“Je suis Nietzsche!”
A Dialogue about Bataille, Freedom, the Economy of waste, Ecology and War
“Je suis Nietzsche!”
A Dialogue about Bataille, Freedom, the Economy of waste, Ecology and War


Paul Stephan talked to Jenny Kellner and Hans-Martin Schönherr-Mann about the interpretation of one of the most important Nietzsche interpreters of the 20th century: Georges Bataille (1897—1962). The French writer, sociologist and philosopher defended the ambiguity of Nietzsche's philosophy against its National Socialist appropriation and thus became a central source of postmodernism. Based on Dionysian mythology, he wanted to develop a new concept of sovereignty that transcends the traditional understanding of responsible subjectivity, and criticized modern capitalist rationality in the name of an “economy of waste.” With all this, he provides important impulses for a better understanding of our present tense.
I. Who was Bataille?
Paul Stephan: Dear Jenny Kellner, dear Hans-Martin Schönherr-Mann, The article on Bataille and Nietzsche's conception of an “economy of waste” has made us — and also numerous readers — curious to learn more about Georges Bataille and his reception of Nietzsche. Jenny Kellner, you have studied them very intensively in recent years as part of your — now successfully completed — doctoral project on the subject Anti-economic communism. Bataille's philosophical challenge. (Congratulations at this point!) Would you like to start our conversation with a brief outline of the very fundamental question of who Bataille actually was and what distinguishes his Nietzsche reception from others?
Jenny Kellner: I'd love to. Georges Bataille was a French writer, sociologist, and philosopher of the first half of the 20th century, but he strangely evades this kind of disciplinary attribution. His work and work is characterized more by procedures that are likely today as inter- or transdisciplinary would be called. He was certainly heavily influenced by contemporary intellectual trends such as Surrealism around André Breton, ethnology following Marcel Mauss and psychoanalytic theory according to Sigmund Freud, but in my opinion there are also systematic reasons for Bataille's “transdisciplinarity” and the difficulty of “classifying” him correctly in theory. These reasons may gradually become apparent in the course of this dialogue. With regard to Bataille's specific relationship with Nietzsche, I would first like to mention three points: First, I imagine Bataille as a kind of hinge between Nietzsche and French “contemporary philosophy” (i.e. the currents of post-structuralism, deconstruction, difference theory). He was one of the first French thinkers to intensively study Nietzsche's work from the 1930s and, above all, tried to defend it against the takeover by German National Socialism. With his interpretation of Nietzsche's thought as a theory of paradox, which has a labyrinthine structure, he paved the way for the rich and heterogeneous French Nietzsche reception of the second half of the 20th century (from Michel Foucault to Gilles Deleuze to Sarah Kofman and others). Second, Bataille's defense of Nietzsche against fascist occupations also had the function of making him fertile for a particular form of anti-fascism, which deviated strongly from the form of party doctrinal communism. The secret society founded by Bataille in 1936 Acephale (German: “headless”), whose public organ was a magazine of the same name, theoretically referred primarily to the Dionysian aspect of Nietzsche's thinking. An attempt was made here to oppose the mythological power of the fascist project not with rational arguments, but with a kind of anti-authoritarian, Dionysian, binding mythology. Thirdly, Bataille's affirmative relationship with Nietzsche is particularly characterized from a philosophical point of view by the fact that he — in contrast to the vast majority of other admirers of Nietzsche — too maintained an affirmative relationship with Nietzsche's theoretical antipode Hegel. The way in which Bataille brings Nietzsche into play in the course of his interpretation of the master-servant dialectic leads to the concept of ruler-free “sovereignty”, which is central to Bataille's Nietzschelectüre (and for his entire thinking).
PS: Thank you very much for this initial overview, which should make it clear why Bataille is not simply 'one Nietzsche reader among many, 'but one of the most important Nietzsche interpreters of the 20th century; and not simply an interpreter, but someone who independently thought about Nietzsche's impulses and referred to his time. Professor Schönherr-Mann, you too have studied not only Nietzsche, but also Bataille. Would you like to add something important to this or perhaps even disagree?
Hans-Martin Schönherr-Mann: I would like to point out a particular punchline in the relationship between Nietzsche and Bataille: “I am Nietzsche.” It is not Nietzsche who says that, but Bataille! He distances himself from the Nietzsche research of his time by simply assuming that you can only understand Nietzsche from your own perspective, precisely if you “are” Nietzsche yourself. In his own letter, Bataille therefore seeks communion with Nietzsche.
In January 1945, Bataille's Defence appeared under the title Nietzsche and the will for opportunity. However, this book doesn't seem to be that much about Nietzsche. The third and longest part contains a diary from 1944, i.e. from the time of the liberation of France and Europe. Nobody wanted to celebrate Nietzsche's 100th birthday this year, except the Nazis in Weimar in the form of a ghostly celebration in the Allied bombardment, to which Mussolini also contributed an ancient statue of Dionysus.
