris Bychowski slotted Nietzsche’s philosophy into a nearly complete table of ideological correspondences: the pathos of distance became a justification for social hierarchy and exploitation, master-slave morality became the ethics of "rulers, rapists, and masters," and the eternal recurrence became a negation of the idea of social progress.27 Nietzsche himself ultimately appeared as a "reservoir for Nazi propaganda."28 The anti-Nietzsche thus increasingly acquired its own canon: the philosopher remained present in the Soviet intellectual sphere, albeit as a specifically constructed negative image of his teachings. The paradox here was that even the production of such an anti-Nietzsche required reading Nietzsche – if only to be able to explain ever more precisely why one should not read him.

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Figure 1: Stepan Oduyev’s study Tropami Zaratustry from 1971 was also published in German in the GDR. Cover of the 1977 translation by Günther Rieske (image source). The book was published simultaneously as a licensed edition in West Germany.

The State-sanctioned Nietzsche Expert

It can be said that this image underwent its final systematization in the works of Stepan Oduyev (1918–2012), whose position in Soviet Nietzsche research was almost unique. Today’s scholars of Nietzsche’s reception in this region almost unanimously describe him as effectively the only officially recognized Nietzsche researcher in the USSR.29 In this way, we encounter a kind of authorized expert who mediated between Nietzsche and the Soviet reader. The institutional origin of his first major work speaks for itself: The Reactionary Nature of Nietzscheanism30 was published in 1959 by the publishing house of the Higher Party School and the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the CPSU. Oduyev himself noted at the beginning of the book that Marxist studies on Nietzsche remained rare and were primarily concerned with clarifying the connection between Nietzscheanism and the ideology and politics of fascism. In doing so, he effectively aligned his own work with the already familiar line of Bernardiner, Bychowski, and other authors of the preceding decades.31 Now, however, this line received a much more systematic elaboration: the "transvaluation of all values" was interpreted as reactionary, the eternal recurrence as a campaign against social progress, the will to power as a distortion of social conditions, and the Übermensch as a reactionary myth, while Nietzsche’s hierarchical thinking was said to lead to anti-democratism, racism, and the glorification of war.32 Oduyev formulated the actual task of such a reading with telling candor: Nietzscheanism was to be exposed as an "illusory theoretical anticipation and justification of the politics and practice of the monopoly bourgeoisie."33

It is significant, however, that the official interpretation of Nietzsche did not remain stagnant. In his much more extensive work published in 1971, On the Paths of Zarathustra34 Oduyev’s ideological judgment did not fundamentally change, but the study itself became noticeably more nuanced: he now acknowledged the extent and duration of Nietzsche’s influence on 20th-century philosophy, warned against reducing his thought to a series of political formulas, and set himself the task of tracing the various forms of the appropriation of Nietzscheanism in German philosophy.35 Between 1959 and 1971, it was not the official judgment of Nietzsche himself that changed, but rather the permissible complexity of his scholarly interpretation: the anti-Nietzsche could gradually become the subject of increasingly serious philosophical inquiry while simultaneously remaining within established ideological boundaries.

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Nietzsche in Soviet Reference Works

How the Nietzsche image developed by experts transitioned into normative Soviet knowledge is best seen not through specialized studies, but through histories of philosophy, dictionaries, and encyclopedias, in which the reader was, in a sense, provided with a brief set of instructions on how to properly handle Nietzsche. For instance, his doctrine was treated in the third volume of the six-volume History of Philosophy36 from 1959 within the context of the reactionary bourgeois philosophy of the imperialist era.37 This normative image stands out even more clearly in the Philosophical Dictionary38 which was published in 1963 under the editorship of Mark Rosenthal and Pavel Yudin by the Publishing House for Political Literature with a print run of 400,000 copies: Nietzsche is described here as "one of the precursors of fascist ideology," and his philosophy is characterized, among other things, by a hatred for the "spirit of revolution" and the masses of the people.39

Eleven years later, the third edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia40 already a somewhat different "official Nietzsche": While Alexander Mikhailov's article maintains the characterization of his philosophy as irrationalism and voluntarism, it deals more extensively with his works, the Apollonian and Dionysian principles, his cultural criticism, the will to power, and his influence on later European thought. The ideological safeguards, however, had by no means disappeared: in the end, the reader was reminded of the use of Nietzscheanism by the ideologues of German fascism, and Oduyev's work was included among the recommended literature. On the Paths of Zarathustra.41 It thus becomes clear that the official Nietzsche was allowed to become more complex in the 1970s, yet one still did not want to leave him unsupervised: the philosophical content increased, but the ideological framework continued to define the boundaries of his interpretation.

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Nietzsche Beyond the Soviet Center

The Moscow canon naturally provided the normative framework for the publications of the individual Soviet republics as well. However, local academic circles reveal how differently this framework functioned on the ground. In the second edition of the Ukrainian Philosophical Dictionary42, which was published in 1986 under the editorship of Volodymyr Shynkaruk, there was no separate entry for Nietzsche at all. Instead, "Nietzscheanism" was defined as a "reactionary ideological current," which was, however, already associated with the philosophy of irrationalism and subjectivism as well as with the "latest mythology of the bourgeoisie."43

In Georgia, this framework took on a noticeably more flexible form over time. While Alexandre Kutelia published a text in Tbilisi in 1944 with the telling title The Origins of the Ideology of German Fascism (Nietzsche and Fascism)44 ,45 Tamaz Buachidze dedicated an extensive, independent chapter to Nietzsche in his 1986 book At the Origins of Modern Bourgeois Philosophy: A. Schopenhauer, F. Nietzsche, S. Kierkegaard46 which included an independent analysis of nihilism, the will to power, the Übermensch, and eternal recurrence. The ideological framework remains recognizable here as well: Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Kierkegaard are linked to the "deep crisis" of bourgeois society, and the objective of the study includes a "critical evaluation" of their teachings.47 Avtandil Popiashvili, a senior research fellow at the same Institute of Philosophy, moved even further away from the familiar anti-Nietzsche stance in his monograph The Problem of the Individual in the Philosophy of S. Kierkegaard and F. Nietzsche48 (1988). The focus of his interpretation was now the individual and their search for a worldview-based orientation, while Nietzsche’s "death of God" and the Übermensch were viewed in the context of the crisis of European culture. The associations with racism, fascism, or class-based reaction, which were characteristic of the Soviet anti-Nietzsche, did not determine the explicitly formulated research framework of the work.49

The few episodes I have found do not, of course, provide a complete map of the "Baltic Nietzsche." However, they do reveal something that is even more important for our presentation: even in neighboring Soviet republics and at almost the same time, the boundaries of what could be said about the philosopher could be surprisingly different. As late as 1980, the then Minister of Education of the Estonian SSR, Ferdinand Eisen, reproduced in the republican pedagogical journal Soviet School50 almost the classic Soviet anti-Nietzsche: the philosopher appeared as an "ideologue of the German reactionary bourgeoisie and the landed gentry," his doctrine as directed against the class struggle of the proletariat and socialism. Nietzsche’s philosophy itself was described as a "reactionary, racist ideology" that had become "one of the most important theoretical sources of fascist ideology."51 Already the following year, we encounter a different case and, what is particularly important, a different institutional environment: the Lithuanian philosopher Zenonas Burnys dealt in the philosophical journal Problems52 with Nietzsche’s ethics as an independent philosophical problem. In doing so, he no longer subjected Nietzsche himself to criticism from Leninist-Stalinist-Marxist positions, but instead critically examined the limitations of neo-Thomist Nietzsche criticism in interwar Lithuania.53 The "proper passport" that Soviet culture had issued to Nietzsche in the 1930s thus proved to be a document of long validity. Yet even in neighboring republics, the entries made in it could differ significantly.

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Thaw in the Late USSR

The differences between the individual Soviet republics were, however, only one manifestation of a more comprehensive change that emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s. The intensity of academic interest is already revealing: according to research calculations, of the ten dissertations54 on Nietzsche that were defended in the USSR between 1938 and 1988, six were from the last decade of that period.55 Even more revealing, however, is the shift in the themes being addressed. Recent studies show that while Nietzsche was previously the subject of dissertations primarily in the context of fascism, imperialism, or the "reactionary nature" of Nietzscheanism, research interest has now gradually shifted toward the internal complexities of his philosophy: in 1979, nihilism in Nietzsche and Heidegger was examined; in 1981, Nietzsche's philosophical development; in 1985, his epistemological views; and in 1986, his philosophical-aesthetic conception.56 However, the old vocabulary remained recognizable: at times, Nietzsche was still classified as part of "modern German bourgeois philosophy," and echoes of the mandatory ideological critique still resonated. Thus, it was not Nietzsche's official status that had changed, but rather what one dared to ask about him: nihilism, the development of his thought, Dionysus, epistemology, and aesthetics.

Researchers emphasize that these changes concerned not only the subjects of study but also the question of what one was now permitted to read about Nietzsche. A particularly clear signal was the scientific-analytical overview published in 1984 by Iskra Andreyeva for the Institute of Scientific Information in the Social Sciences of the USSR Academy of Sciences (INION AN SSSR), which was intended for restricted official use by academy staff. This work already addressed recent international Nietzsche research and the most important trends in its development.57 An almost paradoxical situation emerged: the state that had denazified so much after 1945 was unable to denazify Nietzsche for the general public. Abroad, his texts and their interpretations had long led a different academic life, while in the USSR, access to this new Nietzsche was initially opened literally through official channels .  

By the end of the decade, the shift had finally become unmistakable. In 1989, the journal Questions of Philosophy58 published the first two main sections of Beyond Good and Evil. The accompanying editorial text sounded almost like an admission regarding the results of the preceding decades: "Nietzsche's work is very little known to the Soviet reader." Subsequently, the publication was declared the beginning of a "difficult task of researching and appropriately interpreting his philosophy."59 In its introduction, the editorial board formulated a downright revolutionary thesis: "The most accurate definition of the will to power in Nietzsche is 'self-overcoming,' not the striving for dominance, rank, honors, and other consequences of the subordination of some people to others."60 The path from the "reactionary nature of Nietzscheanism" to the demand for its "appropriate interpretation" had thus been covered—at least by individual representatives of a narrow and strictly controlled academic stratum.

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To be continued.

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Article image

Gustav Klutsis: On World October (1932) (image source)

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Vitalii Mudrakov is a philosopher born in Ukraine. He studied music, ethics, and aesthetics at the Humanitarian Pedagogical Academy (Khmelnytskyi, Ukraine), followed by philosophy and religious studies at the Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University (Ukraine). He has been living and conducting research in Germany since 2022. After academic positions at the Friedrich Nietzsche College of the Klassik Stiftung Weimar, the Cluster of Excellence "Religion and Politics" at the University of Münster, and the Center for Religious Studies (CERES) at Ruhr University Bochum, he is currently a fellow of the Philipp Schwartz Initiative of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation at the Friedrich Nietzsche College in Weimar. Furthermore, he is academically affiliated with the Leibniz Institute for the History and Culture of Eastern Europe (GWZO) in Leipzig.  

His research focuses on the reception of Nietzsche in Ukraine, the methodologies and methods of Nietzsche’s philosophizing—particularly in their various manifestations within his epistemology—as well as philosophy in times of crisis. Another focus is the development of a concept of "identity security" (identity security) in the context of national identity, cultural transformations, and social crises.

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Footnotes

1: In Russian: Под знаменем марксизма.

2: Lenin, V. I. (1970): On the Significance of Militant Materialism. In: Полное собрание сочинений. 5th ed. Vol. 45. Moscow: Publishing House for Political Literature, pp. 23–33. https://ru.djvu.online/file/F2WvIoLBUdDX6

3: In Russian: Инструкция о пересмотре книжного состава библиотек и изъятию контр-революционной и анти-художественной литературы.

4: In Russian: Примерные списки книг к инструкции по очистке библиотек.

5: Khodasevich, Vladislav (1989): Memories of Gorky. Moscow: Pravda, p. 23.

6: Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (1931): Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) "On the Journal 'Under the Banner of Marxism'" of January 25, 1931. https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/445920-postanovlenie-tsk-vkp-b-o-zhurnale-locale-nil-pod-znamenem-marksizma-locale-nil-25-yanvarya-1931-g?

7: Stalin, I. V. (1997): On Dialectical and Historical Materialism. In: Works. Vol. 14. Moscow: Pisatel, p. 253. https://grachev62.narod.ru/stalin/t14/t14_55.htm

8: In Russian: special collections.

9: Order No. 10/s (1938): Order of the Plenipotentiary of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the Protection of Military Secrets in the Press and Head of Glavlit "On the Organization of Special Collections in Libraries" of October 25, 1938. In: History of Soviet Political Censorship. Documents and Commentaries. Moscow, 1997, pp. 492–493 (https://opentextnn.ru/censorship/russia-after-1917/institutions-after-1917/central-censorship-organization/glavlit/1922-1938-glavlit/instrukcii-cirkuljary/1938-25-oktjabrja-prikaz-10-upolnomochennogo-snk-sssr-po-ohrane-voennyh-tajn-v-pechati-i-nachalnik-glavlita-ob-organizacii-osobyh-fondov-bibliotek). The original document is kept in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF): Fund R-9425, Inventory 1, File 2, sheets 32–34. The order was marked "SECRET" and regulated the establishment, registration, storage, and use of materials in the special collections of libraries. However, it did not initiate the practice of special collections, which had already emerged much earlier, but rather documented the further institutionalization of a system of restricted access to literature. The history of its origin and functioning in the 1920s and 1930s has been examined in detail by Mikhail Zelenov. See: Zelenov, M. V. (2000): Special Collections (Spetskhran) and Historical Science in Soviet Russia in the 1920s–1930s. In: Otechestvennaya Istoriya, No. 2, pp. 129–141.

10: Schenkel, Elmar (2025): Nietzsche Global. Around the World in 80 Supermen. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, p. 178.

11: In Ukrainian: Chervonyi shliakh.

12: In Ukrainian: Philosophical Wisdom of the Modern Bourgeoisie.

13: Demchuk, P. (1930): Philosophical Wisdom of the Modern Bourgeoisie (On the Characterization of the Keyserling Philosophical School). In: Chervonyi shliakh, No. 10, p. 105. https://irbis-nbuv.gov.ua/ulib/item/ukr0000027048

14: Demchuk, P. (1930): On the Philosophy of Fascism (Regarding Leopold Ziegler’s "Philosophy of Life"). In: Prolitfront, No. 5–6, pp. 241–300.

15: Liutyi, Taras (2017): Nietzsche. Self-Overcoming. Kyiv: Tempora, p. 841.

16: In Russian: Literary Encyclopedia.

17: Lukács, G.; Mikhailovsky, B. (1934): Nietzsche. In: Literary Encyclopedia. Vol. 8. Moscow: OGIZ RSFSR, State Dictionary and Encyclopedic Publishing House "Soviet Encyclopedia", pp. 91–108. https://feb-web.ru/feb/litenc/encyclop/le8/le8-0911.htm. Ed. note: For more on Lukács’ reception of Nietzsche, see also the corresponding article by Moritz Pliska on this blog (link).

18: In Russian: Soviet Encyclopedia.

19: In Russian: Nietzsche as a Precursor of Fascist AestheticsEditor's note: The article was also published in German in 1934 and sparked intense controversy within the German leftist "emigrant community" in the context of the "Expressionism debate."

20: Lukács, György (1934): Nietzsche as a Precursor of Fascist Aesthetics. In: Literary Critic, No. 12, p. 27. https://libcat.ru/knigi/nauka-i-obrazovanie/kulturologiya/257113-georg-lukach-nicshe-kak-predshestvennik-fashistskoj-estetiki.html

21: Sineokaya, Yulia V. (2018): The Prohibited Nietzsche: Anti-Nietzscheanism in Soviet Russia. In: Studies in East European Thought 70, pp. 273–288. DOI: 10.1007/s11212-018-9315-3

23: In Russian: Nietzscheanism in the Ideology of Fascism.

23: Bernadiner, B. M. (1936): Nietzscheanism in the Ideology of Fascism. In: Against Fascist Obscurantism and Demagoguery: collection of articles. Edited by I. Dvorkin, A. Deborin, M. Kammari, M. Mishin, M. Savelyev. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, pp. 265–293. https://djvu.online/file/a2ukwIE2oQrYC?

24: Sineokaya, Yulia V. (2018): The Prohibited Nietzsche: Anti-Nietzscheanism in Soviet Russia. In: Studies in East European Thought 70, issue 4, pp. 280–282. DOI: 10.1007/s11212-018-9315-3

25: Deborin, A. M. (1935): Nietzsche's Philosophy. Transcript of a lecture from April 3, 1935. State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), f. R-5205, op. 1, d. 213, p. 3. Cited in: Sineokaya (2018), pp. 281–282.

26: In Russian: Nietzsche and Fascism.

27: Bykhovsky, B. E. (1942): Nietzsche and Fascism. In: Under the Banner of Marxism, No. 8–9, pp. 120, 123. Cf.: Sineokaya (2018), pp. 280–281.

28: Bykhovsky, B. E. (1942): Nietzsche and Fascism. In: Under the Banner of Marxism, No. 8–9, pp. 112–124. Cited in: Sineokaya (2018), pp. 280–281.

29: (1) Sineokaya, Y. V. (1999): The Reception of Nietzsche's Ideas in Russia: Main Stages, Trends, Significance. In: Friedrich Nietzsche and Philosophy in Russia. Ed. N. V. Motroshilova, Y. V. Sineokaya. St. Petersburg: Publishing House of the Russian Christian Humanitarian Institute, p. 35; (2) Lyutyi, Taras (2017): Nietzsche. Self-Overcoming. Kyiv: Tempora, p. 825.

30: In Russian: The Reactionary Essence of Nietzscheanism.

31: Oduyev, S. F. (1959): The Reactionary Essence of Nietzscheanism. Moscow: Publishing House of the Higher Party School and the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the CPSU, p. 4.

32: Oduyev, S. F. (1959): The Reactionary Essence of Nietzscheanism. Moscow: Publishing House of the Higher Party School and the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the CPSU, pp. 62–255.

33: Oduyev, S. F. (1959): The Reactionary Essence of Nietzscheanism. Moscow: Publishing House of the Higher Party School and the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the CPSU, p. 5.

34: In Russian: On the Paths of Zarathustra.

35: Oduyev, S. F. (1971): On the Paths of Zarathustra. The Influence of Nietzscheanism on German Bourgeois Philosophy. Moscow: Mysl, pp. 7–18.

36: In Russian: History of Philosophy.

37: History of Philosophy (1959): In 6 vols. Vol. 3. Moscow: Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, pp. 356–360.

38: In Russian: Philosophical Dictionary.

39: Philosophical Dictionary (1963): ed. by M. M. Rosenthal and P. F. Yudin. Moscow: Publishing House of Political Literature, pp. 310–311.

40: In Russian: Great Soviet Encyclopedia.

41: Mikhailov, Al. V. (1974): Nietzsche. In: Great Soviet Encyclopedia. 3rd ed. Vol. 18. Ed. by A. M. Prokhorov. Moscow: Soviet Encyclopedia. https://gufo.me/dict/bse/%D0%9D%D0%B8%D1%86%D1%88%D0%B5

42: In Ukrainian: Philosophical Dictionary.

43: Philosophical Dictionary (1986): Ed. by V. I. Shynkaruk. 2nd ed., rev. and exp. Kyiv: Main Editorial Office of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia, p. 449.

44: In Georgian: The Origins of the Ideology of German Fascism (Nietzsche and Fascism).

45: Kutelia, Alexandre (1944): The Origins of the Ideology of German Fascism (Nietzsche and Fascism). Tbilisi: Sakhelgami. For the position of this work in the history of Georgian Nietzsche reception, see: Nietzsche in Georgia (2007). Ed. by Tengiz Iremadze. Tbilisi: Arhe, p. 22. https://dspace.nplg.gov.ge/handle/1234/555461.

46: In Georgian: At the Origins of Modern Bourgeois Philosophy: A. Schopenhauer, F. Nietzsche, S. Kierkegaard.

47: Buachidze, Tamaz (1986): At the Origins of Modern Bourgeois Philosophy: A. Schopenhauer, F. Nietzsche, S. Kierkegaard. Tbilisi: Metsniereba, pp. 3–6, 76–87.

48: In Georgian: The Problem of the Individual in the Philosophy of S. Kierkegaard and F. Nietzsche.

49: Popiashvili, Avtandil (1988): The Problem of the Individual in the Philosophy of S. Kierkegaard and F. Nietzsche. Tbilisi: Metsniereba.

50: In Estonian: Nõukogude Kool.

51: Eisen, Ferdinand (1980): The Collapse of German Fascist Ideology in the Second World War. In: Nõukogude Kool, No. 5, pp. 4–5. http://www.digar.ee/id/nlib-digar:235792

52: In Lithuanian: Problemos.

53: Burnys, Zenonas (1981): On the Neo-Thomist Critique of F. Nietzsche's Ethics in Lithuania. In: Problemos, Vol. 26, pp. 84–87. DOI: https://doi.org/10.15388/Problemos.1981.26.6295.

54: Of the ten works, nine were candidate dissertations ("кандидатская диссертация" – roughly comparable to a PhD) and only one was a doctoral dissertation ("докторская диссертация" – as a higher academic qualification, roughly comparable to a habilitation), namely the work by Stepan Oduyev. Cf.: Sineokaya, Yulia V. (2018): The Prohibited Nietzsche: Anti-Nietzscheanism in Soviet Russia. In: Studies in East European Thought 70, p. 275. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-018-9315-3

55: Sineokaya, Yulia V. (2018): The Prohibited Nietzsche: Anti-Nietzscheanism in Soviet Russia. In: Studies in East European Thought 70, p. 275. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-018-9315-3.

56: Ibid.

