Nietzsche as a Populist?
Attempt at an Anachronistic Determination of Proportions
Nietzsche as a Populist?
Attempt at an Anachronistic Determination of Proportions
What would Nietzsche have said about the rampant populism of our time? Does his elitist attitude, his “aristocratic radicalism,” not make him an anti-populist par excellence? Or did he not himself dream of populist leaders inspiring the masses and the mass success of his books? — But what is “populism” anyway and what is the score of Nietzsche's stance on populist movements in his own time?
These are not entirely unimportant questions for our blog, which Jenny Kellner addresses in detail in the following article.
What would Nietzsche — he only lived today and enjoyed brilliant mental health — say about our Pappenheimers Trump, Putin, Weidel & Co.? Would he be impressed, appalled? Would he write poisonous polemics against the Trumps of this world or would he rather write: against the Trump-haters of this world? Or even both? Anyone who wants to dismiss such anachronistic questions as idle has good arguments for this, but I old nihilistic atheist have the time for this idle on Good Friday and will therefore dedicate myself to a reflection on the question: How would Nietzsche have positioned himself in the face of today's right-wing populism?
Define Nietzsche?
As always, there are easy answers. One of the very few questions about Nietzsche's political stance, which is (largely) answered uncontroversial in today's scientific Nietzsche research, concerns anti-Semitism: Nietzsche deeply despised it. It is easy to conclude from this that Nietzsche would have thought little of our current right-wing populists, provided that they had a new form of “anti-Semitic screaming neck.”1 looks embodied. However, I don't want to make it that easy for myself — otherwise reading this article would be all too short! So it's a little further afield...
... A determination of proportion requires first a determination of what should be set in relation, i.e. in this case: a definition of Nietzsche on the one hand and a definition of populism on the other. Unsurprisingly, it must be stated here that the definition of both subjects of the investigation is anything but obvious. Isn't the appeal of our favorite philosopher precisely his stubborn refusal to be “unified”? What's more, isn't his philosophy itself essentially one of the “ambiguities”? What some recognize as perspectivism, others grumble completely contradictory within themselves and still others (I) call paradoxical thinking “that you can't cope with.”2, is presumably determined precisely by the fact that it cannot be clearly defined and thus abandons thinkers who are looking for definitions, who are even sorely in need of definitions, with an angry smile. But that's something after all: defining Nietzsche about his indefinability, his 'anti-uniqueness. '
If this abstract definition is to be concretized politically, on the one hand, there is the problem of a philosopher who, due to the ambiguity of his political positions, cannot be assigned to any political camp. On the other hand, there is a picture of radically pluralistic thinking which not only allows, but also expressly affirms, the most diverse, even contradictory views: a way of thinking that dares to push contradiction itself, antagonism, to its extreme extreme at any time. This basic antagonistic feature appears in the first work, which Birth of Tragedy, clearly expressed when Nietzsche creates the highest of all art forms from the productive high tension between Apollinian and Dionysian. And the antagonistic spirit of Nietzsche is still at work in the last creative phase, in the development of the metaphysics of a 'will to power, 'when the will to overwhelm becomes the essential determination of life itself.
Nietzsche does not want to be defined, appears as a radical pluralist precisely because of this, but, as should not be embezzled here, he most likely identifies himself with the attribution of “aristocratic radicalism” given to him by Georg Brandes.3 Would a pluralistic aristocracy be conceivable?
As it should be, the attempt to define Nietzsche led me astray — to the brink of an impossible term, 'pluralistic aristocracy'...
Define Populism?
What is the definitive score of populism? What does this label actually mean in more detail? Anyone who delves into the scientific debates of political theory will notice from a first superficial review that there is no agreement on this either, but rather a variety of opposing views entirely in Nietzsche's antagonistic and perspective sense.4
Ernesto Laclau and Jan-Werner Müller present two very different attempts to describe populism. Müller defines populism as a “shadow of representative democracy,” which combines an anti-establishment stance with a harshly anti-pluralistic stance, which can be attributed to the political campaign “We — and only we — are the people.”5 Populists can be recognized “by their claim to sole moral representation.”6 Populism is therefore opposed to pluralistic democracy, even though it appears to be indissolubly linked to it as its “shadow.” Laclau, on the other hand, develops a positive concept of populism, according to which “populist reason” is a legitimate way of constructing the political in general,7 by drawing a line between “us” and the “others” — freely following the antagonistic definition of the political as a friend-foe distinction in the sense of Carl Schmidt. According to Laclau, who belongs to the “we” and who belongs to the “others” results from the series of “similar” political demands (“chain of equivalence”)8), through which “we” identify “us” with each other. Without such a “populist” demarcation between antagonistic social groups, political struggles and changes are inconceivable. According to Laclau, anyone who does not want to think of the political as a purely economically determined, politically ultimately powerless administrative apparatus must affirm populist reason — only then can democracy be politically realized.