Bataille was the only one who dared to save Nietzsche from the Nazis, who therefore wrote two texts for his birthday, one under the title “Nietzsche Memorandum”, published in a volume Compensation to Nietzsche, and the one mentioned.
Bataille considers Nietzsche to be his twin brother and thinks as passionately and related to the specific life of humans as Nietzsche. According to Nietzsche's insight, which Bataille picks up, man lives in a world in which he has no purposes given to him, which he must seek for himself. In this respect, Nietzsche and Bataille's philosophy proves to be a plea for human freedom.
With the title of the book Nietzsche and the will for opportunity Bataille distances himself from an understanding of Nietzsche, which, in its central conception of the will to power, constitutes a claim to power that may use force unscrupulously — an understanding that was then compiled from the estate by the work compiled by Nietzsche's sister from the estate and diligently manipulated in the process The will to power seemed promoted.
On the one hand, Bataille shares Nietzsche's famous thesis of the death of God. But what Nietzsche coldly diagnoses without regret in order to now set off for new, albeit only earthly shores, has, on the other hand, burned itself deeper into Bataille's thinking. Bataille doesn't want to give up the divine in a world where God is dead.
Atheological sum III That is the subtitle of this Nietzsche volume. Bataille is thus positioning itself vis-à-vis Summa theologica by Thomas Aquinas, who, like no other, has founded the Catholic worldview to this day. Bataille transforms atheism into atheology. The first volume of atheological sum under the title The inner experience deals with methods of meditation and mysticism. But people also experience ecstasy and contemplation under conditions when God is dead, particularly in eroticism. Bataille has dedicated one of his most famous works to her under the title Saint Eros (1957).
Overall, the three volumes of the atheological sum play a central role in his theoretical work, including in particular his economic work The ostracized part. Attempt at a general economy belongs (1949), which will certainly keep us busy in our conversation.
II. What is freedom?
PS: Yes, Bataille's Nietzschean economic critique in the name of an “economy of waste” will certainly have to be returned to. But first, I would like to address a common point that came up in your first two answers: that Bataille represents a “philosophy of freedom” or “rulerless “sovereignty.” Around the same time, the existentialists led by Sartre, Albert Camus and Simone de Beauvoir also developed a “philosophy of freedom,” sometimes with reference to Nietzsche. However, this is a freedom of consciousness, which implies moral responsibility, which brings these thinkers into a certain proximity to philosophical idealism, to Kant, Hegel and perhaps even Fichte. Based on this understanding, the existentialists sometimes very polemically distanced themselves from Bataille and saw him as a pseudo-radical nihilist who was afraid of actual practice. Even today, the concept of “freedom” is once again very controversial in philosophical debate. To what extent does Bataille's (Nietzschean) understanding of freedom differ from the idealistic or existentialist concept? And how would you defend it against existential polemics?
JK: Exactly, the relationship between Bataille's concept of freedom or sovereignty and questions of (political) practice is a very interesting problem. Professor Schönherr-Mann has already pointed out the importance of eroticism in Bataille's thinking. In my opinion, however, it would be wrong to interpret Bataille's emphasis on eroticism as a kind of retreat from the field of politics. Rather, I believe that Bataille takes erotic experience seriously in the sense of an experience of ecstasy, loss of sense and self-worth precisely because it is actually of political significance for him when it comes to radical insubordination. If bataille can be subordinated a policy, then a type of policy of permanent revolt. Sovereignty, as Bataille understands it, is not a characteristic or condition that enables action; rather, it is a rejection of action itself. Action always implies a purpose-means structure (i.e. it is embedded in the rational discourse of mediation) and thus has a fundamental structure of procrastination. But you are only sovereign in the moment — and the erotic experience can be such a moment. Eroticism is about a hopeless waste of energy, an unproductive expenditure of strength (which, by the way, also leads directly to Bataille's “general economy”). What sets us apart when we are “sovereign” (for example in erotic experience, but also in gifts without consideration or in art) is that we have nothing and no one at these moments serve (which is associated with an erosion of subject and object, i.e. also with an experience of community that may be similar to the mystical one, but deviates from it in that one becomes a heterogeneous multiplicity, the Nietzschean desert). The aspect of radical “indiscriminacy” is what Bataille so strongly affirmed about Nietzsche's philosophy. In Batailles as well as in Nietzsche's perspective, all morality, all action is a form of servitude. In Nietzsche and the will for opportunity This idea appears when Bataille points out that fighting for freedom bitterly always means giving it up first. The relationship between freedom or sovereignty and political struggle or political practice is therefore a paradox for Bataille from the outset. We are dealing with a concept of freedom which in fact leads into an abyss, into a fall into nonsense, which the existentialists mentioned above also seem to know, but which they believe to overcome through a moral philosophy of 'freely chosen responsibility'. For Bataille, on the other hand, there is no turning back from the abyss into a regulated moral existence. But that doesn't mean that his thinking is apolitical or political without consequences. Because the radical challenge of rational discourse also questions social conditions and political connections in a very fundamental way. Interestingly enough, Bataille shows his excessive identification with Nietzsche, to which Professor Schönherr-Mann has pointed out, particularly clearly in a short essay from 1951, which has the title Nietzsche in the light of Marxism carries. According to my analysis, Bataille contrasts two forms of emancipation in this essay: a communist form involving the liberation of all of humanity goes, and a Nietzschean form, which is about the liberation of whole people goes, that is, a person who does not subordinate himself to any particular objectives, no action imperatives. Both forms of emancipation clash with each other, are mutually exclusive, but at the same time are interdependent on each other, provided that one is void without the other, or neglecting one would necessarily mean counteracting the other. This shows what is so extremely controversial about Bataille's concept of freedom (and therefore of his Nietzsche reading) from a political point of view: Bataille is far from turning Nietzsche into a left-wing political perspective, making him politically “serviceable.” But he also does not play Nietzsche off against the communist political project. Rather, he places both in a paradoxical tension that cannot be “abolished” in any sense (Hegelian or otherwise). Any emancipatory project that reduces one side of emancipation to the other or ignores one of the two sides runs the risk of turning into a reaction. In my opinion, this is an important aspect of the political significance of Bataille's Nietzschean sense of sovereignty.