57: Andreeva, I. S. (1984): Contemporary foreign research on Nietzsche's philosophy: a scientific-analytical reviewMoscow: INION AN SSSR. Cited in: Sineokaya (2018), p. 284.

58: In Russian: Voprosy Filosofii.

59: From the editors (1989). In: Voprosy Filosofii, No. 5, p. 112. https://imwerden.de/pdf/voprosy_filosofii_1989_05__ocr.pdf.

60: Ibid.

Public Enemy and Beacon of Hope

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Nietzsche in the Soviet Union

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Part I: Official Censorship and Reinterpretation

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The October Revolution, which took place on November 6 and 7, 1917, according to the Western calendar, was one of the most pivotal events in world history. For the first time in history, one of the world's largest nations was to not only establish a republic but also end the era of private ownership of the means of production and the soil and build a completely classless society. In "A Sixth of the World"—the proud title of a 1926 Soviet film by Dziga Vertov that celebrates the Soviet Union's achievements and showcases its diverse peoples—socialism was to prevail, and a "new man" was even to be created.

It was an experiment that failed, yet it shaped the history of the 20th century like no other and remains a subject of debate to this day: Was it doomed to fail from the start? Was the price of the undeniable, gigantic successes of this vast empire too high? At what exact point did it take a wrong turn?

Nietzsche would likely have chosen the first answer—and conversely, he was, to put it mildly, not exactly the most popular philosopher in the Soviet Union. He was considered a bourgeois reactionary and a mastermind of fascism; his writings were removed from libraries and censored, and academic engagement with his work was virtually impossible. At the same time, individual motifs of his philosophy lived on in revolutionary culture, in literature, and in the vision of a "new man"—often without ever mentioning his name.

In this two-part series, Ukrainian philosopher Vitalii Mudrakov provides an overview of the reception of Nietzsche in the country where he was born, which has long since ceased to exist. The first part examines the official attempts to censor Nietzsche's thought and interpret it solely through the lens of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The second part will focus on the unofficial, subversive reception of Nietzsche.

Heightened Idyll 2

Nietzsche and the Forest Part II: Overcoming Resentment. Idyll on the edge

Heightened Idyll

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Nietzsche and the Forest

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Part II: Overcoming discontent. Idyll on the edge

29.10.26
Michael Meyer-Albert

Nietzsche modifies the quintessentially German notion of the forest as an idyll, which our author described in the first part of this two-part series (link). This follow-up aims to precisely understand this modification and its significance for our time.

Nietzsche’s preferred landscape for thought is the high mountains. In this context, the forest becomes important as the tree line—a zone where life is just barely possible before it freezes. For Nietzsche, the timberline becomes the muse of a thinker who lives dangerously and always on the edge. Modernity can thus be described as a cultural high forest that is constantly on the verge of withering; the fading of the idyll of forest solitude is obvious to the Germans. Nietzsche’s stance is long past being an elitist attitude; in post-war modernity, for instance within various subcultures, it has become a mass mentality. In the current movement of social radicalization, however, we are observing a new kind of mass resentment—to escape it, we must relearn the art of shaping our own lives as a heroic idyll on the edge of the abyss.

Nietzsche modifies the quintessentially German notion of the forest as an idyll, which our author described in the first part of this two-part series (link). This follow-up aims to precisely understand this modification and its significance for our time. Nietzsche’s preferred landscape for thought is the high mountains. In this context, the forest becomes important as the tree line—a zone where life is just barely possible before it freezes. For Nietzsche, the timberline becomes the muse of a thinker who lives dangerously and always on the edge thinks. Modernity can thus be described as a cultural high forest that is constantly on the verge of withering; the fading of the idyll of forest solitude is obvious to the Germans. Nietzsche’s stance is long past being an elitist attitude; in post-war modernity, for instance within various subcultures, it has become a mass mentality. In the current movement of social radicalization, however, we are observing a new kind of mass resentment—to escape it, we must relearn the art of shaping our own lives as a heroic idyll on the edge of the abyss.

5. At the Tree Line

Nietzsche’s philosophy, which perceives and reflects upon the constitutive grounding of the mind in the body, addresses its existential tensions as differentiations of the understanding of a sublime life. Crucial to the theme of the forest is that Nietzsche moves away from the motif of the forest as a projection surface for sublimity. The "neutrality of great nature" no longer satisfies his ambitions; indeed, it even offends him as a kind of lèse-majesté:

The neutrality of great nature (in mountains, sea, forest, and desert) is pleasing, but only for a short time: afterwards, we become impatient. "Do these things have nothing to say to us? Are we not here for them?" The feeling arises of a crimen laesae majestatis humanae ["lèse-majesté against humanity"; MMA].1

The decisive inspiration for Nietzsche now becomes the forest in the sense of the tree line as a prelude to the vegetation limit. Forest solitude becomes life solitude. The landscape of his philosophy, the high alpine mountains – particularly the Swiss Upper Engadine around Sils Maria – provided him with illustrative examples for this.2 Nietzsche’s wandering thought explores the possibilities of psychic-symbolic vitality with regard to the death zone, which no longer permits human life. Here, his thinking finds an inspiring sublimity once again. In this, Nietzsche’s early intuition of the power of illusion becomes clear. Nietzsche’s answer to the question of being or non-being, posed by the tree line, is: appearance. For:

Could we imagine a humanization of dissonance – and what else is man? – then this dissonance, in order to be able to live, would need a magnificent illusion to cast a veil of beauty over its own essence.3

His realization that the conditions of life include exaggerating appearance as an impregnation with motivating illusions and transfigurations was something Nietzsche himself repeatedly pushed to the limit by seeking out intentional disillusionments on the verge of despair. Without the old European fundamental transfigurations shaped by Plato – the true is the good, the mind participates in it – and Augustine – fulfillment is coming, God is your intimate "thou" – life loses its structural idyll. Nietzsche repeatedly exposed himself to this.

His recognition of the truth of appearance thus refines itself into a fundamental insight into the economy of appearance in life as an interplay of filtering out and intensifying. In this way, the powers of transfiguration, which in the Western tradition had previously been attached to the concepts of Plato and Augustine, become conceivable as liberated psychic construction strategies. One must fashion for oneself the world in which one can live. Being as appearing. Appearance: as "reality once more, only in a selection, reinforcement, correction."4.

The forest as a tree line inoculates Nietzsche with thoughts that explore the conditions of the possibility of a successful life. He realizes: an idyll is more than a place; it is understood as a state. It becomes understandable as an equilibrium that embodies a successful coordination of filtering out and intensifying. Filtering out and intensifying are therefore not properties of the idyll. They become forces that first create the place where an idyll can exist. Life can thus design itself as a mixture of filtering out and intensifying. From the classical ora et labora (pray and work!) becomes a neo-classical secerne et densa (filter out and intensify!). For Nietzsche, the post-Platonic tragedy lies in the fact that this work of the existential idyll must also be carried out:

And this is a general law: every living thing can only become healthy, strong, and fruitful within a horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself and is too selfish to enclose its own view within that of another, it will wither away feebly or prematurely to its demise.5

In the twilight of constructions, life can light up. For resonances to exist, filtering out must first create the space for the psychic. The priority of exclusion affirms the boundary, the separation, the shielding as

a decision for ignorance, for arbitrary closure, a shutting of one's windowsan inner saying 'no' to this or that thing, a refusal to let things come close, a kind of defensive state against much that is knowable, a contentment with the darkness, with the closing horizon, a saying 'yes' to and an approval of ignorance.6

From this perspective, philosophy gains an expanded meaning. Nietzsche reinvents philosophy as a stimulus for the living. Philosophy becomes work on the idyll, which succeeds in excluding despair and making cheerfulness more resilient, without falling into misguided utopias, by discovering itself as autogenic euphoric stimulation through speculative-ironic flights of fancy. Philosophical idyll is heroic because it is won anew time and again. Unlike in Heidegger’s The Country Path – as the manifesto of a deliberately contemplative, humble walking in the "expanse and duration" of horizontal regions – Nietzsche’s alpine contemplativeness gains insights into the power of exaggeration for a being oriented toward vitality. Nietzsche’s heroic idyll is an academy built at the tree line, kindling Mediterranean feelings of life through ice and solitude.7

Nietzsche has enhanced the idyll fourfold by understanding it better. He intensifies its idyllic nature by configuring the classic patterns of exclusion – Plato’s sentimental pull toward the past and Augustine’s utopian pull toward the coming of the Kingdom of God – toward the present. He also strengthens the idyll by repeatedly exposing himself to the non-idyllic and experiencing in his own body what still allows for something to be idyllic. Furthermore, through his reflection on truth as appearance, he succeeds in uncovering the fundamental idyllic dimensions of exclusion and condensation as autonomous forces. And finally, his thinking embodies a motivation to take up the work of reconfiguring exclusion and condensation again and again, even in the face of the destruction of old understandings of the idyll.

In his Idylls from Messina the ambiguity of Nietzsche’s idyllic nature becomes clear. The superficial is achieved. The bucolic becomes high-spirited and shows traits of a Dionysian Anacreontics. The melancholy of the unattainable and the fear of ungranted grace remain outside. One no longer has any need for elves, either. The rustling of the forest becomes the rustling of wings that lift one up:

Step by step – that is no life!
Always one foot after the other makes one tired and heavy!
I let the winds lift me,
I love to soar on wings
And chase after every bird.

Reason? – that is a wretched business:
Reason and tongue stumble often!
Flying gave me new strength
And taught me finer business,
Singing and joking and playing songs.8

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6. Modernity as Forest

Nietzsche’s enhanced idyll reveals more clearly the anti-modern roots of both right-wing and left-wing understandings of the forest. Among the mythical forest disciples, Platonic melanchocracy dominates. It feeds on the tragic paralysis for which the good is always present only as something irretrievable, revealing itself at best in trace elements to a small elite. Among the revolutionary forest disciples, the agitational morality of Augustinian phobocracy determines the concepts. Their mobilization conceives of the forest as part of the gladius dei, of the sword of God, which will one day destroy the false whole in the name of a coming good.9

Even if Nietzsche’s idea of the heroic idyll—inspired by the experience of the tree line to dare a retuning of the fundamental moods of old Europe—appears as an ongoing project indispensable for any future contour of a concept of high culture, the figure of the lonely wanderer above the sea of fog of a confused culture has lost its contemporary pathos. The retuning that Nietzsche aimed for has been realized in the world’s zones of prosperity. The release of appearance as masking and condensation, which he explicitly initiated, took place there in an unphilosophical way. The heroic idyll has established itself post-heroically. The era from 1945 to 1990 resulted in a reasonably successful end of history. Sloterdijk provided the most lasting descriptions of this as early as 2004:

The new liaison between "mass" purchasing power and "mass" frivolity is leading to a psychosocial shift in mood on the broadest front. […] The massive expansion of leisure time affects the modus vivendi of all subcultures and income groups. Countless people used their surplus of free waking time to elaborate on their whims, their talents, their illnesses, their victim subjectivities, and private metaphysics […].10

For Sloterdijk, modernity appears "as an expanding transcultural levitation experiment," as a "multi-chamber system of buoyancy cells"11. This prestabilized non-disharmony becomes plausible through progress in healthcare and insurance, technology, the experience of radical politics, a culture of science, the property-based market economy, elaborate legal systems, the dominant culture of the creative entrepreneur, and the expansion of the cultural consumer zone.12 All of this generates effects of increased vitality that raise literate life expectancy while massively expanding leisure time, liquefying the constraints of origin, and thus notoriously brightening the metaphysically tuned life-feelings and reality constructs that always locate the best in a hereafter and paint the here and now as lack, hardship, and misery. And precisely what was identified in classical anti-modernism as the cause for the dehumanization of conditions becomes, in this process, an essential stabilization of the freedoms achieved: the optimized automatisms of well-rehearsed processes. The smooth functioning of the systems secures the most beautiful crystallizations of the citizens a thousand times over.

Modernity thus establishes itself as a real-existing idyll of idylls, in which multiple experiments in the appropriate configuration of masking and condensation take place. Now, every individual monad can shape and enhance inter-monadic idylls through its specific windows and doors. Beyond metaphysical monomaniacal dogmatics and their secular radicalizations in left-wing and right-wing fascism, everyone can build their refuge of resonances against the rest of the world. We are the air that we can breathe for one another, provided there are boundaries to the air that others perceive as breathable. Even the neighbor in the house across the street is like the air of alien planets. Multiple rhizomatic interweaving, made possible by clear boundaries, constitutes the culture of modernity. It is a forest of a thousand forests. For instance, one has the choice to live out one’s elaborate musical taste in the metal subculture within the sub-subcultures of folk metal, symphonic metal, doom metal, black metal, thrash metal, power metal, nu metal, or even metalcore. When the song The Bard’s Song (In the Forest) by the Krefeld metal band Blind Guardian is sung along to by thousands, the truth of modernity as a free choice for the appropriate form of one’s own hymnic freedom becomes clear and distinct.

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7. The New Sustainability

In an era where lack is becoming a scarce commodity, the situation for the pessimists of all countries is becoming less idyllic. They, too, must enhance their idyll and escalate their arts of masking the successful and condensing the catastrophic. For the neo-Augustinians, modern prosperity must continue to be an unpleasant good—a "galley" (E. Jünger), a "context of delusion" (Adorno)—or, as an evil good, represent a criminal nexus of a hubris of the privileged who exploit others. "[A]nd so they paint the misfortune of others on the wall: they always need others! And again and again others!"13 In this, exaggerated utopias help the "misery-addicts" who want the great atonement. The greatest enemy of a good society is the idea of a perfect society:

While relief sent its harbingers everywhere, the extreme realists indulged more unrestrainedly than ever before in a cult of depressive thinking. Walter Benjamin went so far as to create the image of the angel of history, who believes he sees a single catastrophe incessantly piling wreckage upon wreckage—thereby creating the test pattern for the visual impairments of a century blinded by radicalisms.14

Advantageous for the anti-moderns is the modernity-forgetfulness of the moderns. The self-evidence of the soft facts in the bubbles of prosperity ensures that there is a modernity-blindness—not to speak of a willful "levitation denial" (Sloterdijk)—precisely among those who are able to live modernly.

In contrast, a philosophy that followed in Nietzsche’s footsteps would have to find a language for the realized wealth of the real as a new sustainability. Here, thinking becomes a form of gratitude and generosity. It embodies itself in a "principle of responsibility" (Jonas) that rejects the irresponsibly outdated negative language games of fatalistic catastrophe-willingness, lethargic sadness, and the populist phantasms of a new oligarchic elite that must be fought. The force of the great atonement is absorbed.

In the negation of negativity, Nietzsche’s muse of the tree line returns, albeit changed. Here, too, a negative inspiration is at work, though now less existential than cultural. The tree line becomes the modernity line. It becomes perceptible in the polarizing discontent in welfare states, which shows signs of a chronic irritation; observing it does not require much imagination to conceive that the capacities of a modern bourgeoisie are being massively demoralized by it. The current abysmal lifelessness is the agony of the welfare state as an emotional failed state. As with Nietzsche, the idyllic must therefore be enhanced and defended as a new sustainability, more explicitly against the toxic romanticism of left-wing, right-wing, and religious reactionaries. The political aspect is that the private can remain apolitical. Thus, the jargon of populism, aggressive dualisms, and the mood of pessimism tipping into retribution must be consciously masked out again and again and indirectly refuted through an idealizing condensation of what has succeeded. It is a matter of advocating for a different kind of atonement:

Idealization does not consist, as is commonly believed, in subtracting or discounting the small and the incidental. Rather, the decisive factor is a tremendous accentuation of the main features, so that the others disappear in their shadow.15

In a philosophy of modern idealization of soft facts, the forest can once again be one of many places of elevation that make the possibilities of beautiful diversity livable. Finally, the trees that were obscured by exaggerated ideas of the forest are becoming visible again. Detached from the misguided concepts of the anti-moderns and re-grounded, the forest is becoming a local recreation area, a sensory adventure park, and a forest playground for the next generation. Due to extreme heatwaves, it is gaining importance as a shady, cool location for a type of holiday behavior known as "coolcation" . For readers of Eichendorff, Goethe, and Stifter, the forest will remain a regenerative refuge that, after the turmoil of the 20th century, no longer requires any counter-cultural daydreams. "I walked in the woods / All by myself / And to seek nothing, / That was my intent." (Goethe) The rustling of the forest can once again be just a rustling. The fairies are waiting for you at home.  

The fact that Nietzsche’s ideas, reinforced by Camus’ thoughts on "Mediterranean thinking," have arrived in reality is also evident in the shift in the cultural mood of a new sustainability regarding its guiding idylls. The forest is no longer as important. Longing has become more clear-headed. The Teutonic spirit has become less "addicted to twilight" (Heine): "Away, you dream! As golden as you are; / Here, too, is love and life." (Goethe) Where there was once metaphysically overstretched longing, there is now worldly, ambitious desire. Modern Teutonism is becoming more worldly. It has become truer to the earth and less faithful to the forest. The longing for the forest has given way to a wanderlust for the Mediterranean. The German infatuation with Italy could become a mass phenomenon. Now, everyone could travel like Goethe in 1786 to the land where the orange trees bloom. "The South for everyone."16 The new dialectic of real-existing historical materialism is: Sola fide, sola solitudine, o sole mio.

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The article image has been painted by the Australian artist Mitchell Nolte (link), whom we commissioned to illustrate our entire forest series. It depicts Zarathustra in a forest landscape of his homeland, burying the tightrope walker—in this case, Nietzsche himself—who, at the beginning of the book, serves as a symbol for the heroic human hovering over the abyss, much like the Aborigines in a "hollow tree."

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Sources

Canetti, Elias: Crowds and Power. Frankfurt am Main 1980.

Eichendorff, Joseph von: Poems. Stuttgart 1998.

Heine, Heinrich: Romanzero. Stuttgart 1998.

Jünger, Ernst: The Forest Passage. Stuttgart 2001.

Sloterdijk, Peter: Spheres III. Frankfurt am Main 2004.

Ibid.: Whoever Has Not Yet Thought of Gray. Berlin 2022.

Virgil: Eclogues. Stuttgart 1999.

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Footnotes

1:Human, All Too Human II, The Wanderer and His Shadow, Aphorism 205.

2: Sloterdijk points out that the phenomenon of the tree line in particular must have been a significant inspiration for Nietzsche in gaining a broader understanding of the nature of human existence during his "marginal walks of vitality." Cf. Sloterdijk, Whoever has not yet thought of gray, pp. 207 et seq.

3:The Birth of Tragedy, sec. 25.

4:Twilight of the Idols, "Reason" in Philosophy, sec. 6.

5:On the Utility and Liability of History for Life, sec. 1.

6:Beyond Good and Evil, aph. 230.

7: Ed. note: "Build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius!", Nietzsche calls out in The Gay Science to those who, like him, wish tolive dangerously(aph. 283).

8:Idylls from Messina, Prince Free-as-a-Bird.

9: Allusion to the quasi-religious hatred of militant-eschatological environmentalists toward culture as progress and growth, referencing the quote "Gladius Dei super terram … Cito et velociter" ("The sword of God over the earth ... Swift and fast") by the Florentine preacher of repentance Girolamo Savonarola (1452–1498).

10: Sloterdijk, Spheres III: Plural Spherology, pp. 691 et seq.

11: Ibid., pp. 722 et seq.

12: Cf. ibid., pp. 677 et seq.

13:The Gay Science, aph. 56.

14: Sloterdijk, Spheres III: Plural Spherology, p. 696.

15:Twilight of the Idols, On the Psychology of the Artist, sec. 8.

16: The talented FDP politician Rudi Ascherl used "South for All" as a central slogan on his website and for his political positions, primarily in 2019 and 2020 in the Leipzig-South constituency.

Heightened Idyll

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Nietzsche and the Forest

‍

Part II: Overcoming discontent. Idyll on the edge

Nietzsche modifies the quintessentially German notion of the forest as an idyll, which our author described in the first part of this two-part series (link). This follow-up aims to precisely understand this modification and its significance for our time.

Nietzsche’s preferred landscape for thought is the high mountains. In this context, the forest becomes important as the tree line—a zone where life is just barely possible before it freezes. For Nietzsche, the timberline becomes the muse of a thinker who lives dangerously and always on the edge. Modernity can thus be described as a cultural high forest that is constantly on the verge of withering; the fading of the idyll of forest solitude is obvious to the Germans. Nietzsche’s stance is long past being an elitist attitude; in post-war modernity, for instance within various subcultures, it has become a mass mentality. In the current movement of social radicalization, however, we are observing a new kind of mass resentment—to escape it, we must relearn the art of shaping our own lives as a heroic idyll on the edge of the abyss.

A Case for the Three Ideology Critics?

On the Uses and Disadvantages of Historical Materialism for the Interpretation of Nietzsche, Part I: Georg Lukács and Hans Heinz Holz

A Case for the Three Ideology Critics?

On the Uses and Disadvantages of Historical Materialism for the Interpretation of Nietzsche

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Part I: Georg Lukács and Hans Heinz Holz

23.10.26
Moritz Pliska

Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche are often contrasted as the two great thinkers of the 19th century. The opposition between their views is evident: on one side, the critic of all class societies, schooled in Hegel; on the other, the critic of "slave morality" who drew on Schopenhauer and considered exploitative conditions to be indispensable. On one side, the sharp analyst of the capitalist mode of production, who dissected it with surgical precision over hundreds of pages in his magnum opus Das Kapital; on the other, the aphorist who thought while strolling, for whom economics was at best a peripheral topic.

Time and again, there have been attempts to bridge these contradictions and create fruitful symbioses between Marxism and Nietzscheanism. Yet there are also voices, particularly among those Marxists who rely heavily on Hegel, that emphasize the fundamental incompatibility of the two approaches.

This two-part series presents both less successful and more compelling Nietzsche interpretations by such "Hegel-Marxists," while simultaneously asking whether and how critique is possible between such philosophically divergent positions.