Both authors, Müller and Laclau, reject popular psychologizing provisions of populist attitudes as fearful, overwhelmed by modern complexity, led by resentment and therefore reactive-aggressive. But in both definitions, a hard distinction between a “we” or a “people” on the one hand and a “not us”, a “not our people” on the other hand appears to be essential to the concept of populism — which shows a significant lack of complexity as a basic element of populism. But while Müller regards this relentless simplistic demarcation as anti-democratic (and therefore as morally reprehensible), Laclau sees it as a condition of the possibility of political action par excellence (and therefore something good).
This rough outline of two populism definitions of political theory in the early 21st century includes the intricate questions that regularly arise in private and public discussions on the topic of populism: What is the state of the complicated relationship between democracy and populism? How do integrating pluralism and exclusionary nationalism relate to each other? Can, may, or must each exclude or include the other? Are populists now anti-democratic or are they the actual democrats?
Pop — the People and Nietzsche?
What would an article be on the online blog NietzschePoparts without self-referentiality? If the POP blog already talks about populism, then the question is: Are both expressions the same “pop”?
Is it not in both cases the people who are to be alluded to, precisely in the “lowest” meaning of this word: Populus, the people who Plebs, the 'wide' mass? This mass of individuals, who become mass due to their lowest common denominators, are henceforth no longer characterized by their uniqueness, but by the mediocrity hated by Nietzsche? Average, dozens of goods, good for sale! None Fine Arts on this website, which would only be accessible to a small elite, but rather an art that opens Nietzsche's “aristocratic radical” to everyone, makes it available to every “Hinz and every Kunz” and every “Crethi and every Plethi”? What would Nietzsche say about that! Wouldn't he somersault in the grave out of sheer indignation?! Nietzsche, who considered himself so noble that he would “not give the young German Kaiser the honor of being his “coachman”?!9
And wouldn't this awareness of Nietzsche's own nobility also remove Nietzsche from any populist movement for miles? Just as he despised the anti-Semitic “all-Germans” of his time, he would probably also have disgusted today's 'Reichsbürger. ' If the young German Kaiser didn't seem noble enough to him in 1888 — would he have had any words at all for people like Donald Trump or Björn Höcke today? It's hard to imagine. It seems more obvious that Nietzsche would not have condescended to any comment at all in view of the appearance and ramblings of today's right-wing populists. On the other hand...
... Perhaps the sheer audacity of Donald Trump would have impressed him on some level after all. Perhaps he would have had nothing but ridicule and ridicule for those who are morally indignant at such audacity. Perhaps he would certainly have appreciated the Machiavellian skills of some populists and their aggressive political style — didn't he profess to be a big fan of the power-hungry human butcher Cesare Borgia?10 In view of the historical examples of 'great politicians, 'whom Nietzsche liked to cite provocatively (Napoleon, Julius Caesar...), all of our current populists appear almost pious and humanist...
And perhaps Nietzsche would have secretly enjoyed a popular online blog, in which his writings circulate and his thoughts are interpreted and interpreted again and again, like a Snow King. In any case, throughout his (mentally healthy) life, he has tried to make his thoughts accessible to an audience through language communication and publication. If this audience was very small or remained completely uninterested, Nietzsche was in no way amused! — And what is an audience other than a broad mass to whom something should be conveyed?
Like most of Nietzsche's work, his relationship with the “people” proves to be ambiguous despite all the polemics he regularly raises against them. Is an extremely paradoxical relationship with the “people” not also a genuine characteristic of Nietzsche's Zarathustra? The prophet descends from his mountain to speak to the people. His devotion to the people, the desire to know their truths mediate, are the driving force behind his entire journey! But the people understand him poorly — Zarathustra fails in his attempt to make himself understood: “Do you have to smash their ears first so that they learn to hear with their eyes? Do you have to rattle like timpani and preachers of repentance? Or do they just believe the stammerer? ”11 Is Zarathustra perhaps failing precisely because it is impossible for him to speak like a current populist: rattling and stammering?