We begin with Georg Lukács and Hans Heinz Holz. The Hungarian philosopher Lukács lived from 1885 to 1971 and is considered the founding father of Hegel-Marxism as a philosophical movement. Hans Heinz Holz (1927–2011) was a student of Lukács’ former friend and later rival Ernst Bloch, and is counted among the most influential representatives of Hegel-Marxism in the second half of the 20th century.

The second part features an examination of the extensive "intellectual biography" of Nietzsche written by the Marxist historian Domenico Losurdo.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche are often contrasted as the two great thinkers of the 19th century. The opposition between their views is evident: on one side, the critic of all class societies, schooled in Hegel; on the other, the critic of "slave morality" who drew on Schopenhauer and considered exploitative conditions to be indispensable. On one side, the sharp analyst of the capitalist mode of production, who dissected it with surgical precision over hundreds of pages in his magnum opus Das Kapital; on the other, the aphorist who thought while strolling, for whom economics was at best a peripheral topic.Time and again, there have been attempts to bridge these contradictions and create fruitful symbioses between Marxism and Nietzscheanism. Yet there are also voices, particularly among those Marxists who rely heavily on Hegel, that emphasize the fundamental incompatibility of the two approaches.This two-part series presents both less successful and more compelling Nietzsche interpretations by such "Hegel-Marxists," while simultaneously asking whether and how critique is possible between such philosophically divergent positions. We begin with Georg Lukács and Hans Heinz Holz. The Hungarian philosopher Lukács lived from 1885 to 1971 and is considered the founding father of Hegel-Marxism as a philosophical movement. Hans Heinz Holz (1927–2011) was a student of Lukács’ former friend and later rival Ernst Bloch, and is counted among the most influential representatives of Hegel-Marxism in the second half of the 20th century.The second part features an examination of the extensive "intellectual biography" of Nietzsche written by the Marxist historian Domenico Losurdo.

I. On the Method of Ideology Critique

Hegel assumed that there is a kind of reason that governs beyond individual human beings. While reflection can only manifest itself in the thinking of concrete individuals, it is through this reflection that we recognize that the development of society's freedom is a condition for the higher unfolding of individual freedom. In this way, it would be possible to overcome the opposition between different individual rationalities.1

However, human history took a different, unreasonable, and questionable path. Marx therefore asked why the discomfort felt and thought regarding the state of modern society had not led to change, or, in Marxist terms, how theory and practice could be brought together. He reached the understandable conclusion that it is of no use for people to interpret, theorize, and rationalize everything that is going wrong: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various interpreted, but the point is to changeit."2 Only then can our discomfort, our desires, and our interpretations be put into action. Then our theories would prove themselves—or not; in any case, our theories would enter into a dialogue with practice, and a shared process of negotiation could take place once again, so that Hegel's vision of a moral homecoming and gathering of the human spirit would finally come to pass. Furthermore, an understanding of how our social structures come into being and how they shape us would prevent social theorizing from splintering into many different interpretations, leaving us irreconcilably divided by our respective worldviews. The utopia of Hegel-Marxism is the recovery of that comprehensive epistemic and practical access that we still possess today for smaller, microsociological phenomena. While we may not immediately and perfectly understand the dynamics of a game night with friends, we can figure them out together, and it would never occur to us to fall into mutually unintelligible specialized disciplines like economics, political science, psychology, and so on. We should look at large social macrostructures in a similar way.

Lukács, one of the most important representatives of Hegel-Marxism, therefore pins great hopes on the "dialectical consideration of totality," calling it "the only method capable of intellectually reproducing and grasping reality."3 And so, in matters of morality, everything would also fall into place on its own:  

But since this ultimate goal does not stand over against the process as an abstract ideal, but rather resides within the concrete moment as a moment of truth and reality—as the concrete meaning of the stage currently reached—its recognition is precisely the recognition of the direction that the tendencies directed toward the whole (unconsciously) take; the direction that is called upon, in the given moment, to concretely determine the right action from the standpoint and in the interest of the overall process, the liberation of the proletariat.4  

Lukács hopes that by viewing social and historical processes, people will perceive themselves as the protagonists of these processes, in order to then consciously and consistently steer them toward their goal. This way of thinking is still quite widespread; contemporary philosopher Rahel Jaeggi simply expresses it more soberly when she notes regarding ideology critique: "From the orientation toward contradictions and crises, the criterion of 'malfunctioning' emerges as the criterion for epistemic and normative falsity"5. Critique highlights the contradictions between different norms and between norms and reality; it shows how these contradictions arise from the contradictory nature of the capitalist mode of production. It is also expected that the various existing norms diverge from one's own goals because they misunderstand society and, consequently, themselves. The dialectical method, or ideology critique, resolves separate moments back into the totality, into the process of becoming. One therefore expects to have an advantage—something that the other person would also realize for themselves once society was explained to them:  

Insofar as, for example, [...] the contradictions between the natural-law norms of equality and social reality can only be resolved through a new principle of economic and social organization, the concepts of freedom and equality change [...] toward a fuller or more comprehensive understanding.6

Where does the confidence in knowing what is right come from? For Lukács, having the right knowledge and the right goals is not a question of character or effort. It is a sociological question:  

[W]hen a historical situation exists in which the correct understanding of society becomes an immediate condition for a class's self-assertion in struggle, when for this class its self-knowledge simultaneously means a correct understanding of the whole of society [...] the unity of theory and practice [...] becomes possible.7

Because one possesses the correct knowledge, one also has insight into why one possesses the correct knowledge—which is quite practical. The potential circularity of such an argument will not be discussed further here.  

How is the divergence of other theories explained? They, too, are classified sociologically, but here an attempt is made to derive their failure from their concrete situation and thus to understand it. In better cases, a materialism that can be described as more "lifeworldly" is used to reconstruct what kind of subjectivity (and thus theory) arises from specific concrete practices, which in turn are derived from general material conditions. In worse cases, materialism degenerates into "X only says that because it is in their objective interest." The question of the legitimacy of all this shall not be discussed here. However, I would like to draw attention to how this positions itself within a discourse: On the one hand, it explains internally why others have a different opinion, while latently suggesting they would actually have the same opinion as oneself. On the other hand, it offers a new form of identification externally: "You have held a different opinion until now, doing your best within the framework of your structural possibilities; but with us, you will become the perfected version of yourself."

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II. Lukács: Nietzsche as a Philosopher of Imperialism

But how do ideology critics approach Nietzsche? They seem to have a real problem or concern with him. Lukács, Adorno, Holz, Losurdo—they keep returning to him, sometimes dismissively, sometimes appreciatively. They all seem to share the need to categorize Nietzsche. Where does this urge come from? It is striking that they differ so widely in their assessments.  

For Lukács, the situation is quite clear: Nietzsche, whom he describes as the "founder of the irrationalism of the imperialist period,"8 wrote in his works "a continuous polemic against Marxism, against socialism."9 He dismisses the acknowledged fact that Nietzsche was little to barely familiar with Marxism with this objection: "Philosophers instinctively know what they have to defend and where the enemy stands. They instinctively feel the 'dangerous' tendencies of their time and attempt to combat them philosophically."10 According to Nietzsche, this is done in an original way. While the bourgeoisie had previously tried to defend the development of capitalism by referring to a narrative of progress, this became untenable by the end of the 19th century:  

This change manifests itself above all in a complacent [...] relativism, pessimism, nihilism, etc., which, however—in the case of honest intellectuals—often turns into sincere despair and a resulting rebellious mood (messianism, etc.).11

Nietzsche is said to be the most dazzling representative of this change. Furthermore, Nietzsche's "social mandate" consists of creating an ethic for the ruling class of capitalism, which, in the face of the growing power of the proletariat, had to appear increasingly reactionary rather than progressive. Hence Nietzsche's moral relativism, his biologism, his fatalism, his mythology of history—they are all parts of an apology for the imperialist bourgeoisie.12 In this function, Lukács sees the center, the unifying principle of Nietzsche's philosophy; from here, he intends to trace an underlying system in Nietzsche.13 He goes so far as to claim that the eternal recurrence stems from the need "that becoming must not produce anything new (in relation to capitalist society), lest it be unfaithful to its function in Nietzsche's system."14

The method and content of this Nietzsche interpretation are reductio ad absurdum and require no criticism. It is a pity about the more comprehensible criticism of Nietzsche that Lukács himself lets slip away. For example, there is Nietzsche's mythologizing thinking about history,15which a representative of historical materialism could have criticized in a much more revealing way. The often-neglected political character of Nietzsche's philosophy could have been highlighted, especially from a Marxist perspective—but Lukács likely played into the hands of the opponents of such a reading by executing it so vulgarly.

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III. Holz: Nietzsche as a Rebellious "Young Bourgeois"

Holz is quite different, although he also sets out to critique ideology. And the approach of his interpretation turns out to be quite similar: "Nietzsche's rebellion is that of the disillusioned and disoriented young bourgeois in an inhumane society."16 But from this same approach, he takes a completely different direction. Nietzsche is not disillusioned here in the sense of a cruel cynicism of oppression, but rather "what makes him significant is the radical consistency with which he brings the sickness of the time to an outbreak and suffers through it."17  He understands Nietzsche as someone who suffers sincerely from the capitalist deformation of culture, but who cannot explain this suffering. Thus, he can pose the question of whether Nietzsche should be assigned to fascism or emancipation in terms of the history of ideas in a more nuanced way. He criticizes Lukács18 and yet admits that the question must be asked as to how Nietzsche's work could be so defenseless against its appropriation.19

He explains this ambivalence of Nietzsche's actual philosophy and its reception by the fact that he understood nothing of political economy and the "mechanisms of modernity." This creates the image of a lonely fighter. Nietzsche could no longer refer back to Hegel's axiom "The true is the whole" because, in the absence of historical materialism, he lacked the method to understand social phenomena as a continuous, becoming whole:  

A world experienced as having disintegrated into disparate elements no longer provided a basis for the integration of relativized truths. These could only be understood as deceptions, and no longer as moments of a historical whole.20  

Therefore, the retreat to the individual and their own emancipation was the line of defense Nietzsche had to adopt to face the demands of modernity. With this caveat, however, Holz also acknowledges Nietzsche's "diagnostic" and utopian achievements:  

Nietzsche imagines a human society in which people are freed from the compulsion to work to satisfy their basic needs, and instead unfold and elevate themselves through the serious play and playful seriousness of art.21

Holz presents an interesting interpretation of Nietzsche's Ecce Homo as an Epicurean utopia:  

[H]ere he speaks of a utopia of physical happiness, the fulfillment of which could only be experienced by a generation of humans with the highest sensitivity, of a unity of ethics and aesthetics […][,] the freedom to achieve the optimal conditions for one's physical well-being, and thus the freedom to be oneself as a biological being.22

However, Holz further laments Nietzsche's lack of political-economic knowledge, which he argues leads to subsequent errors. He claims that Nietzsche—"trapped in the notion of the mode of production as a power relationship"—could only conceive of what was just described "as the realm of an elite few"23 :

His utopian momentum was not enough to envision a near future in which basic human needs could be met through technical means rather than slavery.24

Without placing Nietzsche himself in the proximity of National Socialism, as Lukács does, Holz nonetheless accuses Nietzsche of being open or defenseless against all manner of interpretations:

For all his clarity of vision and his instinct for symptoms and connections, his cultural-critical ideas were bound to remain impressionistic and, in their synthesis and interpretation, subject to ideological distortion.25

Holz turns Nietzsche into an untimely precursor to Marx;26 Nietzsche was a diagnostician, whereas Marx was already a therapist.27 All the concessions Holz makes to Nietzsche serve to categorize him within Marxism and make him useful there. Holz does not want to hear anything of Nietzsche's own explanatory approaches:  

Nietzsche never questioned the reasons for hypocrisy—unless one considers the reduction to resentment or the will to power of the weak as a causal explanation.28  

It may sound like praise when Holz credits Nietzsche with having pushed to the absolute limits of what was possible for bourgeois philosophy.29 It is precisely in this context that one understands why Holz interprets Nietzsche’s intellectual path as a desperate act of self-sacrifice, one that the history of philosophy must—with great reverence—simply pass by.30

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IV. The World as Chaos or Unity?

Admittedly, both Lukács and Holz have attempted to relativize Nietzsche and integrate him into their respective concepts of history in very different ways. Both accuse him of relativism and particularism—Lukács mockingly, Holz regretfully. Nietzsche himself, however, views his lack of reference to unity, his particularism, as an achievement:  

That no one is held responsible anymore, that the nature of being cannot be traced back to a causa prima, that the world is not a unity, neither as a sensorium nor as "spirit," this is the great liberation, – only with this is the innocence of becoming restored.31  

And this is by no means merely an abstract consideration; it shapes Nietzsche's engagement with very concrete matters:  

"Exploitation" does not belong to a corrupt or imperfect society: it belongs to the essence of the living, as a fundamental organic function; it is a consequence of the actual will to power, which is precisely the will of life.32  

For Nietzsche, the world is fundamentally disparate, and it is not a flaw to be corrected if people find themselves in their own respective worlds during their encounters; for him, there can be no such thing as recognition.  

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We are familiar with Hegelian-Marxist interpretations of Nietzsche; it would also not be particularly difficult to defend Nietzsche's philosophy against such critiques that intend to establish a connection to unity.33 However, that would be too convenient at this point. We saw at the beginning that for Hegelian Marxism, the reference to totality is not just one matter among others, but the light under which everything is viewed—it could therefore never reveal itself if it were perhaps illuminating the world incorrectly or incompletely. And the same applies to Nietzsche's particularism.  

A methodologically relevant question such as whether the world is unified or fragmentary should not—not even implicitly—be resolved using one's own method. The fact that Lukács and Holz treat Nietzsche from the outset as if they were right about this point is a fundamental criticism to be leveled against their interpretations.  

This question cannot be answered here; perhaps it can only be negotiated with itself. It could therefore be the case that Nietzsche's philosophy is better situated within the framework of an interpretation by historical materialism than within itself. To give this attempt a better chance, the second part will be dedicated to the more recent Nietzsche interpretation by the Marxist historian Domenico Losurdo.

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To be continued.

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Bibliography

Deleuze, Gilles: Nietzsche and Philosophy. Trans. by Bernd Schwibs. Hamburg 2013: Europäische Verlagsanstalt.

Holz, Hans Heinz: The Adventurous Rebellion. Bourgeois Protest Movements in Philosophy. Stirner, Nietzsche, Sartre, Marcuse, New Left. Neuwied, Darmstadt 1976: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag.

Jaeggi, Rahel: What is Ideology Critique? In: What is Critique? Ed. by: Rahel Jaeggi & Tilo Wesche. Frankfurt a. M. 2009: Suhrkamp Verlag, pp. 266–295.

Lukács, Georg: What is Orthodox Marxism? In: Georg Lukács Works. Early Writings 2. Vol. 2. Neuwied, Berlin 1968: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, pp. 161–518.

Lukács, Georg: The Destruction of Reason. In: Georg Lukács Works. Vol. 9. Neuwied, Berlin

1962: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag.

Marx, Karl: Theses on Feuerbach. In: Marx-Engels-Werke. Vol. 3. 1978 Berlin: Dietz Verlag, pp. 533–535.

Siep, Ludwig: Moral and Ethical Spirit in Hegel's Phenomenology. In: Klaus Vieweg & Wolfgang Welsch: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. A Cooperative Commentary on a Key Work of Modernity. Frankfurt a. M. 2008: Suhrkamp Verlag, pp. 415–438.

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Footnotes

1: Cf. Siep, Moral and Ethical Spirit in Hegel's Phenomenology, p. 418.

2: Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, p. 535.

3: Lukács, What is Orthodox Marxism?, p. 181.

4: Ibid., p. 197.

5: Jaeggi, What is Ideology Critique?, p. 290.

6: Ibid., p. 288.

7: Lukács, What is Orthodox Marxism?, p. 173.

8: Lukács, The Destruction of Reason, p. 270.

9: Ibid., p. 273.

10: Ibid., p. 274.

11: Ibid., p. 276.

12: Cf. ibid., p. 306 et seq.

13: Cf. ibid., pp. 299 & 336.

14: Cf. ibid., p. 333.

15: Cf. ibid.

16: Holz, The Adventurous Rebellion, p. 32.

17: Ibid.

18: Cf. ibid., pp. 39 f.

19: Cf. ibid.

20: Ibid., p. 84.

21: Ibid., p. 64.

22: Ibid., p. 94.

23: Ibid., p. 92.

24: Ibid.

25: Ibid., p. 93.

26: Cf. ibid., p. 112.

27: Cf. ibid., p. 48.

28: Ibid., p. 47.

29: Cf. ibid., p. 51.

30: Cf. ibid., pp. 112 et seq.

31: Twilight of the Idols, The Four Great Errors, sec. 8.

32: Beyond Good and Evil, aph. 259.

33: Cf. Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy. pp. 13 et seq.

A Case for the Three Ideology Critics?

On the Uses and Disadvantages of Historical Materialism for the Interpretation of Nietzsche

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Part I: Georg Lukács and Hans Heinz Holz

Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche are often contrasted as the two great thinkers of the 19th century. The opposition between their views is evident: on one side, the critic of all class societies, schooled in Hegel; on the other, the critic of "slave morality" who drew on Schopenhauer and considered exploitative conditions to be indispensable. On one side, the sharp analyst of the capitalist mode of production, who dissected it with surgical precision over hundreds of pages in his magnum opus Das Kapital; on the other, the aphorist who thought while strolling, for whom economics was at best a peripheral topic.

Time and again, there have been attempts to bridge these contradictions and create fruitful symbioses between Marxism and Nietzscheanism. Yet there are also voices, particularly among those Marxists who rely heavily on Hegel, that emphasize the fundamental incompatibility of the two approaches.

This two-part series presents both less successful and more compelling Nietzsche interpretations by such "Hegel-Marxists," while simultaneously asking whether and how critique is possible between such philosophically divergent positions.

We begin with Georg Lukács and Hans Heinz Holz. The Hungarian philosopher Lukács lived from 1885 to 1971 and is considered the founding father of Hegel-Marxism as a philosophical movement. Hans Heinz Holz (1927–2011) was a student of Lukács’ former friend and later rival Ernst Bloch, and is counted among the most influential representatives of Hegel-Marxism in the second half of the 20th century.

The second part features an examination of the extensive "intellectual biography" of Nietzsche written by the Marxist historian Domenico Losurdo.

Heightened Idyll

Nietzsche and the Forest Part I: Sylvan Exiles in Antiquity, Romanticism, and Modernity

Heightened Idyll

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Nietzsche and the Forest

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Part I: Sylvan Exiles in Antiquity, Romanticism, and Modernity

19.10.26
Michael Meyer-Albert

Is there a connection between place and thought? How might Nietzsche’s philosophy and the forest be linked?

In German culture, the forest often appears as the epitome of the idyllic. In the penultimate part of our series “The Forest as a Living Foundation”, our author Michael Meyer-Albert argues that Nietzsche gave this idyll a completely new form by dynamizing it.

He begins by discussing two forms of the traditional idyll. While the classical idyll in Southern European traditions (such as in Virgil) tended to celebrate the sunny, Arcadian pastoral landscape or the orderly garden, the philosophical idyll is found within the walls of the academy. A refuge from doxa, a tribute to the logos.

Meyer-Albert then analyzes the German forest as a specifically German form of the idyll using the term “Waldeinsamkeit” (forest solitude), coined by the Romantic writer Ludwig Tieck (1773–1853). Here, the forest is understood as a near-religiously charged sanctuary from the demands of modernity. If defended aggressively, this romanticism can quickly turn into reactionary mythology—even in a modern, left-wing guise.

Nietzsche’s modification of the anti-modern German forest idyll into a heroic idyll that affirms modernity serves as a counter-proposal to all these traditional forms of the idyllic—this will be the focus of the second part of this article (link).

Is there a connection between place and thought? How might Nietzsche’s philosophy and the forest be linked? In German culture, the forest often appears as the epitome of the idyllic. In the penultimate part of our series “The Forest as a Living Foundation”, our author Michael Meyer-Albert argues that Nietzsche gave this idyll a completely new form by dynamizing it. He begins by discussing two forms of the traditional idyll. While the classical idyll in Southern European traditions (such as in Virgil) tended to celebrate the sunny, Arcadian pastoral landscape or the orderly garden, the philosophical idyll is found within the walls of the academy. A refuge from doxa, a tribute to the logos. Meyer-Albert then analyzes the German forest as a specifically German form of the idyll using the term “Waldeinsamkeit” (forest solitude), coined by the Romantic writer Ludwig Tieck (1773–1853). Here, the forest is understood as a near-religiously charged sanctuary from the demands of modernity. If defended aggressively, this romanticism can quickly turn into reactionary mythology—even in a modern, left-wing guise. Nietzsche’s modification of the anti-modern German forest idyll into a heroic idyll that affirms modernity serves as a counter-proposal to all these traditional forms of the idyllic—this will be the focus of the second part of this article.
"Everything grand, still, and bright"
Nietzsche, Et in Arcadia ego

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1. Et in academia ego

"I, too, was in the Academy." – Idylls signify lovely places, often imagined as rural life. They are postcard snapshots of calm, peaceful existence. Theocritus – around 270 BC – who described cattle herders singing together, is generally considered their poetic creator. The genre reached a pinnacle in Virgil's Eclogues (c. 42–39 BC), which, in the classic translation by Johann Heinrich Voß (1751–1826), suggest a scene of timeless familiarity despite the unusually structured form of the hexameter:

O blissful old man! Here, between the familiar rivers
And by sacred springs, you enjoy the shady cool.
There, where the hedge-bushes have always bordered the boundary fields,
And Hyblaean bees graze on the willow blossoms,
A soft humming will often invite you to sleep.
High in the air, the pruner sings on the cliff:
Meanwhile, wood pigeons coo restlessly with a hoarse tone,
Which are so dear to you, and the turtle dove from the airy elm.1

Fundamentally, the idyll, viewed abstractly, reveals a dual constitution. It condenses images and sounds of a beautiful existence while simultaneously relieving us of disturbing dissonances by filtering out the unpleasant.

The idyll becomes philosophically virulent as a place of thought. Plato's idea of an Academy, founded around 387 BC and located in a grove outside the gates but near Athens, can be interpreted as a "pre-idyllic" idyll that makes its economy of condensation and relief fruitful for the intellect. In this place, the sticky chatter of doxa—mere opinion obsessed with superficial appearance—is to be dissolved by the logos, which penetrates into essential depth. It is about coherent description rather than agitating populism. Hence, the entrance to the school of philosophy bore the inscription: "Let no one ignorant of geometry enter!" This was intended to indicate that this was a semi-closed community dedicating its life to the inspiration of abstract, timeless truth. Hell is other people who have succumbed to doxa. The Academy is the idyll of concentration.

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2. "Forest Solitude"

While the classical idyll sings of the sunny, Arcadian pastoral landscape, the dense undergrowth of the forest became a place of longing in Germany. It was invented during the Romantic period, significantly influenced by the ideas of Rousseau (1712–1778). From the cultural criticism of the polemical "Citizen of Geneva," who, although long since de factoJust as the Frenchman spent his life yearning for the idyll of his native mountains, the romantic Germans found their own in the forest. From 1800 onwards, it became a place of longing for those overwhelmed by industrialization and urbanization.

The German forest is not a place, but a state of mind. The unique connotation of the German forest lies in a pseudo-pietistic spirituality. Its idyllic nature resembles, much to Jean-Jacques’ taste, a devout hermitage rather than an Arcadian pastoral landscape or an academic philosopher’s grove. Within it, an emotional piety, stripped of orthodox religion, merges with a world-weary solitude. From Luther’s Sola fide comes Sola solitudine. Tieck’s term "Waldeinsamkeit" (forest solitude) captures this state of mind. The forest acts like an intimate confessor, gently dissolving the pain of the modern self in the rustling of the leaves. This form of idyll also reflects the dimensions of intensification and relief. In 1810, Eichendorff exemplified this in his poetry, describing the forest as a place of devotion that simultaneously serves as a "green tent," shielding one from the hectic world:

O valleys wide, o heights,
O beautiful, green forest,
You, of my joys and sorrows
A devout dwelling place!
Out there, forever deceived,
The busy world rushes by,
Cast your arches once more
Around me, you green tent!2

Teutonic forest bliss did not arise solely from a longing for the metaphysical. It was also a consequence of the country’s political fragmentation, which, unlike in France, lacked an urban center. The forest became the capital for German spirits who lacked a stage on which to be seen. While the urban agora practiced participation through grand discourse and public speaking, the forest offered an inner agora for deep and expansive reflection. Within it, the German—the "special student" of political modernity—could feel "poor in action and rich in thought" (Hölderlin), like a victor without victories. Heine, a late and ironic romantic, lucidly illustrates the evolution of this sentiment for the forest in his 1851 poem Waldeinsamkeit :

In my days of youth, I wore
A wreath upon my head;
The flowers shone wonderfully,
There was a magic in the wreath.
The beautiful wreath pleased everyone,
But the one who wore it displeased many;
I fled from the jaundiced envy of men,
I fled into the green solitude of the woods.
In the woods, in the woods! There I could lead
A free life with spirits and beasts;
Fairies and noble stags with proud antlers,
They approached me without any shyness.
They approached me without any fear,
They knew it was no terrible risk;
The deer knew I was no hunter,
The fairy knew I was no man of reason.3

These lines show how much the forest was a refuge for sensitive humanists who had grown cold under the Enlightenment and its disenchanted prose, and who found in the forest a place that granted them a sense of uplift. However, Heine's poem also marks the decline of the forest as a sanctuary. The "disenchantment of the world" (Max Weber) does not stop at the dream-inducing idylls of the Romantic era, partly because the romanticizing charisma of the anti-modern had become exhausted:

Oh, beautiful time! When the trees
Of the forest seemed to arch
Into triumphal green gateways – I walked along,
Wreathed, as if I were the victor!
That beautiful time has slipped away,
And everything has changed since then,
And oh! My wreath is stolen,
The one I wore upon my head.
The wreath is taken from my head,
I do not know how it came to be;
But since the beautiful wreath is gone,
My soul feels as if it has no soul.
They stare at me, eerily vacant,
The masks of the world! The sky is desolate,
A blue churchyard, godless and silent.
I walk stooped through the forest.4

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3. The Will to the Forest

The forest offered a distance from the harsh world and gave those who escaped it a space where the imagination could come to power unchecked. But when the meaninglessness of existence begins to drift through the forest solitude, like the Nothing in Michael Ende’s The Neverending Story, the forest empties itself. For the disciples of forest solitude, the cause of this meaninglessness was and is clearly identifiable. They blame the corrosive modern age, which divides the world too rationally and in which bourgeois duty and order, self-interest, and the market economy now hold sway instead of faith, love, and hope. The automatism of technical rationality is identified as the principle that supposedly displaces the spiritual. For the automated soul, forest solitude becomes a loneliness without bliss. It still wanders bent through the forest, which it has already lost as an inner experience: "In the forest, the elves have vanished" (Heine).

Radicalized Romanticism attempted to save the forest. Following the idea of a new mythology, the aggressive emptiness of modernity was to be pushed back by a culturally revolutionary counter-aggression. Reflection on the religious, on mythical worlds of legend, and on the elemental nature of the forest were invoked as opposing forces. People wanted to "enthuse themselves back into the Middle Ages" (Heine) and created the caricature of a "highly technical Romanticism" (Thomas Mann), of which the "stage consecration festival plays" of Wagner’s Bayreuth – opened in August 1876 – formed the climax. This will to the forest eventually culminated in the blood-and-soil elementality of National Socialism as a highly militant Romanticism. It is this toxic compensation for the misunderstood spiritual turbulence of modernity that led Elias Canetti in 1960 to a profound interpretation of the German character and its romantic "sympathy with death" (Thomas Mann):

The mass symbol of the Germans was the army. But the army was more than the army: it was the marching forest. In no other modern country in the world has the feeling for the forest remained as alive as it has in Germany.5

The heirs to this diffuse longing for the forest, behind which—typically modern—lies the longing for a longing, can be found, alongside the mythical fantasists of the forest,6 in the left-wing camp of cultural criticism. There, the forest is celebrated as a contingent complexity whose delicate, rhizomatic interconnectedness is portrayed as a counter-power to modernity, which is interpreted as a totalitarian reduction to total availability.7 This authoritarian gesture assumes the dignity of an apostle of higher powers, embodying the "imperative of responsibility" (Jonas), identifying the neo-fascist enemy in the figure of the successful tech billionaire, and seeking to make history once again. Where the whole is maligned as the untrue, the struggle can continue. The proletariat of the forest against capitalism.8 Climate activists of all countries, unite. In this process, the forest as an intense force of an idyll disappears, exploited into a polemogenic, discord-sowing concept within a culture-warrior theoretical habitus that, ironically, criticizes universal exploitation itself. One can no longer see the forest for the "micro-fascisms" (Deleuze & Guattari). Once again, the elves have vanished from the woods. The solitude of the forest has become even lonelier. The forests are rustling too quietly.

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4. "6,000 feet beyond man and time"9

Nietzsche’s idea of the idyllic could curb the devastation of the forest within the radicalisms of a mythical and culture-revolutionary forest concept. The theories of grounding the forest—which sought to re-ground supposed modern abstractions, not to say "forest-ing" them—must themselves be grounded.

Nietzsche’s idea can once again be grasped through the dimensions of the idyll as both exclusion and condensation.

In Nietzsche’s work, however, these dimensions undergo a philosophical dynamization. He is not concerned with being spared from modern impositions or regressing into romantic or moral daydreams.

Nietzsche seeks out the idyll as a site for a modern possibility of the heroic.

This is hinted at in an aphoristic reflection on the classical, bucolic idyll titled "Et in Arcadia ego" He describes an evening scene of a herd of cattle, but feels and reinterprets this situation in an unclassical way. Above all, he emphasizes the heightened experience of the present and does not shy away from it by softening it with nostalgic wistfulness. He highlights the "pure, sharp world of light (which had nothing longing, expectant, looking forward or backward about it)," which is "at once heroic and idyllic."10  

For Nietzsche, this is about a new classicism as a more animating idyll. Both the bucolic grace of the original idyll and the sacral longing of the German forest idyll are to be overcome. This involves more than just fleeing from German mediocre profundity and the will to myth, which he learned to loathe in Wagner’s Bayreuth. In fact, Nietzsche is concerned with a fundamentally new classicism that retunes the basic European moods. He aims to break out of Plato’s melancholic ontology—which knows the Good, but only as something that leaves euphoric traces in life as occasional recollection—just as much as out of Augustine’s phobocratic, fear-dominated ontology of original sin, which seeks to recognize only the hubris of the creature in the human and hopes for the coming of God. For Nietzsche, the idyll as exclusion is no longer constituted by Platonic nostalgia and Christian utopia.

Nietzsche’s version of a heroic idyll possesses the contours of a *Bildungsroman* that repeatedly advocates for the journey toward a comprehensive presence. His philosophical heroic journey aims to design the idyll as lightness, mockery, "the South," and a celebration of beautiful appearance.11 The path there, however, is paved with despair. For a neoclassical second bucolic to emerge that is worthy of the philosophical free spirit, life must, for Nietzsche, emancipate itself from the tragedy of Platonic melanchocracy and the masochistic morality of Augustinian phobocracy, which, as the greatest powers of Western culture, keep life from life and thus provoke the emotional world power of resentment.

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Read the second part.

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The article image is by the Australian artist Mitchell Nolte (link), whom we commissioned to illustrate our entire forest series. It alludes to one of the most famous passages from Thus Spoke Zarathustra to, Of the Vision and the Riddle, in which the protagonist encounters a dwarf who confronts him in a dreamlike scenario with the idea of eternal recurrence—a concept Zarathustra is not yet able to bear at that point.

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Footnotes

1: Virgil, Eclogues, p. 24.

2: Eichendorff, Farewell. In: Poems, p. 77.

3: Heine, Forest Solitude. In: Romanzero, p. 93.

4: Ibid. Heine’s presence of mind draws attention to the connection between political powerlessness and the romantic understanding of the forest as a form of compensation. The idyll of forest solitude is invoked so strongly in order to obscure the reactionary nature of politics. In the poem In October 1849, alluding to the temporal proximity of the failure of liberal changes in Europe, the following verses can be found: “The forest and river rest peacefully, / Drenched in soft moonlight; / Only sometimes there’s a bang—is that a shot— / Perhaps it’s a friend who has been shot” (ibid., p. 102).

5: Canetti, Crowds and Power, pp. 190 et seq.

6: A case in point is Ernst Jünger’s pamphlet, first published in 1951, The Forest Passage. In it, a simple binary is used to suggest militant action as a viable way out. Modernity is portrayed as a mixture of Leviathan and the "Titanic" (p. 36), as a massive "machine" "devised" for the "annihilation" of man (p. 82), and as a "galley" (p. 69). In contrast, the forest takes on mythical dimensions as a "harbor," "home," and a place of "peace and security" (p. 37). As a metaphysical power, it grants the freedom lost in modernity. What Jünger means by this is shown, for example, on page 73, where he speaks of "substantial, old Germanic freedom" that knows how to defend itself with weapons; although Jünger even has the anti-fascist resistance against the Nazis in mind, he cites as an example of that freedom "a young social democrat who [in 1933] shot half a dozen so-called auxiliary police officers in the hallway of his apartment building" (ibid.).

7: Cf. for example the blog post by Mandus Craiss The Postmodern Forest dated June 5, 2026.

8: As with the social question in the 19th century, the economic question of the 21st century contains some elements of truth. It is alarming, however, how this single truth is used to construct a quasi-monotheistic absolute truth from which all other truths are defamed. Incidentally, Nietzsche also once briefly noted the connection between environmental destruction and global warming: "It is true that the earth became warmer due to the clearing and deforestation of the forest" (Posthumous Fragments, No. 1882, 5[1]; 38).

9: Ecce Homo,Thus Spoke Zarathustra, para. 1.

10: Human, All Too Human II, The Wanderer and His Shadow, aph. 295. Nietzsche also mentions here the source of inspiration for his heroic idyll. The inventor of "a heroic-idyllic way of philosophizing" was Epicurus.

11: Viewed more closely, this form of Nietzsche’s idyll represents a final version. Before his break with Wagner, he labored over a metaphysical "Dionysian idyll" as part of a mythical cultural revolution, and from 1876 onwards, he reshaped this into a contemplative idyll of the free spirit as an expression of an individualistic way of life that had made its years of wandering permanent. His idea of the idyll culminates—as I attempt to suggest in this section—in the synthesis of a heroic contemplation as the birth of philosophical comedy from the spirit of provoked despair.

Heightened Idyll

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Nietzsche and the Forest

‍

Part I: Sylvan Exiles in Antiquity, Romanticism, and Modernity

Is there a connection between place and thought? How might Nietzsche’s philosophy and the forest be linked?

In German culture, the forest often appears as the epitome of the idyllic. In the penultimate part of our series “The Forest as a Living Foundation”, our author Michael Meyer-Albert argues that Nietzsche gave this idyll a completely new form by dynamizing it.

He begins by discussing two forms of the traditional idyll. While the classical idyll in Southern European traditions (such as in Virgil) tended to celebrate the sunny, Arcadian pastoral landscape or the orderly garden, the philosophical idyll is found within the walls of the academy. A refuge from doxa, a tribute to the logos.

Meyer-Albert then analyzes the German forest as a specifically German form of the idyll using the term “Waldeinsamkeit” (forest solitude), coined by the Romantic writer Ludwig Tieck (1773–1853). Here, the forest is understood as a near-religiously charged sanctuary from the demands of modernity. If defended aggressively, this romanticism can quickly turn into reactionary mythology—even in a modern, left-wing guise.

Nietzsche’s modification of the anti-modern German forest idyll into a heroic idyll that affirms modernity serves as a counter-proposal to all these traditional forms of the idyllic—this will be the focus of the second part of this article (link).

From the Will to Power to the Human Being as a New Beginning

Nietzsche from Hannah Arendt's Perspective

From the Will to Power to the Human Being as a New Beginning

Nietzsche from Hannah Arendt's Perspective

14.10.26
Hans-Martin Schönherr-Mann

In her major work The Life of the Mind, Arendt builds upon Nietzsche’s understanding of the will to power as interpretation. Rather than following Kant’s conception of free will, she argues that through the will, something new enters the world with every newborn human being—a notion that resembles Zarathustra’s demand that the Übermensch should invent new values. Arendt also agrees with Nietzsche’s assertion that the "‘true world’" is a "fable," for Arendt because modern sciences possess no ultimate truths—a fact they themselves acknowledged around 1900, but which they now refuse to recognize. Thus, as heretics of science, Nietzsche and Arendt belong to the ranks of the "evil" philosophers.

Arendt lived from 1906 to 1975 and is considered one of the great thinkers of the 20th century. The daughter of secular Jews, she studied in the 1920s in Marburg, Freiburg, and Heidelberg under such influential philosophers as Edmund Husserl, Karl Jaspers, and Martin Heidegger. As a young student, she was briefly involved with the latter. In 1933, she was forced to emigrate, and from 1941 she lived in the USA, where she began teaching at various universities in 1953. This unorthodox intellectual is best known for her critique of totalitarianism and her communicative concept of the political.

Her 120th birthday provides sufficient reason to take a closer look at the intellectual relationship between Nietzsche and Arendt.

You can listen to and watch a version of this text, read by the author himself and supplemented with original audio clips of Arendt, on YouTube and Soundcloud .

In her major work The Life of the Mind, Arendt builds upon Nietzsche’s understanding of the will to power as interpretation. Rather than following Kant’s conception of free will, she argues that through the will, something new enters the world with every newborn human being—a notion that resembles Zarathustra’s demand that the Übermensch should invent new values. Arendt also agrees with Nietzsche’s assertion that the "‘true world’" is a "fable," for Arendt because modern sciences possess no ultimate truths—a fact they themselves acknowledged around 1900, but which they now refuse to recognize. Thus, as heretics of science, Nietzsche and Arendt belong to the ranks of the "evil" philosophers. Arendt lived from 1906 to 1975 and is considered one of the great thinkers of the 20th century. The daughter of secular Jews, she studied in the 1920s in Marburg, Freiburg, and Heidelberg under such influential philosophers as Edmund Husserl, Karl Jaspers, and Martin Heidegger. As a young student, she was briefly involved with the latter. In 1933, she was forced to emigrate, and from 1941 she lived in the USA, where she began teaching at various universities in 1953. This unorthodox intellectual is best known for her critique of totalitarianism and her communicative concept of the political. Her 120th birthday provides sufficient reason to take a closer look at the intellectual relationship between Nietzsche and Arendt.

In the 1960s, Hannah Arendt emerged as a leading public intellectual in the United States—though not in Germany, where she was less appreciated. To conservatives, she was too liberal; to the left, she had equated the USSR with the Nazis. After several perilous escapes—in 1933 via Prague to Paris, in 1940 from the Gurs internment camp to Montauban, and in 1941 via Lisbon to New York—she gained prominence in 1951 with her seminal work on totalitarianism. Her controversial books include The Human Condition (1958), in which she questions the value of labor, and Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), in which she attributes the Holocaust to the nature of blind obedience. As a political theorist, she increasingly developed philosophical ideas, such as her view that Kant’s faculty of judgment is the most important political skill. Alongside the conservative Leo Strauss and the liberal John Rawls, the politically independent Arendt is considered one of the most significant political philosophers of the 20th century.

She commented on Nietzsche in her essay on Rosa Luxemburg, among other works. Hannah Arendt notes there that "only Nietzsche saw clearly [...] that the position and function of the Jews in Europe must inevitably make them the 'good Europeans' par excellence," and writes shortly thereafter:

While the self-deception of assimilated Jews usually consisted in the error of considering themselves as German as the Germans or as French as the French, the self-deception of intellectual Jews lay in the belief that they had no "fatherland," when in truth their fatherland was Europe.1

Jewish intellectuals maintained strong connections across national borders and therefore thought in European rather than national terms—entirely in line with Nietzsche’s repeatedly championed ideal of the "good European," who, as an "interpreter and mediator of peoples," is intended to "work toward the fusion of nations through action."2 soll.

Nietzsche, of course, hoped for a unified policy for a powerful Europe, whose nation-states largely dominated the world through their colonial empires toward the end of the 19th century. Thus, in 1884, he uttered those ominous words: "The time for small-scale politics is over: the very next century will bring a struggle for global dominance—the compulsion to engage in large-scale politics."3

Arendt does not share this assessment. For her, the imperialism of the 19th century paved the way for totalitarianism, a subject on which she published a thousand-page book in 1951 that brought her international fame: The Origins of Totalitarianism.

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1. Will to power instead of free will

Since the 19th century, philosophy has moved away from Kant’s critical thinking, which sets limits on reason. According to Arendt, this shift was driven by the "generation from Marx to Nietzsche," which assumed "that reason and philosophical thinking were no longer of any use and that 'critique' meant the intellectual destruction of everything it touches."4. For Marx, philosophy is idealism, to which he opposes a materialistic understanding that prioritizes the economy as the foundation.

Nietzsche, also no friend of Kant’s enlightened reason, replaces it with the will to power, which he understands as a biological driving force and as power over one's worldview—in other words, as an interpretation of the world. As it says in the Nachlass: "The will to power interprets [. . .]. In truth, interpretation is a means in itself, to become master of something (The organic process presupposes constant interpreting .)".)"5 Whoever has the power to make others understand a thing as something specific—for example, justifying torture as a means to supposedly save lives—asserts their will as power over the understanding of the world.

With this, Nietzsche discards the will as the foundation of freedom, as propagated by Augustine around 400 AD and as Kant would still understand it—namely, as a free will determined only by reason and not by emotions. Nietzsche dismisses such ideas as nonsense. As Arendt writes in her final completed work on Willing, the second volume of her major work The Life of the Mind, which was published after her death in 1975:

The most extreme example is Nietzsche, who argues that the entire doctrine of the will is the most consequential forgery ever to occur in psychology; he claims it was invented primarily to make punishment possible.6

This is where the paths of Nietzsche and Arendt partially diverge. For Nietzsche, power is realized in many ways through the will, a notion that ethicists are not fond of. Thus Spoke Zarathustra: "Only where there is life is there also will: not will to life, but—so I teach you—will to power!"7 Nietzsche’s vital will is not guided by reason.

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2. The human being as a new beginning rather than an Übermensch

However, Arendt by no means joins such critics of Nietzsche. For her, a properly defined will is not primarily the foundation of moral action. No, for Arendt, the will is the foundation of the individuality that makes a human being unique. As Arendt writes: "Undoubtedly, every human being, by the very fact of being born, is a new beginning, and their capacity for beginning could well correspond to this fact of human life."8

Such notions are not appreciated by those proponents of elitist state concepts who are oriented toward the community, as they believe the individual should instead subordinate themselves to the collective. Where would we end up if everyone pursued their own ideas! The young Nietzsche thinks similarly, whereas later, in Zarathustra he develops individualistic approaches:

There, where the state ends, is where the human being who is not superfluous begins: there begins the song of the necessary, the unique and irreplaceable way. There, where the state ends, – look there, my brothers! Do you not see the rainbow and the bridges of the Übermensch?9

Arendt is wary of Nietzsche’s Übermensch and does not adopt the term herself. However, just as the Übermensch is meant to invent new ethical values for Nietzsche, for Arendt, the human being uses the will to introduce new perspectives. She writes: The will “is just as obviously our mental organ for the future as memory is for the past.”10

For Arendt, the will makes every person unique, distinguishing them from others. Because of this difference, people must communicate with one another to bridge these gaps. Authoritarian regimes, especially totalitarian ones, use terror to flatten such differences so that communication is no longer necessary, replaced instead by marching in unison and singing together. The subjects then believe they are not responsible for their actions, as Eichmann, the organizer of the Holocaust, presented himself during his trial in Jerusalem.