Mediation is just the word after mediocrity. In the end, letterpress gives birth to pop culture. Paradoxically, the aristocratic radical Nietzsche strives for popularity as a journalist. Nietzsche's aristocratism is to be taken seriously, because what he expresses with him is worth considering. But it should not be forgotten that Nietzsche counteracts his own aristocratism often enough and clearly enough — sometimes explicitly, sometimes subtly and very often implicitly, if only by seeking to make a public impact: by writing books.
Nietzsche, the Failed Anti-Populist?
It is quite possible that Nietzsche would have profoundly despised our current right-wing populists. It is not unlikely that he would have had just as little left for moralizing populism abusers. It cannot be ruled out that Nietzsche would even have spoken positively about a populist political style out of provocation or genuine admiration. Idle speculation...
Anyone who primarily recognizes Nietzsche as a complex thinker of radical pluralism and suspects the most important characteristic of populism with Müller in its anti-pluralistic nature, will regard Nietzsche and populism as irreconcilable opposites. On the other hand, anyone who essentially interprets Nietzsche's philosophy as one of antagonism and sees populism with Laclau as a way of constructing the political through a clear social demarcation, will attribute to Nietzsche a clearly populist tendency on the basis of the antagonistic principle of his thinking — and will not criticize him for it, but rather praise him.
A reflection on today's right-wing populism, as well as a reflection on Nietzsche's politics, is exposed to the torrid tension between aspects of popularity and aspects of elitianism. I am convinced by the idea that Nietzsche (did not) want to be both: popularly — beautiful and accessible, understandable to all, loved by everyone — and elitist — beautiful and reserved, misunderstood by most, hated by many. He succeeds in both, he fails at both. Against this background, how appropriate does the subtitle appear to be Zarathustra? — A book for all and none.
Nietzsche would probably not have acted as a populist or as a supporter of populist politics today. But would he have acted as an anti-populist? Wouldn't he also necessarily have failed as an anti-populist? Is it not failure itself that he presents again and again, in ever new constellations, with his devising work — even in the triumphal howl of the author of Ecce homo? Is today's populism not itself a symptom of failure and, as such, perhaps even to be affirmed in the sense of completing nihilism according to Nietzsche? More question marks than exclamation marks — that is perhaps the biggest discrepancy between the effect of Nietzsche and that of Trump. Although: even a question mark can be deceptive, because it is often used purely rhetorically...
Jenny Kellner (born 1984) studied acting, philosophy, and sociology in Hamburg and received her doctorate at the Berlin University of Arts with a thesis on the political implications of Georges Bataille's reading of Nietzsche. Her doctoral thesis was published in 2025 under the title Anti-ökonomischer Kommunismus. Batailles nietzscheanische Herausforderung ("Anti-economic communism. Bataille's Nietzschean challenge") at Campus Verlag. She currently teaches at the Berlin University of Arts and at Hafencity University Hamburg and is a speaker for the electronic beat prose projects Nach uns die Ewigkeit ("After us eternity") and Deimos with.
Article Image
Tobias Fendt: The Vision of Ezekiel (1565) (source)
Sources
Kellner, Jenny: Anti-ökonomischer Kommunismus. Batailles nietzscheanische Herausforderung. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt am Main: 2025.
Laclau, Ernesto: Populist Reason (2005). Passagen Verlag, Vienna: 2022.
Müller, Jan-Werner: What is populism? An essay. Suhrkamp, Berlin: 2016.
Footnotes
1: Beyond good and evil, Aph 251.
2: waiter, Anti-economic communism, p. 52 f.
3: Cf. Letter to Georg Brandes v. 2. 12.1887: “The term 'aristocratic radicalism' that you use is very good. That is, with all due respect, the scariest word I've ever read about myself. ”
4: In this regard, see, for example, Müller, What is populism, p. 15 f. & 25 f. and Laclau, Populist Reason, PP. 29-41.
5: Müller, What is populism, p. 18 f.
6: Ibid., p. 20.
7: Laclau, Populist Reason, P. 23.
8: Ibid., p. 164.
9: Ecce homo, Why I'm so wise, paragraph 3.
10: See e.g. Beyond good and evil, Aph 197, The Antichrist, paragraph 61 and Götzen-Dämmerung, rambles, Aph 37.