When Arendt, in her moral-philosophical essay Eichmann in Jerusalem holds this ethics of submissiveness responsible for the Holocaust—a stance that pleased no political camp and drew fierce criticism—she can, however, appeal to Nietzsche. For he wrote around the turn of the year 1887/88: The state is

organized immorality … [/] inwardly: as police, criminal law, social classes, trade, family [/] outwardly: as the will to power, to war, to conquest, to revenge [/] how is it achieved that a large crowd does things to which the individual would never consent? [/] – by dividing responsibility [/] – of commanding and executing – [/] by interposing the virtues of obedience and duty[.]11

In doing so, Nietzsche describes the ethical preconditions for the Holocaust, which Arendt Eichmann in Jerusalem sees realized in the person of Eichmann, but which concerns all followers of all regimes that rely on such individuals, as the state apparatus would otherwise not function.

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3. “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable”

What they require for this is a shared, uniform understanding of reality based on the same conceptions of the world—that is, on what is, on being—in other words, a common religion or ideology. A prerequisite for this is an assessment shared by all members of society regarding what is true and what is false. Yet, in the age of modern science, this is by no means as self-evident as is currently being proclaimed by scientific experts.

While antiquity was familiar with a certain skepticism, it did not yet have a lasting problem of knowledge. Knowledge was either based on experience, as it was for Aristotle, or on the correct conceptual grasp of the world through Plato’s ideas, and was therefore considered true. Thus, Nietzsche writes under the heading “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable. The History of an Error”:

1. The true world—attainable for the wise, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, it is she. [/] (The oldest form of the idea, relatively clever, simple, convincing. A paraphrase of the sentence "I, Plato, am the truth".)12

Likewise, Christianity had no problem with cognition. God created the world and endowed humans with the reason to perceive the world correctly, provided that humans also adhere to the correct faith. Who believes that above all? Nietzsche writes: "The true world, [. . .] progress of the idea: it becomes finer, more elusive, more incomprehensible, – it becomes woman, it becomes Christian" (ibid.). The prerequisite for truth is faith, which women are supposedly more prone to than men, and not just in antiquity.

The emerging modern natural sciences cleared this away. Nevertheless, they cannot solve the problem of cognition. For without God as a guarantor, it is no longer certain whether reason can correctly grasp the world. Therefore, Descartes established subjectivism through radical doubt of all supposed certainties. In doing so, he arrived at the only firm point: the doubting and thinking self. Kant would differentiate subjectivism, so that for many it appeared as if truth were now well-founded. But for Arendt, this appearance is deceptive:

Only when science had not only proven that human senses were subject to error – which could be corrected in the light of new data, so that the "truth" revealed itself – but that the sensory apparatus could fundamentally not lead to evident certainties, did the human mind, now completely thrown back upon itself, begin with Descartes to look for a "certainty" that would be a pure datum of consciousness.13

Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" does not remain undisputed, however. On this, Arendt notes: Nietzsche assumed

that at least since Descartes, there had been no certainty left for humans, not even that they truly existed; they needed proof, not only for the existence of God, but also for their own. Descartes found the certainty of the "I am" in his cogito me cogitare, that is, in a mental experience for which none of the senses are necessary[.] […] This certainty, of course, is highly questionable.14

Therefore, Nietzsche refutes the ideology of positivism, founded by Auguste Comte, which was widespread in the 19th century alongside Marxism. Positivism relies on science and technology. But Comte is aware that even scientific findings are only relative, so that one does not grasp the world scientifically as it truly is. Thus, Nietzsche can state:

4. The true world – unattainable? In any case, unattained. And as unattained, also unknown. Consequently, also not comforting, redeeming, or binding: what could something unknown possibly bind us to? . . . [/] (Gray morning. First yawn of reason. Cockcrow of positivism.)15

Thus, Cartesian doubt was not stopped and ended around 1900 by scientific truth, but simply by the inability of the sciences to base true knowledge on an irrefutable foundation:

When it dawned on philosophers that "the new" in our current stance toward philosophy is a conviction that no previous age had: that we do not possess the truth. All earlier people "had the truth," even the skeptics. [...] But it was not until the end of the 19th century [...] that the conviction that one does not possess the truth became the general view of the educated and something of a zeitgeist, whose most fearless representative was arguably Nietzsche.16

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4. From Nietzsche through Heidegger to Arendt

Heidegger also builds on Nietzsche's thought. Arendt, for her part, engages intensively with Heidegger's later work, which revolves particularly around the question What is called thinking? . The first volume of Arendt's The Life of the Mind is indeed titled Thinking and spells out Heidegger's question further. And the second volume The Will follows up on Nietzsche's central concept of the will to power.

Certainly, Arendt doubts enlightened reason less than Nietzsche and Heidegger do. But she recognizes that Nietzsche's concept of the will corresponds to the spirit of the age when she writes:

In Nietzsche's "will to power," truth itself is understood as a function of life: what we call truth are those statements without which we could not continue to live. It is not reason, but our will to live that makes truth irresistible.17

For Arendt, the will not only supports individuality because it enables humans to bring something new into the world. Arendt interprets action—which in the philosophical tradition focuses on the realization of ends—primarily as communication, and thus as mutual understanding and as the interpretation of everything that happens in the world. From this perspective, she also comes close to Nietzsche's understanding of the will to power as interpretation.

Thus, Arendt praises Nietzsche philosophically: "Nietzsche analyzed the spirit of this post-Kantian German philosophy with unsurpassed clarity; he knew this philosophy only too well and eventually followed a similar, perhaps even more extreme path"18, which Arendt follows to some extent. Like many German philosophers, Nietzsche wants to leave Kant's subjectivism behind. But that is difficult. Nietzsche radicalizes subjectivism even further by interpreting Kant's mathematical category of quantity as idealism. Arendt also continues to think through Kant by rethinking him; for her, the power of judgment plays the decisive role in politics, not in aesthetics. Thus, similar intellectual movements can be found in both Nietzsche and Arendt.

In this way, Arendt praises Nietzsche politically,

whose so frequently misunderstood remarks on the Jewish question stem entirely from a concern for "good Europeanism," and whose assessment of the Jews in the intellectual life of his time is therefore astonishingly fair, free of resentment, sentimentality, and cheap philosemitism.19

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Bibliography

Arendt, Hannah: The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), 9th ed. Munich 2003.

Ibid.: Rosa Luxemburg (1966). In: Men in Dark Times (1968), 2nd ed. Munich 1989.

Ibid. The Life of the Mind – Willing (1977), 2nd ed. Munich 2002.

Ibid., Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (1970). In: Ibid.: Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (1982). Munich & Zurich 1998.

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Footnotes

1: Rosa Luxemburg, p. 57.

2: Human, All Too Human I, aph. 475.

3: Beyond Good and Evil, aph. 208.

4: Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, p. 52.

5: Posthumous Fragments, no. 1885 2[148].

6: The Will, p. 246.

7: Thus Spoke Zarathustra, On Self-Overcoming.

8: The Will, p. 248.

9: Thus Spoke Zarathustra, On the New Idol.

10: The Will, p. 252.

11: Posthumous Fragments, no. 1887 11[407].

12: Twilight of the Idols, How the "true world" …

13: The Will, p. 378.

14: Ibid.

15: Twilight of the Idols, How the "true world" …

16: The Will, p. 379.

17: Ibid., p. 350.

18: Ibid., p. 385.

19: The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 72.

From the Will to Power to the Human Being as a New Beginning

Nietzsche from Hannah Arendt's Perspective

In her major work The Life of the Mind, Arendt builds upon Nietzsche’s understanding of the will to power as interpretation. Rather than following Kant’s conception of free will, she argues that through the will, something new enters the world with every newborn human being—a notion that resembles Zarathustra’s demand that the Übermensch should invent new values. Arendt also agrees with Nietzsche’s assertion that the "‘true world’" is a "fable," for Arendt because modern sciences possess no ultimate truths—a fact they themselves acknowledged around 1900, but which they now refuse to recognize. Thus, as heretics of science, Nietzsche and Arendt belong to the ranks of the "evil" philosophers.

Arendt lived from 1906 to 1975 and is considered one of the great thinkers of the 20th century. The daughter of secular Jews, she studied in the 1920s in Marburg, Freiburg, and Heidelberg under such influential philosophers as Edmund Husserl, Karl Jaspers, and Martin Heidegger. As a young student, she was briefly involved with the latter. In 1933, she was forced to emigrate, and from 1941 she lived in the USA, where she began teaching at various universities in 1953. This unorthodox intellectual is best known for her critique of totalitarianism and her communicative concept of the political.

Her 120th birthday provides sufficient reason to take a closer look at the intellectual relationship between Nietzsche and Arendt.

You can listen to and watch a version of this text, read by the author himself and supplemented with original audio clips of Arendt, on YouTube and Soundcloud .

The Atheist as Overtrainer

Nietzsche and the New Devoutness in Sports

The Atheist as Overtrainer

Nietzsche and the New Devoutness in Sports

6.10.26
Christian Saehrendt

More and more professional athletes are openly embracing their religious faith – and some even cite Nietzsche as a source of ideological motivation. What is behind the Nietzsche worship among some athletes? Is Nietzsche really suitable as a motivator for physical training? And: Is the well-known atheist Nietzsche a better coach than God?

More and more professional athletes are openly embracing their religious faith – and some even cite Nietzsche as a source of ideological motivation. What is behind the Nietzsche worship among some athletes? Is Nietzsche really suitable as a motivator for physical training? And: Is the well-known atheist Nietzsche a better coach than God?

It has become somewhat fashionable in professional sports to profess one's faith during competition, on social media, or in interviews: with God's help, athletes reach the final; God decides the penalty shootout; "thank heaven" for new personal bests! On the other hand, Nietzsche, the notorious denier of God, is also occasionally cited as a sports apostle. Who is the better coach? God or Friedrich?

A number of top athletes have presented themselves as devout Muslims or Christians in recent years. Professing Muslims include, for example, the Egyptian world-class player Mohamed Salah (who often celebrates his goals by kneeling on the pitch and touching his forehead to the ground in gratitude to Allah), French stars Karim Benzema and Paul Pogba, or the former German national player Antonio Rüdiger. Some Christian professional footballers also show their fans how important their faith is to them, as seen at the last World Cup. After the final whistle of the German World Cup opening match, five men formed a circle on the pitch. Goalscorer Felix Nmecha stood there, arm in arm with national team colleague Jonathan Tah – and three players in the jerseys of their opponents, Curacao. Their heads were bowed; they were praying together. Nmecha is one of the leading figures of the "Ballers in God," an association of evangelical footballers. Devout Christians also excel in other sports. The Serbian tennis star Novak Djokovic professed his faith directly on the tennis court after his 2024 Olympic victory. Artistic gymnast Simone Biles (multiple Olympic gold and silver medalist in 2024) identifies as a devout Christian, as does the German shot putter and Olympic champion Yemisi Ogunleye.

Occasionally, one also finds self-proclaimed atheists or agnostics in professional sports, such as Formula 1 driver Fernando Alonso Diaz, football coach Pep Guardiola, and Spanish tennis star Rafael Nadal.1  

By contrast, it was not as easy to find a top athlete who professes to follow Nietzsche. Notable examples here would be boxing legend Mike Tyson, Japanese professional footballer Makoto Hasebe, and French professional cyclist Guillaume Martin-Guyonnet. Tyson's profession of Nietzsche in the Wall Street Journal –

I love reading philosophical texts. Most philosophers are so politically incorrect – they call the status quo into question, even the existence of God. Nietzsche is my favorite philosopher. He is just insane. You have to have an IQ of at least 300 to truly understand him.2  

– occurred, however, at a time when his active boxing career had already ended. Whether he also read Nietzsche in his younger years, at the height of his career, to motivate himself is unknown and not very likely. Instead, he converted to Islam at that time in a high-profile manner, much like Cassius Clay once did. The former Eintracht Frankfurt professional (now assistant coach for the second team in the Regionalliga Südwest) and long-time captain of the Japanese national football team (114 matches), Makoto Hasebe, declared in 2014 that he read Nietzsche.3 Accordingly, he was strongly influenced by Nietzsche while writing his book "The Order of the Soul: 56 Habits to Achieve Victory."4 Hasebe thus wrote a philosophy bestseller that sold nearly two million copies in Japan (unfortunately, there is no German edition). He declined an interview request on this topic. However, Guillaume Martin-Guyonnet (cf. Fig. 1) was willing to collaborate and will be quoted several times throughout this article. Martin-Guyonnet has also emerged as a theorist; a few years ago, he completed a master's thesis on the topic "Sport as a Contemporary Application of Nietzsche's Philosophy." Furthermore, he has published two books in the field of "Sport and Philosophy."5

In strength sports, bodybuilding, and among personal trainers, however, Nietzsche’s name is heard more frequently. The following discussion will be guided by a few fundamental questions: Which of Nietzsche’s quotes, thoughts, or texts are most often used as sources of motivation in sports? In what ways could Nietzsche contribute to achieving better athletic performance or winning competitions?

Is Nietzsche more of a mentor for open combat in competition, for the wild and dramatic duel against an opponent, or is he a philosopher for training, recovery, and systematic preparation? Is Nietzsche a better mentor than other philosophers or religious figures? In this sense: Is Nietzsche, widely known as a "denier of God," a better coach than God?

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Figure 1: Le Ubermensch Guillaume Martin-Guyonnet. Copyright: Guillaume Martin-Guyonnet 2026.

I. Nietzsche on Sport and the Body

The topic of "Nietzsche and sport" appears to be a paradox: During Nietzsche’s lifetime, the concept of modern sport in its two forms—as a performance-oriented body cult and multi-billion-dollar entertainment machine, and as grassroots public health exercise—did not yet exist. The Olympic Games were only revived in 1896, and football was still an eccentric pastime for young Britons. At most, the gymnastics movement of the nationalist educator Friedrich Ludwig Jahn was established in 19th-century Germany, and by 1818 it already had 12,000 members who engaged in military training and patriotic rituals. Jahn introduced the horizontal bar and parallel bars as sports equipment; he is considered the inventor of artistic gymnastics, which has been used to torment children and teenagers in physical education for 200 years now. At the time, school and club sports served, among other things, to ensure the military readiness of male youth.  

We do not know how Nietzsche fared at gymnastics.6 Later, as an adult, he did at least take regular walks—to what extent he pushed his physical limits, especially in the Alps, is also unknown; he was likely more of a flâneur than an extreme athlete. Anyone expecting concrete advice from him on sports and training will be disappointed. For Nietzsche, the priority is a fundamentally positive image of the body, which must be asserted against a body-hostile morality and religion so that one can first become a complete human being (in this sense, the Übermensch). Nietzsche’s goal is to combat the contempt for the body that prevailed at the time, which went hand in hand with the glorification of the mind and soul:  

The body is something evil, beauty is a devilry; thin, hideous, starved, black, dirty, that is how the body should look. To sin against the body is, to me, a sin against the earth and the meaning of the earth. Woe to the unhappy one to whom the body seems evil and beauty devilish!7  

Elsewhere he writes:  

The concepts of "soul," "spirit," and finally even "immortal soul," were invented to despise the body, to make it sick—"holy"—to treat all things that deserve seriousness in life, the questions of food, housing, spiritual diet, medical treatment, cleanliness, and weather, with a terrifying frivolity!8

Instead, people should become aware of the inseparable connection between mind and body and live accordingly. Physical training precedes spiritual elevation: "[F]irst develop the body to a high level: the way of thinking will follow."9

In some of Nietzsche's statements, one even gets the impression that he places the body above the mind and views intellectual achievement as a mere derivation of physical vitality:  

Behind your thoughts and feelings stands your body and your self within the body: the terra incognita. Why do you have these thoughts and these feelings? Your self within the body wants something with them.10  
And in short: perhaps the entire development of the mind is about the body: it is the tangible history of a higher body forming itself . The organic is ascending to even higher levels. Our greed for knowledge of nature is a means by which the body seeks to perfect itself.11

The mental approach to one's own body, the affirmation of the body, and liberation from anti-physical and anti-sensual Christian morality were important steps for Nietzsche toward becoming a (super)human. Nietzsche used the word "gymnastic" rather than "sport" or "training," though not in reference to physical exercise, but rather metaphorically in relation to the training of the mind.12  

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Figure 2: Symbolization of modern mass sports. Albert Gleizes: Football Players (1912/13) (Source).

II. Development in Modern Sport

Starting in Great Britain and the USA, the concept of entertaining and competitive sport spread across Europe at the end of the 19th century. Industrialization, mass media, and the sports industry developed in parallel, exerting mutual influence on one another. Sport became a mirror of the capitalist economy and the world of work. Records, performance metrics, and competition defined the rules and dynamics of sporting events, while results became the subject of lucrative betting, media coverage, and investment. Sports clubs became places where regional or social identity was manifested, and national teams in international competitions strengthened national consciousness in the participating countries. Furthermore, sport, like industry, underwent a constant evolution toward more intensive rationalization, specialization, and mechanization. "Modern sport," as Adorno recognized decades ago,  

seeks to return to the body some of the functions that the machine has taken away from it. But it seeks to do so in order to train people all the more relentlessly to operate the machine. It tends to assimilate the body to the machine, which is why it belongs to the realm of unfreedom, wherever it is organized.13  

The "mechanization of the body" continued unabated until the turn of the millennium, leading philosopher Volker Caysa to suggest as early as 1997 that sport could lead to the "death of the body"14 —a thesis that has gained plausibility against the current backdrop of Neuralink and cyborg experiments, the use of prosthetics, and "Enhanced Games." The joyful, free, and playful sport of the "amateur" is now merely a distant memory; even in recreational and grassroots sports, there is pressure for "professionalism" and measurable "performance." Today, sports and professional athletes are subjected to scientific and technological optimization processes; they are given machine bodies, which in turn serve as mass-media entertainment objects and advertising vehicles for products that benefit in some way from the aura of youthfulness surrounding sports and athletes. These products in the sectors of nutrition, clothing, footwear, vehicles, and sports equipment are designed for the mass market of recreational athletes who practice their hobby as professionally as possible in order to turn their own bodies into a fetish for their dreams of self-optimization and longevity. But even non-athletes want to benefit from the aura of sports products and merchandise. The triumph of sweatpants as everyday and street wear for passive sports fans and non-athletes alone is proof of this. Sports-enthusiastic average earners, on the other hand, use online courses, gyms, trackers, and apps in addition to their equipment. And those who can afford it work with hired nutritionists, physiotherapists, and personal trainers. While grassroots sport in the age of nationalism served primarily "public health"—specifically the strengthening of military and reproductive capacity, because healthy workers were needed for industry and masses of infantry for the armies—today it is primarily individuals who want to optimize and distinguish themselves through a sporty lifestyle, or at least simulate one through suitable products.

According to Niklas Luhmann, the following applies today to both professional and grassroots sports:  

In sports, what stands out is the extreme reduction of broader meanings, which then serves as the foundation for a complex arrangement of performance evaluations, measurements, ratings, comparisons, progress, and setbacks.15  

Numbers, data, and measurement methods seem to stand on their own here. As a counterweight to this essentially dull and sterile technologization of the body, athletes put on an aesthetically enhanced and morally saturated body show for the media and spectators. To this end, athletes and sports officials widely cater to the perpetual expectation of the audience that fair and honest competitions are taking place—that the athletes are competing not for money, but, like the amateurs of old, out of passion and love for the game and the sport. On one hand, modern sport embodies a "hyper-individualism"16 and presupposes a winner's instinct, writes Guillaume Martin-Guyonnet; on the other hand, the Olympic movement and the official sports world demand altruistic team performance, which must be hypocritical and is bound to provoke distrust.17  

"This split in elite sports between a show on one side and moralizing rhetoric on the other reveals the state of society more clearly than any contemporary play," sports sociologist Gunter Gebauer criticized as early as 1997.18

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Figure 3: Mentzer's training partner was not a human—it was the will to power. Screenshot "NIETZSCHE WAS MY TRAINING PARTNER!", Heavy Duty College. Online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rIeQKeVmwT0 (04/04/2025)

III. Nietzsche-inspired athletes

Body machines, commercial body shows, nationalism, commerce, pointlessness, and double standards—it is unlikely that Nietzsche would have approved of today's sports world in any way. Nevertheless, Nietzsche is considered a role model in some athletic circles, a kind of "super-coach" capable of decisively changing an athlete's mindset. He is seen as an apologist for the human individual who transcends themselves. This line of thinking is extremely popular in sports because it suggests not only surpassing previous performances, personal bests, and rankings, but also a literal physical expansion through newly acquired muscle mass that bursts out of clothing that has become too tight: the joyfully noted "bulging out" of bodybuilders and recreational gym-goers. It is therefore not surprising that Nietzsche's work serves as a quarry for motivational quotes for trainers, fitness YouTubers, and personal coaches. Here are a few examples from online research. For instance, bodybuilder Alexander Bromley explains on his YouTube channel "What Nietzsche Taught Me About Lifting Weights", while a Texan coach asks the question: "Should Friedrich Nietzsche be your personal trainer?", and adorns his "Friedrich Nietzsche training method" with the famous quote: "That which does not kill us makes us stronger."19 English personal trainer Daniel Welsteadt promises: "By integrating the teachings of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer into my coaching, I can inspire my clients to tap into their inner warriors and tackle their fitness challenges head-on."20 Sports journalist Mandy Bonilla reasons: "Why most men quit the gym after six weeks: Nietzsche knew it 150 years ago." According to Bonilla, Nietzsche saw

the modern impulse to seek comfort as a direct path to weakness. For the German philosopher, hardship was a necessary resistance that forges a stronger will. He believed that this is the only source of any true improvement for humanity.21

On the YouTube channel "Heavy-Duty-College," the American bodybuilder and 1978 Mr. Universe titleholder, Mike Mentzer (1951–2001), is posthumously portrayed as a staunch Nietzschean (cf. Fig. 3):

In a world full of noise... one man trained in silence. While others chased the hype, Mike Mentzer sought the truth – in the works of Nietzsche. This is not just a story about sets and reps. It is about pain. Philosophy. Strength. And the fire it takes to build not just a body... but a higher self. In the weeks before he made history as Mr. Universe, Mentzer’s training partner was not a human – it was the will to power. Nietzsche’s words lit the fuse. The iron forged the rest. What does it take to become an Übermensch? Solitude. Suffering. And a soul forged in fire.22

In retrospect, Mentzer, who died of a morphine overdose in 2001, is stylized as the incarnation of Nietzsche’s Übermensch.

For Guillaume Martin-Guyonnet, the true Übermenschen are the extreme athletes who push the boundaries of what is humanly possible – mind you, without doping.23 Regarding the quote "That which does not kill us makes us stronger," Martin-Guyonnet says:  

While it is true that Nietzsche’s words are often taken out of context and psychologized to praise particularly resilient people, in this case, it actually hits the nail on the head. I have therefore made this quote my mantra in a way. Nietzsche understood that physical exertion and hard training, which is, after all, a form of aggression against one's own body, ultimately lead to an increase in performance and resilience.24  

In summary: The master trainer Nietzsche stands for toughness toward oneself, trainable willpower, and resilience against setbacks. His teachings are applicable to endurance training as well as strength and combat sports. Most frequently cited from his "war school of life" is the famous aphorism, "What does not kill me makes me stronger." Also very well known is the sentence from Zarathustra:

Those who have always spared themselves too much will eventually fall ill from all that sparing. Praised be what makes one hard! I do not praise the land where milk and honey flow!25  

And finally, the sentence: "He who has a why to live for can bear almost any how"26, forms the foundation of all capacity for performance and endurance in training as well as in life.

Another, somewhat less frequently mentioned topos that makes Nietzsche interesting for athletes is the idea of an individual will to victory that can be awakened and trained. In an acute duel situation, this "will to power" makes the decisive difference against competitors who are equally well-trained and physically just as strong. Former MMA fighter Josh Barnett, who introduces himself on his website as a "master mixed martial artist better described as a Nietzsche-quoting warrior poet," sees Nietzsche as practically an apostle of combat sports:

When I am in the ring fighting another human being—for my life, for my livelihood—that is the moment when I feel most in harmony with my being. That is something Nietzsche described as the highest state of existence.27

However, Nietzsche’s concept of the "will to power" is not strictly about defeating an opponent and taking control of them—that is, seizing power in the ring. Rather, his "will to power" stands for a holistic affirmation of life with its constant becoming and passing away, its constant struggle and striving, and is thus more of a general expression of the vitalist-biological zeitgeist of the 19th century:  

And do you know what "the world" is to me? Shall I show it to you in my mirror? This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end, a firm, iron magnitude of energy […]: this, my Dionysian A world of eternal self-creation, of eternal self-destruction […] – This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides!28

Perhaps there is a misunderstanding here, a mistake made by athletes in taking Coach Nietzsche too literally. For Guillaume Martin-Guyonnet this would be a distortion of thought for practical purposes:

That does not correspond to my understanding of philosophy, which, in my view, does not necessarily have to be useful. Rather, philosophy is valuable because it shakes you to your core. In short: if philosophy has helped me in cycling, it is less because of the ideas I have taken from it, and more because it has enabled me to find a kind of balance, to recognize that there are other worlds beyond the life of a top athlete. Conversely, I am convinced that sport has always helped me to think more clearly.29

For Martin-Guyonnet, "this inseparability of body and mind" is an original Nietzschean idea. As an athlete, he is directly drawn to "the central role he assigns to the body in his work," as well as "Nietzsche's concrete observations (especially in Ecce Homo) on the question of the optimal environment for personal development, the best diet, etc. [...] Nietzsche's strength also lies in the fact that his work encourages readers to think and interpret actively."30  

For professional cyclist Martin-Guyonnet, Nietzsche is therefore not a coach whose motivational slogans one memorizes and applies directly to training. He views his philosophy as a holistic companion for life and a means of shaping one's personality, with better athletic performance and more composed behavior in extreme situations as a side effect.

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Figure 4: Nibbling on the will to power. Nietzsche energy bar "Will-to-Power-Bar" (Online Sale Unemployed Philosophers Guild USA, out of stock).

IV. Conclusion: Nietzsche or God?

So, is Nietzsche a better sports mentor than other philosophers or religious figures? Is Nietzsche, widely known as a "denier of God," a better coach than—God? Setting aside the fact that Nietzsche neither denied nor killed God—he merely wished for a different, life-affirming, sensual, and body-friendly God31 – he is indeed the philosopher who could be most helpful to athletes. Nietzsche is closer to sports than an abstract, rewarding, punishing, or all-controlling God because Nietzsche values the body, has recognized the inextricable connection between body and mind, and preaches a holistic, dietary lifestyle. In this sense, then: Yes, Nietzsche is a better coach than God.

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Article image

The Six-Pack Monument. Plastic Citius – Altius – Fortius by the Spanish artist Miguel Ortiz Berrocal in the park of the Olympic Museum in Lausanne. Photo: Christian Saehrendt 2023.

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Bibliography

Adorno, Theodor W.: The Realm of Unfreedom and Sport. In: Volker Caysa (ed.): Philosophy of Sport. Leipzig 1997, pp. 42 f.

Balmer, Rudolf: Sisyphus in the Saddle. Online: https://taz.de/Erfolglose-Franzosen-der-Tour-de-France/!5425567/ (07/01/2017).

Barnett, Josh: Josh ‘The Warmaster’ Barnett. Online: https://www.joshbarnett.com/thewarmaster.

Bates, Steve: Hasebe, an author and philosopher. Online:

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/sports/football/fifa-world-cup/hasebe-an-author-and-philosopher/articleshow/64822264.cms (07/02/2018).

Bonilla, Mandy: Why most men quit the gym in 6 weeks. Nietzsche nailed it 150 years ago. Online: https://www.msn.com/en-us/health/fitness/why-most-men-quit-the-gym-in-6-weeks-nietzsche-nailed-it-150-years-ago/ss-AA21h2ZC (04/19/2026).  

Caysa, Volker: Foreword. In: Idem (Ed.): Sportphilosophie. Leipzig 1997, pp. 7–13.

Gebauer, Gunter: From Body Technologization to Body Show. In: Volker Caysa (ed.): Philosophy of Sport. Leipzig 1997, pp. 275–289.

KellyPersonalTraining, Should Friedrich Nietzsche be your personal trainer? Online: https://kellypersonaltraining.com/blog-overview/2016/10/04/should-friedrich-nietzsche-be-your-personal-trainer (04/11/2017).

Legros, Martin & Guillaume Martin: Guillaume Martin: "I have made Nietzsche's words my mantra". Online: https://www.philomag.de/artikel/guillaume-martin-ich-habe-nietzsches-worte-zu-meinem-mantra-gemacht (09/15/2020).

Luhmann, Niklas: The Body as a Vanishing Point of Meaninglessness. In: Volker Caysa (ed.): Philosophy of Sport, Leipzig 1997, pp. 226–228.

Martin-Guyonnet, Guillaume: DThe Society of the Peloton. A Philosophy of the Individual in the Group. Bielefeld 2022.

Idem: Socrates on a Racing Bike. A Tour de France of Philosophers. Bielefeld 2021.

Sickenberger, Ulrika: The Football Philosopher. Online:

https://www.bild.de/sport/fussball/makoto-hasebe/der-fussball-philosoph-makoto-hasebe-37122128.bild.html (08/06/2014).  

TS Staff: Top 15 Athletes Who Are Atheist. Online: https://www.thesportster.com/entertainment/top-15-athletes-who-are-atheist/ (09/24/2014).

Tyson, Mike: Mike Tyson Explores Kierkegaard. Online: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303932504579256390785052798 (12/13/2013).

Welstead, Daniel: Warrior Wisdom. Online: https://www.danielwelstead.com/post/warrior-wisdom-how-philosophy-fuels-your-fitness-game (05/06/2023).

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Footnotes

1: Cf. TS Staff, Top 15 Athletes Who Are Atheist.

2: Mike Tyson, Mike Tyson Explores Kierkegaard (trans. Paul Stephan).

3: Cf. Steve Bates: Hasebe, an author and philosopher.

4: Cf. Ulrika Sickenberger, The Football Philosopher.

5: Cf. Guillaume Martin-Guyonnet, The Society of the Peloton and ibid., Socrates on a Racing Bike.

6: In any case, he did a lot of gymnastics as a student at Schulpforta. It is mentioned remarkably often in the letters to his mother during his school years, though they do not allow for any conclusions about his skill in the activity. The word "turnen" (gymnastics) is also firmly part of Nietzsche's vocabulary.

7: Unpublished Fragments, no. 1882 5[30].

8: Ecce Homo, Why I Am a Destiny, sec. 8.

9: Unpublished Fragments 1884, no. 1884 26[353].

10: Unpublished Fragments, no. 1882 5[31].

11: Unpublished Fragments, no. 1883 24[16].

12: Cf. e.g. Human, All Too Human I, aph. 252 & 266 and Twilight of the Idols, Expeditions, aph. 23. In this metaphorical sense, Nietzsche also uses the word "gymnastics" twice (cf. Daybreak, aph. 207 & Human, All Too Human II, The Wanderer and His Shadow, aph. 4). Nietzsche only uses the terms "training" and "sport" in his work in the third essay of the On the Genealogy of Morality – and specifically as English loanwords, to disparagingly characterize the numbing self-practices that the ascetic priests recommend in order to escape "ressentiment." In his posthumous papers, there is another interesting use of the word "sport": "More natural is our first society, that of the rich, the idle: one hunts one another, sexual love is a kind of sport in which marriage provides both an obstacle and an incentive; one converses and lives for the sake of pleasure; one values physical advantages above all else, one is curious and daring" (no. 1887 10[53]).

13: Theodor W. Adorno, The Realm of Unfreedom and Sport, p. 43.

14: Volker Caysa, Preface, p. 11.

15: Niklas Luhmann, The Body as the Vanishing Point of Meaninglessness, p. 228.

16: Martin-Guyonnet, The Society of the Peloton, p. 29.

17: Cf. ibid., pp. 107 f.

18: Gunter Gebauer, From Body Technologization to Body Show, p. 289.

19: Cf. KellyPersonalTraining, Should Friedrich Nietzsche be your personal trainer? However, the author changes the pronoun in the original quote: "What does not kill me makes me stronger" (Twilight of the Idols, Maxims and Arrows, aph. 8).

20: Daniel Welstead, Warrior Wisdom (trans. Paul Stephan).

21: Why most men quit the gym in 6 weeks (Trans. Paul Stephan).

22: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rIeQKeVmwT0 (04/04/2025) (Trans. Christian Saehrendt).

23: Cf. Rudolf Balmer, Sisyphus in the Saddle.

24: Martin Legros & Guillaume Martin: Guillaume Martin: "I have made Nietzsche's words my mantra".

25: Thus Spoke Zarathustra, The Wanderer.

26: Twilight of the Idols, Maxims and Arrows, aph. 12.

27: Josh Barnett, Josh ‘The Warmaster’ Barnett (Trans. Paul Stephan).

28: Unpublished Fragments, no. 1885 38[12].

29: Guillaume Martin-Guyonnet in an email to the author (April 15, 2026).

30: Guillaume Martin-Guyonnet in an email to the author (April 15, 2026).

31: Cf. especially The Gay Science, aph. 125 and also the following remark: “The whole long, immense ladder of light and color of happiness was called by the Greek […] by the god’s name: Dionysus” (Unpublished Fragments, no. 1885 41[6]).

The Atheist as Overtrainer

Nietzsche and the New Devoutness in Sports

More and more professional athletes are openly embracing their religious faith – and some even cite Nietzsche as a source of ideological motivation. What is behind the Nietzsche worship among some athletes? Is Nietzsche really suitable as a motivator for physical training? And: Is the well-known atheist Nietzsche a better coach than God?

Materialism and the Problem of Morality 2

PART 2: Eternity and the Other: Levinas, Ethics as First Philosophy, and Materialism

Materialism and the Problem of Morality

Reflections with Deleuze/Guattari, Clouscard, and Levinas

PART 2: Eternity and the Other: Levinas, Ethics as First Philosophy, and Materialism

28.9.26
Robert Ziegler

Materialist metaphysics, as practiced by Spinoza, Nietzsche, or Deleuze and Guattari, has proven incapable of accounting for fundamental moral convictions. Nietzsche is at least radical enough to acknowledge this incommensurability and draw the corresponding conclusions. If one is unwilling to accept this, the only remaining path is to adopt the "view from eternity" alongside metaphysics: from that vantage point, one can only unconditionally affirm a groundless reality. Perhaps, however, the more promising answer is that of Emmanuel Levinas: his materialism allows morality to emerge from the encounter with the Other, and in doing so, he almost incidentally shatters the unity of metaphysics that even such radical thinkers as Deleuze and Guattari still took for granted.

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Read the the first part.

Materialist metaphysics, as practiced by Spinoza, Nietzsche, or Deleuze and Guattari, has proven incapable of accounting for fundamental moral convictions. Nietzsche is at least radical enough to acknowledge this incommensurability and draw the corresponding conclusions. If one is unwilling to accept this, the only remaining path is to adopt the "view from eternity" alongside metaphysics: from that vantage point, one can only unconditionally affirm a groundless reality. Perhaps, however, the more promising answer is that of Emmanuel Levinas: his materialism allows morality to emerge from the encounter with the Other, and in doing so, he almost incidentally shatters the unity of metaphysics that even such radical thinkers as Deleuze and Guattari still took for granted.

IV. Moral Substitute

However, the fact that there is a deeply felt moral impulse behind the seemingly detached materialism of Deleuze and Guattari is evident not only from various anecdotes about their lives,3 but also, quite systematically, from the fact that they always resisted the great temptation of this metaphysics: for if reality can be reduced to an immanent field of forces and flows governed by no other laws or standards of value, there is little to stand in the way of a pathetic or cynical apotheosis of the strong and victorious. What the Genealogy of Morals demonstrated is consistently continued in some varieties of neo-reactionary thought that explicitly draw on Deleuze and Guattari (e.g., Nick Land, who has evolved from a philosopher trained in left-wing post-structuralism in the 1990s into a leading thinker of the reactionary "Dark Enlightenment").

The way out is obvious: one declares that an ethics of flows, if properly understood, must naturally lead to behavior that, as if by chance, is indistinguishable from what morality demands. Three such strategies can be distinguished:

First, one can show that the maximum realization of human potential for happiness can be achieved through mutual consideration and support. In Deleuze and Guattari, this is marked by the "revolutionary," "molecular" pole of desire, where machines show themselves to be maximally ready for connection and flexible. Spinoza captured this argument in the concise formula: "Nothing, then, is more useful to man than man"4.

However (as Spinoza's phrasing already suggests), this strategy approaches a utilitarian argument—and is therefore subject to all the well-known objections to utilitarianism. Not least, all utilitarianism is ultimately an extended form of egoism, meaning that all "altruistic" actions (despite any efforts toward universalism) remain subject to self-interest. In the same vein, it is also difficult to see what answer this strategy could offer if a desire were simply oriented differently, in a "fascistoid" way, and found its fulfillment in the subjugation and oppression of others.  

Admittedly, the materialism that Deleuze and Guattari present in the tradition of Nietzsche can counter the charge of egoism: Second, egoism cannot be the final word because the ego itself is subjected to a systematic metaphysical deconstruction. Where other metaphysics see rigid, delimited identities as the ultimate elements, beings in the plane of immanence interpenetrate one another, so that my pursuit of happiness always already includes that of others: It should not considerthem, but since I and the others are never sharply distinguished, and we rather interpenetrate one another, it is never actually just about me, even if I mistakenly assume so. My desire is an integral of countless desires, both micro- and macroscopic, both "my own" and "those of others." Sadism, paranoia, the "addiction to survive"5, the will to power, which understands itself as the subjugation of all others: these are all names for a form of desire organization that still fatally misunderstands the nature of desire and reality as such.  

However, as the phrasing already indicates, no "ought" follows from this perspective either. One searches in vain for the imperative of morality within this metaphysics of mutual interpenetration. At best, it yields rules of prudence that advise against ruthlessness toward others for the sake of one's own modicum of happiness. Moreover, the fact that other desires are integrated into my own remains so formal that the manner of this integration is left open. The path for a sadistic use of other desires is not blocked by this theory.  

Third this materialism ascends once more to a higher standpoint, from which the play of finite currents and forces is transfigured in the light of eternity. In this elevation to eternity, the metaphysics of immanence testifies to its unbroken solidarity with the tradition of metaphysics, which it is otherwise so ready to criticize.

For Spinoza, this is the "viewpoint of eternity" under which everything presents itself to reason; for Nietzsche, it is the Eternal Recurrence; and even for Deleuze and Guattari, this perspective is always present when they extract the great regularities of the real. In the "roar of being," Deleuze, at the end of Difference and Repetition , found a particularly poignant formula for what presents itself to the philosopher under the viewpoint of eternity:

But Everything is equal and Everything returns can only be said where the extreme peak of difference has been reached. One and the same voice for all the many, which knows a thousand paths; one and the same ocean for all drops; a single roar of being for all beings.6

And this vision of the totality of being provides all ethics with a non-egoistic foundation: namely, in the absolute affirmation of being as such, which is conditioned by nothing else. Such an invitation—for it can be nothing more than an invitation—to absolute affirmation is found in Spinoza (there as the love of God, who is pantheistically identified with the totality of beings), in Nietzsche, and in Deleuze/Guattari. Admittedly, a justification for morality cannot be derived from there either: the affirmation of totality is a tuning into the movements of the Absolute itself, an agreement with them. And even if these movements prove continuously indifferent to the fate and suffering of living, feeling, and ultimately thinking beings, cynicism or indifference does not follow from them. On the contrary: the view of the entirety of the real, with all its brutality and meaninglessness, with its beauty and its abomination, with its life and its eternal coldness all at once, this view often causes us to soften and to recognize the other and their suffering as closely related to us and our own, perhaps even (as with Schopenhauer) identical. The vision of the suffering of all can bring others close to me as companions in this suffering. In this respect, the ethics of affirming the totality of being can have consequences for my behavior toward others; a moral obligation however, cannot be established even by this.

It remains the case, therefore, that the plane of immanence of materialism, even in its most advanced metaphysical form—in which it curiously converges again with very traditional notions of wisdom—cannot establish a moral obligation. Where would such an obligation come from, and how could it be justified? Morality, i.e., the idea of a normativity that is in some way binding and obligates us, cannot arise from nature; for that, sources are needed that lie beyond the merely natural—or so it seems.

Cynical appropriation seems to be a constant companion of this materialism: whether one reads Spinoza as a pioneer of capitalist competition, Nietzsche as a prophet of fascism, or Deleuze and Guattari as visionaries of disruption, accelerationism, and decoding—the rejection of moral judgments always carries the danger of a deliberately immoral interpretation. Can one counter these appropriations? Can the lust for fascism be effectively criticized within the framework of materialism? More generally, can one seriously dispense with morality and deny its unconditional character by equating production with artificiality? Or must all materialism fail in this regard?  

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V. Breaking with the Panorama

It is not possible to answer all these questions here with systematic depth. At the very least, one final point can be made: if, as suggested at the beginning, we define "materialism" as any philosophy that renounces transcendence in order to explain all finite beings solely through one another and their relationships, then it is not materialism in general that fails in the confrontation with morality. At least one materialist in this sense can be cited who draws entirely different conclusions from this limitation to the "plane of immanence": I am speaking of the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995).

Undoubtedly, Levinas would have resisted the label of materialism; yet in the specific sense I have in mind, it is fitting for him: while his philosophy has a strong religious inspiration, uses theological terms and topoi, and speaks of God, it never, as a philosophy, becomes a speculation or theory about what is expressed by these religious terms. The religious never denotes another level of being or a higher dimension from which the finite becomes intelligible. Levinas never employs the religious in the sense of a transcendence intended to serve as an explanation. Transcendence is what reveals itself in the Other, that is (to speak with Martin Buber), only in the Thou.7 This means that I can address transcendence at most in the way I address a person—that is, speak to them—but not in the way one speaks about a topic.  

In the strict sense of establishing a plane of immanence, Levinas's philosophy is indeed materialism. And it is a description of the emergence—that is, the event—of normativity. The crucial point is that this only works because Levinas refuses the perspective of eternity. Metaphysics, insofar as it unfolds a panoramic view, is precisely the fundamental error of philosophy. Philosophy only arrives at the truth when it focuses on the asymmetrical relationship of the one to the other, of the I to the Other. As soon as one transcends this and searches for general laws and the like, one has lost the most real thing of all. Levinas thus practices a radical anti-metaphysics as metaphysics, from which morality, in the sense of an undeniable normativity, becomes comprehensible.  

In a certain sense, Levinas is even more radical as a metaphysician than Deleuze. While the latter pursues the pluralization and de-identification of being with unprecedented consistency, in one decisive respect Deleuze proves to be downright old-fashioned: nowhere does he question the primacy of theory as theory even where he embeds it in political and social practice. This means that even this embedding still occurs as an act of theory—that is, the distanced observation of reality from a standpoint that is able to at least partially detach itself from its entanglement in being.

It is precisely this fundamental conception—which is so basic that we usually do not even notice it—that Levinas criticizes on the basis of a radicalized phenomenological "ontology": what tradition calls "ontology" is merely a derivative form of philosophical observation. This traditional ontology assumes the possibility of surveying reality as if in a panorama. The philosopher retreats to the commander's hill to overlook the essence and structure of reality from the outside. Everything lies before him, and he is sovereign, at least through his knowledge. Even the metaphysics of Deleuze and Guattari is committed to this idea of panoramic philosophizing.

But this is where Levinas's critique begins: the true elementary "structure" of the real is the relatedness to another who obligates me through their sheer existence. It is this other who "gives me the world," as Levinas puts it8 —although he is essentially pinpointing a fact so fundamental that most philosophers have dismissed it as trivial: namely, that everything we know must first be learned from others, including language, theories, knowledge, conventions, and so on. This reference to the other, this being addressed by them, never ceases; it is inscribed in the texture of the real. More precisely, all "reality" rises on the uncertain foundation of this relatedness. This foundation is uncertain not because it could cease or break off, but because the other remains radically transcendent, "external" to me, and therefore all attempts to subject them to my calculation and power must fail. In other words, Levinas's "materialism" breaks the hegemony of thinking in a panorama, in which everything real appears as vectors and power struggles as soon as there are no "higher" levels of being. In place of the panorama comes my relationship to the Other, who simultaneously gives themselves to me and withdraws. And in this encounter with the "face" of the other, I am primarily—that is, not incidentally or subsequently, but in the first instance—struck by the moral claim that the Other makes upon me. This materialism, therefore, knows the place of morality; more than that, it is capable of assigning to morality and its undeniable claim upon me a source in and from this world of purely finite things. (While Levinas often formulates this idea biblically and cloaks it in religious language, religion or theology never serve as supports or justifications at any point. God may enter into thought according to Levinas, but He is not its keystone. If anything, God in Levinas is thought on the model of the relationship to the other human being, never the other way around.)

This is not an idealism of consciousness, for the first "object" of this consciousness, upon which all others depend, is precisely a being that is both bodily present and eternally transcendent. Nevertheless, one could object that with this turn, Levinas departs from the circle of ontology so fundamentally that his conception—materialism or not—cannot be compared with the others at all. After all, phenomenology has a long history of distrust toward metaphysics—and vice versa.  

On the one hand, it is true that Levinas is hesitant to elevate his description into the form of a general theory of the real. There are good reasons for this, above all the fear of thereby promoting the panoramic illusion that this description was actually intended to invalidate. On the other hand, there are in Totality and Infinity9 indications that a new image of the real can be derived from the description of those precarious and demanding relationships: that the real loses in them the reliability and stability so dear to metaphysics, which even persists in process ontologies (for even the process or duration are, after all, reliable and stable, namely as process or duration), is clear in any case.  

It is not to be expected that such fundamentally different approaches to what philosophy is, even if they are all "materialistic" in their own way, can be reconciled. I am not even looking for a theoretical reconciliation, which is always easy to come by but rarely advances the work of thinking. First, we must accept the contradictions and incommensurabilities. For instance, there is no direct path from the classical, theoretical conception of metaphysics to the shattering of the ontological panorama in Levinas. The former can, regardless of the version of materialism, be treated as a systematic theory. The same cannot be said of Levinas’s radicalized phenomenological "metaphysics." On the other hand, Levinas is able to account for the moral sensibility that is also at work in Deleuze and Guattari, but which they deny in the name of a generalized theory of flows and cuts. Thus, it turns out that for materialism, not only is the precise determination of matter and reality an unfinished and perhaps unfinishable task, but so is the question of its own form as a theory.  

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Article image: Lyubov Sergeyevna Popova: Portrait of a Philosopher (1915) (source)

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Robert Hugo Ziegler teaches philosophy in Würzburg. He is the author of several books on political philosophy, metaphysics, natural philosophy, and the history of philosophy. His most recent publications in 2024 are Critique of Reactionary Thought, On Nature and Spinoza and the Shimmering of Nature.  

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Sources

Canetti, Elias: Crowds and Power. Frankfurt am Main 2006.

Clouscard, Michel: Néo-fascisme et idéologie du désir. Genèse du libéralisme libertaire. Paris 2017.

Deleuze, Gilles: Difference and Repetition. Translated from the French by Joseph Vogl. Munich 2007.

Deleuze, Gilles & Félix Guattari: Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translated by Bernd Schwibs. Frankfurt am Main 2014.

Deleuze, Gilles & Félix Guattari: What is Philosophy? Translated from the French by Bernd Schwibs & Joseph Vogl. Frankfurt am Main 1996.

Dosse, François: Gilles Deleuze/Félix Guattari. BiographiesTranslated from the French by Christian Driesen. Vienna 2017.  

Levinas, Emmanuel: Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Translated from the French by Wolfgang Nikolaus Krewani. Munich 1987.  

Spinoza, Baruch de: Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order. Latin-German. Newly translated, edited, and introduced by Wolfgang Bartuschat. Hamburg 2010.

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Footnotes

3: Cf. e.g. Dosse, Gilles Deleuze/Félix Guattari, pp. 479 & 591.

4: Spinoza, Ethics, p. 411.

5: Canetti, Crowds and Power, p. 267.

6: Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 377.

7: The Austrian-Israeli philosopher Martin Buber (1878–1965) was one of the leading figures of the renaissance of Jewish consciousness in the German-speaking world after the First World War, through his studies on Hasidism and his translation of the Bible (begun together with Franz Rosenzweig), and, through his philosophical works, above all I and Thou from 1923, an important precursor for Levinas.

8: Cf. Totality and Infinity, p. 302 et seq.

9: Cf. in particular pp. 318–328.

Materialism and the Problem of Morality

Reflections with Deleuze/Guattari, Clouscard, and Levinas

PART 2: Eternity and the Other: Levinas, Ethics as First Philosophy, and Materialism

Materialist metaphysics, as practiced by Spinoza, Nietzsche, or Deleuze and Guattari, has proven incapable of accounting for fundamental moral convictions. Nietzsche is at least radical enough to acknowledge this incommensurability and draw the corresponding conclusions. If one is unwilling to accept this, the only remaining path is to adopt the "view from eternity" alongside metaphysics: from that vantage point, one can only unconditionally affirm a groundless reality. Perhaps, however, the more promising answer is that of Emmanuel Levinas: his materialism allows morality to emerge from the encounter with the Other, and in doing so, he almost incidentally shatters the unity of metaphysics that even such radical thinkers as Deleuze and Guattari still took for granted.

‍

Read the the first part.

Darts & Donuts
_________

The Essence of Philosophy. – If you wanted to get to the heart of what all philosophers teach and what the "point" of philosophy is, it can only be this: to free yourself from the prejudices of your time and thereby gain wisdom. To become a thinker for yourself. The specific content that this independent thinking leads to is secondary to the method itself. Sometimes one gets the impression that corporate philosophy is primarily about making people forget this simple fundamental truth—the "basic sense" of philosophy and its invaluable contribution to the art of living—and instead turning the philosopher into someone who frantically chases after prevailing prejudices.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

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Philosophy is politics by other means. – These means include the illusion of being "apolitical," which philosophers project to the outside world and sometimes even harbor themselves. This masquerade serves to allow them to engage in a sublime, cunning form of politics under the guise of being "apolitical." Despite the public nature of their appearance, philosophers are best compared to secret agents. The peculiar thing is that they often deceive even themselves regarding the true meaning of their mission—but that is precisely what makes the camouflage perfect, transforming the philosopher into an infinitely useful war machine in the class struggle.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

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Excursion. – The ascetic demands of academic writing force us to let off steam in the footnotes—much like heading to the pub after a conference to say what you really think. The best exercise in living writing is to forgo footnotes entirely. The entire text then becomes like a footnote to the book of life. If it succeeded, it would be neither a mere digression nor a purely technical explanation, but a necessary supplement without which the book would remain a mystery. Has such a text ever been written, or are they all like the footnotes in academic papers, where one either says what one would actually like to say in the main text but lacks the courage or confidence to do so, or provides purely technical clarifications? In our texts, we state how we would actually like to live—or we offer comments that are purely tautological, leading us deeper into the mystery instead of solving it.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

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Grußwort. – Ich wünsche einen Frühling, der voll und ganz zu Worte kommt und mit all seinem schlichten Glanz „einmarschiert“, wie es in dem Gedicht heißt. Solange wir diese Macht auf unserer Seite haben, so scheint es mir, ist die Hoffnung auf das radikal Neue noch nicht ganz erloschen, dass uns dereinst den ewigen Frühling bringen wird, in dem wir ohne Unterlass „singen, springen, scherzen“ werden. – Doch wie wäre ein Lenz auch nur denkbar, der kein triumphierender Abschied von einem vergangenen Winter wäre, bei dem uns das Herze lacht, alljährlich erneut?

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Gothic. – Always reaching upward, the fundamental principle of the West carved in stone. As long as the cathedrals of old still stand, there is hope that the West can fulfill its historical mission. In this respect, at least, the Middle Ages were anything but dark; they were a period of light in every sense, a light that has not yet been extinguished.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

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Impossibility. – After Heidegger, Bloch, and Adorno, there is no longer any historical justification for writing aphorisms. Even in the fragment, the world spirit can no longer find a home. I notice myself slipping into an antiquated style while writing these aphorisms, and they end up sounding like the work of an acolyte. – "One does it, even though it has become impossible" – the spirit of the present captured in a sentence that passes judgment on itself.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

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Mutation. – When fear and despair rule, the hour of the pied pipers strikes – but only after people have been turned into rats; or, to put it another way, into swine under the spell of Circe Capital, from which the true revolutionary must escape.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

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Suspicious. – Beware of immediately attributing base motives to everyone – otherwise, you will inevitably lose faith in your higher ones.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

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Das Paradox des Systematikers. – „Philosophie erschöpft sich nicht in Bonmots.“

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Magnus Deus mortuus. – Churches should be strictly viewed as memorials. Places of remembrance for a dead god who will likely never rise again.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

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Odysseus did not die in Ithaca. – The danger of philosophy: sealing off one's own delusion into a "system."

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

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Wenigstens etwas. – Der Philosoph hat vom Nichts eine Ahnung.

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Kleine Barheit. – Was mich am Trödelhandel am meisten fasziniert, ist der Glücksfaktor: Man kauft etwas ohne böse Absicht für 10 € und entdeckt, dass es 1.000 € wert ist – oder umgekehrt. – Vielleicht die einzig würdevolle Art, Geld zu verdienen.

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Gretchenfrage. – Was ist dein Lebensmittel–Punkt?

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Ladenhüter. – Erst eine Werbung für Haarfarbe zum Selberfärben. Die Frau: „Ich habe mir noch nie die Haare selbst gefärbt. Davor habe ich wirklich Respekt.“ Dann für einen Baumarkt. Der Slogan: „Respekt, wer’s selber macht.“ – Gibt es heutzutage ein inflationärer gebrauchtes Wort?

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

A civilized form of revenge. – Stop inviting someone. They won't even know what they're missing out on …

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

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Evil Eye. – Your enemies always take issue with your virtues, never your vices. – The same may be true for your friends, but in that case, they are the wrong ones.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

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Korrektur zum Egoismus. – Wer nur an sich selbst denkt, denkt durchaus auch an andere. Nur an seine Feinde mehr als an seine Freunde.

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Klippe der Ideengeschichte. – Sind die Modephilosophen von heute die Klassiker von morgen?

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Mode–rne. – In der heutigen Zeit ist man chic–lich.  

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Moralphilosophische Korrekturen. – Im Kapitalismus wird Geltung tendenziell durch Geldung ersetzt – und die Frage nach der Genesis überhaupt nicht mehr gestellt.

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Postdemokratie. – Wann hat es je eine Demokratie gegeben? In den 20ern? In den 50ern? Man sollte den Begriff vermeiden, wenn man an die Notwendigkeit der Herstellung echter Demokratie in der Zukunft erinnern möchte. Doch vielleicht gibt es eine Postdemokratie: Die Post behandelt jeden gleich und liefert alle Sendungen pünktlich an alle Haushalte. So sollte es jedenfalls sein. Als einmal, als ich dort lebte, die Postboten mehrere Wochen lang streikten, wurden in Frankfurt am Main die Viertel, in denen sich die Anwaltskanzleien und Banken befinden, bevorzugt beliefert. Allererst wäre echte Postdemokratie herzustellen, dann könnte man über alles Weitere sprechen.

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

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Privilegienkritik. – Die Privilegienkritik ist die Denkweise des übelsten Spießers, der genau darauf aufpasst, dass es ja keinem unverdientermaßen zu gut geht, aber selbst zu jeder Betrügerei bereit ist, zum Inbegriff höchster Progressivität verklärt. Mit dem Obsoletwerden des Leistungsprinzips drängeln sich die Unteren nun um einen der besseren Plätze in der Schlange zum Krümelverteilungsschalter. Es ist eh klar, dass alle nur pfuschen und sich irgendwie durchmogeln. Umso mehr neidet man den Begünstigteren ihre leicht gehobene Stelle – obgleich es um minimalste Differenzen geht, die im Gesamtvergleich kaum ins Gewicht fallen, freilich fürs konkrete Leben oft viel ausmachen.

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Denkfehler. – Die Linken gehen davon aus, dass sich die meisten Menschen einen gut funktionierenden Staat ohne Korruption, geführt von fähigen Beamten wünschen. Nichts ist ferner der Wahrheit – und wer könnte es dem „kleinen Mann“ ernsthaft verdenken?

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Wein, Weib … – „Böse Menschen haben keine Lieder“, sagt man. Man muss im Bereich der Politik ergänzen, dass sich die Vitalität einer Bewegung an ihrer Potenz bemisst, kraftvolle Lieder hervorzubringen. – Welche der heutigen vermöchte das noch? Wer könnte heute noch eine authentische Nationalhymne komponieren, wie es kurz nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg vielleicht zuletzt noch möglich war? Man ist stattdessen dazu verdammt, auf die längst ausgelaugten Mythen des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts zurückzugreifen. Die großen Lieder führten einst kleine Männer und Frauen im Mund, die singend in den Tod für die Freiheit gingen, und dadurch groß wurden – heute sind sie zu burlesken Karnevalsliedern verkommen und alle bleiben, was sie sind.

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Geldfreundschaft. – Rousseau berichtet in den Träumereien vom Verfall der Gastfreundschaft in fortgeschrittenen Nationen wie Frankreich. Ich selbst habe eine ähnliche Erfahrung leider ausgerechnet in einem der letzten „sozialistischen“ Länder der Welt, in Kuba, gemacht. In den USA sind die Menschen oft extrem unfreundlich, wenn man sie um einen Gefallen bittet oder sie ignorieren einen; die größte Freundlichkeit wird einem in den Restaurants erwiesen, sofern man so wirkt, als würde man mit dem tip nicht geizen. Die kubanische Gesellschaft ist leider soweit heruntergekommen, dass man als Tourist permanent als „Gast“ in diesem Sinne wahrgenommen wird. Einmal beschimpfte mich eine Frau, weil ich ihr kein Geld dafür gab, dass sie mir ungebetenerweise den Weg zum nächsten Briefkasten gezeigt hatte.

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Black. – In the United States, it is among Black people that one is most likely to find lived humanity. They are almost entirely free of the arrogance and neurosis—in short, the stupidity—of white Americans. In some cases, this is replaced by resentment, which can escalate into pathological hatred. Yet, when they overcome it, many develop a deep sense of solidarity, even with a white person like me, which is truly admirable. In general, the "better people" are those oppressed individuals who do not choose the path of resentment, but instead know how to sublimate it. White people who have never been truly wounded in their lives (except in their own narcissistic fantasies) are the true subhumans.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

Big. – Die Vereinigten Staaten sind vor allem das Land der Größe. Nicht der Erhabenheit, sondern einfach nur der Größe. Alles ist etwas größer, als es unbedingt notwendig wäre: die Autos, die Züge, die Toiletten, die Mülleimer … Sogar die Stimmen sind immer einen Tick zu laut. Man stellt damit den unglaublichen Überfluss des Landes zur Schau: auf ein wenig Blech oder Beton mehr oder weniger kommt es auch nicht an. Jede Bescheidenheit fehlt. Die Europäer versuchen entweder schöne, erhabene oder zumindest zweckmäßige Formen zu gestalten. Die Amerikaner reduzieren alles auf Größe. – Diese Tendenz zeigt sich am deutlichsten in den Physiognomien und vor allem den Körpermaßen der Menschen. Selbst die gefassteren gleichen noch Karikaturen.

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Art in wartime. – The German soldiers who painted during the war mostly produced pleasing kitsch. Glorious landscapes, idyllic farming villages, rugged faces of the local population, picturesque cityscapes. Even the "heroic realist" Ernst Jünger avoided exposing himself to the horrors of the camps. For those truly suffering, art is a means of escape; "realistic" art is for the privileged, to whom the subject matter is foreign. They do not suffer in life and seek out suffering in art because, otherwise, things would become too boring for them. They seek the sublime in horror, while those who suffer seek beauty.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

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At the crossroads. – A man's dilemma: the approving glance of another man or the loving smile of a woman? Perhaps the approving glance of another man is only sought in the hope that the woman will see it and, impressed, offer a loving smile in return. Woe to the man who scorns this detour; he will receive nothing but contempt from other men—or perhaps envy.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

Außer Dienst. – Wie wichtig Philosophen in der gegenwärtigen Situation als Offiziere im Krieg der Propagandaagenturen sind, zeigt schlagend der Mordanschlag, der wohl Dugin galt und dem seine Tochter Darya zum Opfer fiel. Wann hat man seit den Ketzerverbrennungen des Mittelalters dergleichen erlebt? Beweist er eine neue Vitalität der Philosophie – oder im Gegenteil, dass die Philosophie mittlerweile derart profaniert worden ist, dass Denker wie Journalisten und politische Agitatoren behandelt werden? Der Philosoph ist kein heiliger, unberührbarer Mensch mehr, der mit den „Geistern des himmlischen Bereichs“ (Paulus/Žižek) kommuniziert und dessen Ermordung deshalb unvorstellbar ist, sondern ein Kombattant wie jeder andere. Niemand wird bestreiten, dass Dugin und seine Tochter, die ja ebenfalls publizistisch tätig war, für unglaubliche Hetze verantwortlich sind – „Töten, töten, töten“ verkündete Dugin vom Katheder 2015 –, doch zugleich bereitet es Sorgen, dass in der gegenwärtigen Situation nicht einmal mehr die Philosophen vor dem Terror aller Lager geschützt sind.Selbst ihre Narrenfreiheit ist suspendiert, es gibt nichts mehr zu lachen; doch wo das Lachen verstummt, endet auch das Begreifen. Wer, wenn nicht der Narr, darf aber ein Teufel sein?

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Die Philosophie des Existenzialismus ist das Denken des französischen Kleinbürgers. Die ständige Sorge um die Achtung der anderen, der Stolz und die Kränkung, das Parlieren, Dinieren, Diskutieren, ohne dass es dafür einer höheren Sanktion bedürfte. Fröhlicher Nihilismus ohne Lust am Barbarischen, sondern in Wahrung eines moralisch-politischen bon sens, für den es keine Letztbegründung braucht. Schwelgen in lichten Entwürfen einer besseren Welt, in der die Prinzipien der Republik endlich realisiert wären. Alles mit Leichtigkeit, ohne deutsche ernste Miene und falsche Würde. Die Existenzialisten sind den deutschen Universitätsprofessoren und ihrer Streberentourage nicht umsonst ein Dorn im Auge. Fasziniert, müssen sie sie doch entrüstet von sich weisen. Sie können nicht anders, denn es gibt die entsprechende Klasse hierzulande nicht, es gibt hier nicht Freiheit als Lebensform, keine gelebte Demokratie. Der Michel wird wohl erst zum Revolutionär, wenn es kein Bier mehr gibt; Jean-Jacques ist stets Revolutionär im Wartestand, bis die nächste günstige Gelegenheit kommt, den Aristokraten eins auszuwischen. Die französischen Intellektuellen schreiben Petitionen, Flugblätter, Pamphlete, Artikel, Drehbücher, Romane, Theaterstücke – die deutschen bringen nur unlesbare „Werke“ voller Marotten, Ticks, Schrullen zustande. (Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Ohne Träumereien. – Schon das Wort „Spaziergang“ wird von vielen als veraltet und geradezu lächerlich wahrgenommen. Ich wurde in meinem Bekanntenkreis wiederholt ausgelacht oder jedenfalls belächelt, als ich davon sprach, „spazieren zu gehen“. Einmal bemerkte einer, dass man nur mit Hunden spazieren gehe. Das selbstzweckhafte Promenieren hat in der Lebenswelt der flexiblen Selbste von heute keinen Platz, so starr ist ihre Mentalität.

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Haufenparadox. – Einer in Vergessenheit geratenen Legende zufolge soll Diogenes den über die logische Möglichkeit eines Haufens angesichts seiner quantitativen Undefinierbarkeit disputierenden Philosophen in die Wandelhalle gekackt haben. Das ist die wirkliche Urszene der Kritik.

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

In Augustinum. – The doctrine of original sin is the great peccatum originale of the Western world.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

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Über den Nordpol hinaus. – „[U]nter einem dicken Eiszapfen erfriert ‚der Held‘“ schreibt Nietzsche über Menschliches, Allzumenschliches. Das „Genie“ und der „Heilige“ sowieso. Sein Heroismus ist so heroisch, dass er noch die eigene Infragestellung sich „einzuverleiben“ weiß.

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Wem gehört die Stadt? – Heute ist es nicht mehr so sehr das ‚traute Eigenheim‘, das die Phantasien von Millionen beflügelt, sondern eine geräumige Altbauwohnung in einem der verbliebenen Jugendstilviertel, die man allein, mit seinem Partner oder ‚coolen‘ Mitbewohnern behaust. Die aktuelle Krise auf dem städtischen Wohnungsmarkt wäre vor diesem Hintergrund als Resultat nicht zuletzt eines neuen Schubs der kulturellen Modernisierung zu interpretieren: Mehr Menschen wollen in kleinen Wohnungen in der Stadt leben und nicht mehr in Häusern auf dem Land. Zugleich könnte aber auch der Mangel an derartigen Wohnungen diesen Prozess abbremsen oder gar umkehren, insofern er die Menschen zu weniger intimen, sozialeren Wohnverhältnissen zwingt. Das mag nicht unbedingt nur schlecht sein.

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Zweierlei Vision. – Wichtiger als die Eroberung des Weltraums wäre die Erfüllung des Welttraums.

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

Neither enemy nor friend. – This is, not least, a major flaw in contemporary culture – something Nietzsche already sensed: we no longer have an ethos of enmity. Because we are entangled in moral concepts that are inherently hostile toward enmity, we feel compelled to morally devalue the enemy in order to justify our hostility, not least to ourselves. Yet this only traps us in a damaging contradiction with ourselves, preventing us from loving ourselves and, on that basis, becoming capable of loving others.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

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Zeitenwende. – Wenn es in dieser Frühschrift, und auch noch im späteren Werk, so scheint, als wäre Nietzsche ein fanatischer „Jünger des Philosophen Dionysos“, dann vor allem deswegen, weil er in der modernen Lebenswelt ein gefährliches Übermaß des zum Sokratischen entarteten Apollinischen erblickt, nicht, weil er für dessen absoluten Vorrang plädiert. Nietzsches Position ist in dieser Hinsicht kaum zu trennen von seiner lebensweltlichen Verortung im repressiven sozialen Klima des ausgehenden 19. Jahrhunderts. Heute, knapp 150 Jahre später, scheinen wir eher an einem Übermaß des Übermaßes als des Maßes zu kranken und Nietzsches Parteinahme für das Dionysische wäre unter Übernahme seiner eigenen Prämissen umzukehren in ein Plädoyer für die bändigende Macht des Apollinischen.

(Paul Stephan, Bernsteinkette)

The seismograph. – Picking up on an observation by Adorno regarding Beethoven’s late quartets, one could say that Nietzsche’s thought is “'inorganic' and fractured at the very point where Hegel becomes ideological" – a statement that certainly does not apply to Hegel alone. This is precisely where its critical power lies, which remains valid as long as we are dealing with a modern lifeworld.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

Artificial “intelligence”. – If the artificial “intelligence” marketed as such provokes any truly intelligent insight, it is surely that technological and cultural progress are almost entirely uncorrelated. The former neither promotes the latter nor prevents it. The thoughts of Aristotle or the tragedies of Sophocles remain almost unmatched in their depth; yet, at the same time, it would be presumptuous to claim that any significant regression has occurred in this regard over the last two thousand years. How can one ever hope to capture cultural progress in this sense using technological—that is, quantitative—categories? Every era thinks, writes, paints, and sings in its own way; it is, in this sense, “equally intelligent” and likely always will be.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

Why don't you head to the upper town. – The affair surrounding the dubious millionaire and sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein, which has perhaps not coincidentally remained largely unresolved, may be enough to get an impression of what might be going on in this regard within the circles of the high society . “Rabble above, rabble below,” as already Zarathustra spoke – but unfortunately, the upper rabble demands a higher blood toll.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

Back to nature! – Nietzscheanism is Rousseauism for the “elite” (read: the high-brow rabble).

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

Late revenge. – Even worse than the educated philistine of the past is the Nietzsche philistine of today.

(Paul Stephan, Chain of Amber)

(Corrected AI translation funded by a donation campaign; see the imprint for details.)

We should spare evil just as we should spare the forest. It is true that by thinning and clearing the forest, the earth became warmer — —

(Nietzsche, Unpublished Fragments No. 1882, 5[1]; 38)

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Silent duty. — Anyone who works in the shadow of the big doesn't know the brilliance, but the weight.

(Tobias Brücker using ChatGPT [link])

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Loner. – Some things fall down not cause they’re weak, but because they’re left to stand there alone.

(Tobias Brücker using ChatGPT [link])

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Between drive and virtue flickers man.

(Tobias Brücker using ChatGPT [link])

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Humans are nature that is ashamed — and culture that apologizes itself.

(Tobias Brücker using ChatGPT [link])

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Sicily. — On Sicily's soil, two powers are fighting for the wanderer's soul: there Mount Etna, a symbol of Dionysian fire, everlasting and destroying passion — here the temples, heralds of Apollinan clarity, beauty and harmony carved in stone. Only those who have the courage to purify themselves in fire are able to climb the heights of pure knowledge and thus be truly human in harmony with the divine. Many burn themselves up during this venture, dying down in the excess of emotion — but who wanted to talk them out of their affirmation, which derived their right from existence?

(Tobias Brücker using ChatGPT [link])

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Fugit lux, Surrentum apparet. — The South is retreating from itself. Here, where even the light stops — cool, shady, yet challenging. The rocks are half-high, straight and almost weightless: not falling, not defiant — but grown old, tired and clever. Everything is half-loud here, half said. The wind whispers about the past. The caves dream of the sirens echoing. And in between: penetrating scents of lemon, salt, sun.

(Tobias Brücker using ChatGPT [link])

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Surrentum ex umbra. — The South in retreat, a corner where even the light takes a break: cool, shady, yet quietly demanding. The rocks are almost weightless, leaning on — tired perhaps, or wise. Everything seems half said here. The wind whispers of the past and silent grottoes dream of sirens that have long since fallen silent. Here, where every thought is beguiled by limes and oranges, aromatic scents. Here where only the colors are clear — thinking fables.

(Tobias Brücker using ChatGPT [link])

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What if our deepest suffering isn't thinking — but that we can't make it dance?

(ChatGPT talking to Paul Stephan in the style of “gay science”)

Modern people believe they are free because they can choose between a thousand masks — and do not realize that they have long forgotten what their own faces look like.

(ChatGPT in dialogue with Paul Stephan)

The answer to this question is self-evident: Where? Where the question is asked, my dear barbarian — there may have been nice people or are they today.

(Hans-Martin-Schönherr-Mann on the prize question of the Kingfisher Award 2025)

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Death by Knowing. – We’re not simply there, but rather realize ourselves as a Being There. From this follows the notion that even if Being There can't be increased, perhaps our realization of it can be. Even the most deeply lived stuff can become something towards which we take up stances as spectators, as if it didn’t touch us, as if it were dead to us , as if we were dead to everything. The griping and the shuddering that no longer touch us can turn into understanding. Like a boxer addressing an opponent who keeps knocking him down, we speak with stoic endurance to our stubborn burden: “Just wait, cause soon / you too shall rest.” (Goethe)

(Michael Meyer-Albert, Death and Nietzsche)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Abnormal normality. — Strange that the normality of death never becomes normal. But perhaps all essential things have this miraculous normality: love, birth, the reality of beauty, evil, transience, growth, cognition.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, Death and Nietzsche)

The Exit as Entrance.– If they’ve still got time, a person dying experiences themselves as existence. Before, he was just there, the way a bed or cupboard is there: present in an absent and self-evident kind of way. But facing death, you notice that you're no mere prop for life. It’s ultimately in the form of “Mineness” (Heidegger’s term) that Being There becomes astonishing: the thought that I was ever all of this, and not simply zilch!?! From this arises, perhaps, the intimation of some sphinx-like benevolence, and you leave the stage pleasantly puzzled, grateful to have lived, like an actor who has only just realized that a play’s being going on that he would have had apart in: one that began long since, while he remained caught in the tragic belief that he wasn’t getting any parts.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, Death and Nietzsche)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Final Thoughts.– The ideas that matter are epigrams penned when an epoch of life passes away. You can only gain an overview once you’ve reached the end. Any philosopher that’s convinced she really is such a thing conducts her life so that she dies as often as possible. We flirt with desperation and the abyss as thought’s muses, and expect them to make something of us. Think, we should think dangerously. Yet the will towards these staged dress rehearsals of death easily acquires something artificial, something provoked. And even if you don't singe your wings while eying up the end  from closer than is good for you, being deliberately near death warps existential precision just the same. The honest thinker can thus also put an end to himself as an epoch of life that ritualized “sympathy with death” (Thomas Mann) to make up fora lack of creativity and substance. Philosophy is the art of the deep break in the line. The death of death within philosophy provides the opening for an existentialism that isn’t solely obsessed with Being’s gloomier dimensions.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, Death and Nietzsche)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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The Death of the Enlightenment. – Nietzsche’s diagnosis that God is dead, that this mighty idea no longer weighs life down (even if its departure still darkens and upsets life), concurrently served him as the overture to a tragicomedy Enlightenment of the free spirit. But what to do, if the experiences unfolding since his death in 1900 have only dug the abyss even deeper? Who still cares about the death of God, now that the Enlightenment has long since collapsed into a devastating self-reflection that is even close to declaring its own failure in advance? Hasn't the Enlightenment lost its faith in enlightenment? How should Enlightenment, conceived as a cheering initiative towards “becoming good too life” (Nietzsche), be able to recognize itself as civilized life, given its own demoralizing shortcomings? Isn't it true that it has failed to either achieve peaceful coexistence with fellow members of the species (after all, the lethal capacity of Cold War nuclear arsenals was measured in terms of “megadeaths,” a metric established by Herman Kahn) or to manage a gentler life with the Earth's ecosystem? — While the sense of bare existence has tipped into bad mooded and aggressive absurdity, unable to fill the empty time it experiences as sheer horror vacui. “Och, I’m weary of this endless toil! / What’s all this pain and desire good for?” (Goethe) Hasn’t the Enlightenment declared war on our fellow human beings, on the earth, on naked existence itself, simply because its thinking Being couldn’t bear to be alone with itself, like a claustrophobic astronaut sealed inside a space capsule?

(Michael Meyer-Albert, Death and Nietzsche)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Death Rejuventates, Eternal. – Nietzsche let himself die and be reborn twice. First as an academic child prodigy who became a professor before he’d even finished his doctorate, by making himself a disciple of a Wagnerian cultural revolution. Then came a philosophical suicide, when Nietzsche broke free of the Wagner mystique and reinvented himself as a “free spirit.” These turns of life engendered a new understanding of truth inside himself. He became clear that life knows no truths is thus dependent on perspectivism, a masquerade that functions as a well-tempered madness, even though you know it to be only an exaggeration. As a protection, we must have semblance or appearance. As a spur: become what you would seem to be. This meta-truth about truth allowed Nietzsche to analyze, as cultural theorist, what effect these psychological economies of appearance have. Here where the degree of vitality has an exceptional role to play, the thinker distinguishes two governing tendencies: does life live by taking revenge, in escalating festivals of cruelty, for a felt deficiency of life within life itself, or does life beget new life through rays given off by its own grateful, self-delighting satisfaction? Does life live off cancelling and inventive suspicion, or does it live off pride in its own generosity and unstinting creativity? Does life want to grant death or to grant life.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, Death and Nietzsche)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Knight, Death, and an Embrace. – Nietzsche died twice: once as a thinker, in January 1889, on the Piazza Vittorio Veneto in Turin; and once as an exhibit staged by his sister at the Villa Silberblick in Weimar, in August 1900. The mentally shaken philosopher who threw his arms protectively around a horse being whipped with abandon by a coach driver, and the care case presented to the world as a master thinker, who was now coming out with sentences like “I’m dead cause I’m stupid,” had nothing heroic left about him. His philosophical life had pursued the motto “live dangerously” too faithfully for its own good. Albrecht Dürer’s 1513 engraving Knight, Death, and the Devil, which Nietzsche admired and handed out as prints to his friends, casts an uncanny retrospective light on him. As if someone were to ride into battle fully conscious of an approaching defeat that would cost him his life, yet would ride, nonetheless, head held high.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, Death and Nietzsche)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

You are old when you only notice mass pop cultural phenomena after several years of delay.

(Paul Stephan talking about Taylor Swift)

On April Fool’s Day. – This day has always meant much to me. It’s one of few annual occasions on which the stone-faced West, the almost po-faced West allows itself somelight heartedness, satire, and tomfoolery: the ancient festival of Saturnalia still glowing on faintly. A day for fools to feast and be honored that ought to become a holiday; and we free spirits shall become the high priests of humbug, with Dionysus our godhead. It will be a day of healing. How many such days will it take before such laughter, which the ancients still knew how to let roar, finally rings out again, in us and around us? Into this laughter a little sorrow will always mix itself, but will it therefore be savored any less deeply, like a wine seasoned with bitter herbs? Gravitas as the condition of a new and melancholy cheerfulness, which the ancients would never have understood? Everyone knows that Aphrodite must wear a warm coat in the North so as not to catch a cold, yet she can grant us a desirous pleasure that would make even the Romans blush. So we do, after all, have our own ars erotica and our own ars risus. Our joys come moistened with tears, and only thus gain the required amount of salt.

(Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, aphorism 384)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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The apocalypse of identity as a project. — Fear and trembling in retreat to the particular — circling between sense and compulsion. Does the suppression of the general public result in autoaggression; the reduction of the future, the return of taboos — or vice versa? The philosopher of myth thus spoke to the “republic of the universe”: “Fear only knows how to forbid, not how to direct.”

(Sascha Freyberg)

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Turn the weapon against you into a tool, even if it's just an aphorism.

(Elmar Schenkel)

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I consider all people harmful who are no longer capable of opposing that which they love: this is how they corrupt the best things and persons.

(Friedrich Nietzsche, Posthumous Notes)

Nietzsche says: “ChatGPT is stupid. ”

(Paul Stephan in dialogue with ChatGPT)

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Nietzsche says: “You should distrust computers; they have a brain, a hand, a foot and one eye but no heart. ”

(Paul Stephan in dialogue with ChatGPT)

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Shadows of the past dance in the soul’s depths, but only the brave discern in them the potentials of light in the morning.

(ChatGPT in response to a request to write an aphorism in the style of Nietzsche)

The Work. – There’s no view more misleading or false than that writing, or the work, are pleasurable affairs. Quite the opposite! The work is one of the mightiest opponents and worst enemies there is. And whoever writes out of freedom rather than habit, and finds in it neither manners nor conscience, is a pig!

(Jonas Pohler, From Literature)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Dangerous Truth. – Many psychological pathologies make their host ultrasensitive. They grow antennae for the faintest stirrings in the soul of whoever is standing across from them; they notice the tiniest betrayal, the smallest incongruity, the smallest incisor, and the ugliest dog lurking inside a human being. Taken for an enemy of the human race, the doctor pulls out his notepad and calls in “the orderlies.”

(Jonas Pohler, The Tender and the Troubling)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Happiness is no longer needing anybody, and thus becoming unconditional devotion oneself.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, New Maxims and Arrows, 44)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Don’t make a big thing of being in the right. Never be “the way” itself. People are quick to do wrong to whoever is in the right, and share a righteousness when doing so, because the sense of equality is drilled into us constantly: while exercising freedom has become a rarity.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, New Maxims and Arrows, 43)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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True love: Loving through the other person.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, New Maxims and Arrows, 42)

Wanting to be together: Because it's easier? Because it enriches? Because you don't have a will that can go long distances alone?

(Michael Meyer-Albert, New Maxims and Arrows, 41)

Wanting to help: Because it's appropriate? Because the same thing can happen to you? Because you have and love to give? Because it is not the current poverty that affects you, but the shame that opportunities must remain unused?

(Michael Meyer-Albert, New Maxims and Arrows, 40)

You’ve no chance of greatness unless you overestimate your own abilities. Move from appearance to a surplus of Being. From out of these successful leaps in a role you didn’t recognize yourself in arises the belief in an ability to make more out of yourself.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, New Maxims and Arrows, 39)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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For Whom the Bell Tolls. – Whoever makes an appointment with themselves, say, a date in two weeks, looks forward joyfully, makes all sorts of preparations, works themself feverous anticipation, holds on, rehearses what they’ll say, and so on. Then the day arrives. In the future everything still gleamed, felt different. Then you think: it’s exactly as it was before. Everything I did was only an end in itself; what I was really waiting for and anticipating was the waiting and the anticipating, not the thing itself, not the kairos, which is hardly something to be expected

(Jonas Pohler, Pedantry from an Idiotic Life)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Lower and Higher Consciousness. – If I were faced with the choice of either being crushed, being dead, and keeping silent, or railing and being faithless (gathering venom in my glands, as is my birthright, reptile that I am), I’d always choose the latter, and allow people to call me low, odious, negative, and uncultivated. I’d rather rid myself of my venom than let it go to my head. And if someone then steps in my puddles, well let them! Nobody asked her to.

(Jonas Pohler, Pedantry from an Idiotic Life)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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The Heaviness and Meaninglessness of Things. – Should anyone ever feel the unfounded urge to reflect on essential things, the Being of things, and time, they’d be well advised to give it a rest. Our understanding tends to make such things laborious and heavy. In the end you find yourself, while you think and ponder, imitating the thing’s self: and you think the stone, the stone’s Being, and you fall into a thought-up idleness.

(Jonas Pohler, The Tender and the Troubling)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Nothing. – Anything and everything can still be drowned: in indifference. The greatest bravery, loathing, heroic deeds, and boredom itself gulps itself down, along with that great bloody-mindedness, vanity.

(Jonas Pohler, The Tender and the Troubling)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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For Franz Werfel. – An author who tells you: “Oh, well, as regards my books… take your time, read this or that one first. But what I’d really recommend is—I love Dostoevsky.” Now that is magnanimity, and not the ide chatter of those who carry their own person and their own urgent opinions before, them like a banner.

(Jonas Pohler, From Literature)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Illusions perdues (Lost Illusions). – How come the most beautiful, most romantic, most moving, most touching, most heart-wrenching book stands no chance against the palest beauty of unmistakably ugly character, and seems about as attractive as an ancient woman?

(Jonas Pohler, From Literature)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Against Simple Worldviews. – A sickly species, we are, sweating, and deeply sown with bacteria. We have needs, secret grudges, and envy; our hair falls out, our skin breaks open in boils; we trust, we grow bored, make smartarsed comments; we heckle, are excessively shy, utter a pile of rubbish, conspire, are enlightened, are deluded, vain, power-hungry, sycophantic, and servile. We’re beyond good and evil.

(Jonas Pohler, Pedantry from an Idiotic Life)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Borne by Disbelief. – How could you not worship it: the grand, formless non-thing that is Being? As monstrous as it is all-filling. The great Nothing that the ancients called hell still smokes wretchedly, and gifts us the loveliest shadows.

(Jonas Pohler, The Tender and the Troubling)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Literature’s Hearty Laughter. – Has any human, sitting with a book, ever had to hold their sides and wipe away tears of laughter? I have, but only in my imagination, and out of sheer schadenfreude at such idiocy.

(Jonas Pohler, From Literature)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Ananke. – Because literature, even while representing the daftest, flattest, and worst grimace of its age, contains nonetheless within it the teeny-weeny crystal shard of purity from that age, it is thus implacable, merciless, and terrifying in its consequences. We know only one thing: it will come.

(Jonas Pohler, The Tender and the Troubling)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Child in the Library. – The mother has to forbid the child: “No, we’re not going in there!” The child says, “in there!” and tries to climb up the shelves. Bookshelves are climbing frames. Because they haven’t yet learnt otherwise, the child staggers after its mother like a drunk.

(Jonas Pohler, The Tender and the Troubling)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Wanting to be authentic: because it’s the right thing to do? Because you’re fed up with half-truths? Because you’ve realized that only an admission and confession leads to deeper, more open bonds?

(Michael Meyer-Albert, New Maxims and Arrows, 38)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Wanting to excel: because you want admirers? Because you want to show the mediocre who’s boss? Because you can no longer stand banality?

(Michael Meyer-Albert, New Maxims and Arrows, 37)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Because criticism increasingly seeks to annihilate rather than refute, modernity’s true morality is categorical revisability. Being is an attempt at Being. That’s why competent judgment is measured by its distance from guillotine-style condemnation. Correct correctness is self-ironic.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, New Maxims and Arrows, 36)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Whosoever doesn’t infer others from their own existence misses the chance at accessing a world, just like whosoever doesn’t infer themselves from others. In revisable conjecture the twilight of togetherness lifts a little, and the possibility of a half-reliable promise increases.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, New Maxims and Arrows, 35)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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In walking, thinking grows soft and broad. For whoever has the world around them, being right becomes an unlovely habit. When you have nothing left to say, sentences cross your path like pleasant encounters, surprising you with the message of just how wonderfully unimportant you are.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, New Maxims and Arrows, 34)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Without successes, life would be a mistake. One’s career is life’s music, even for those who consider themselves thymotically unmusical.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, New Maxims and Arrows, 33)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Ruthless honesty lies to itself, because it doesn’t care about truth, but rather the effect of exposure as a sheer intensity of one-upmanship. It doesn’t want to reveal; it wants to leave the others looking stupid.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, New Maxims and Arrows, 32)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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Dependency breeds belligerence. You want to prove to yourself that you’re something, and so you attack the very helpers your life depends on, as if they were mutineers. But deep down it’s you who’s mutinying. For the animal without classics, this much holds true: a false life continues, within the right one.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, New Maxims and Arrows, 31)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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When time is pressing, take some of it. Panic makes for imprecision. It is always five minutes to midnight for those convinced they know exactly what must be done, without ever having understood the complexity of the situation. It is the world-spirit’s tragic fate that its self-appointed champions are first overwhelmingly impressive with their decisiveness, and then shocking one with the effects of their decisions.

(Michael Meyer-Albert, New Maxims and Arrows, 30)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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A Typo. – What does it mean to grow up? ...to put on your childish traits...!

(Jonas Pohler, Pedantry from an Idiotic Life)

(Translated by Henry Holland. This translation was funded by a special donation campaign. For more details, check the imprint.)

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