SM: Bataille responds to the start of the Second World War with a partly diary-like, partly philosophical text The friendship, which he published in 1944. It says almost programmatically:
With the passion, the vicious lucidity that I am capable of, I have wanted That the life in me undresses. I've been writing this book since the state of war, everything else is empty in my eyes. I want nothing but to live: alcohol, ecstasy, naked existence, like a naked — and confused — woman. To the extent that the life that I am is revealed to me and at the same time, since I have lived it without hiding anything, is visible from outside, I can only bleed, cry and desire within.1
That is a different answer to war than you find in French existentialism, which takes shape in those years when Camus in The myth of Sisyphus 1942 attested to people the opportunity to revolt even in the face of their hopelessness. Sartre's analysis 1943 in Being and nothingness attributes to consciousness the ability to change, thus establishing freedom phenomenologically — not idealistically: at most from a materialistic and communitarian perspective — which results in individual responsibility for one's own life. For the militarized societies since the beginning of the 19th century, in which people are led as subjects, these are intolerable claims. Bataille does not follow this understanding of responsibility, although it can rely on Nietzsche. And Camus is still taking L'Homme Revolté (1951) takes a rather skeptical attitude towards Nietzsche, as he is suspected of being close to the Nazis.
There is another parallel between existentialism and battalion, which dates back to the development of the former in the thirties. Bataille wrote in The friendship: “Anyone who speaks of justice is justice himself, suggests a judge, a father, a leader. I'm not proposing justice. I bring complicit friendship. A feeling of festivity, of freedom of movement, of childlike and demonized lust” (p. 58). Bataille rejects the hope that problems could be solved by states.
Individual relationships are taking the place of politics, which in turn for Bataille are in no way based on successful communication, as Camus, Sartre and de Beauvoir imagine. In contrast, Bataille writes:
To the extent that beings seem perfect, they remain isolated, closed within themselves. But the wound of incompleteness opens it. Through what you can call incompleteness, animal nudity, wound communicating The various, separate beings gain life by losing themselves in communication with each other.2
Bataille's thinking is not only in Die friendship, but consistently, but especially in The ostracized part and in Saint Eros (1957) characterized by a radical rejection of social discourses, which he counters with provocative ideas. This is also found in the early existentialism of the thirties and still in the forties, when it is not about individual responsibility but about separation from the social sphere.
That is the title of Sartre's novel The disgust (1938) as well as in Camus' novel The Stranger from 1942. In Sartre's story Herostrate (1939) he has certain sympathies with a gunman. And in the third volume of The paths of freedom The hero, a Parisian philosophy teacher like Sartre, shoots at German soldiers completely senselessly:
It was a huge revenge; every shot avenged him for an old doubt. [.] He shot at man, at virtue, at the world: freedom — that is terror; [.] he shot at the beautiful officer, at all the beauty of this earth, at the street, at the flowers, at the gardens, at everything he had loved.3
As early as the 19th century, there was a philosophy that society rejects without caring about state alternatives: Max Stirner and Nietzsche; in the 20th century, in addition to the existentialists and E.M. Cioran, there were primarily writers such as Henry Miller, Philip Roth, Charles Bukowski, Hermann Hesse, Franz Kafka. Philipp Blom names Diderot and Holbach 2011 Evil philosophersbecause, like the Marquis de Sade, they defend sensuality and pleasure. Bataille and Sartre could share such a title, even if the former emphasized sovereignty and the latter emphasized responsibility. Like Nietzsche, both are concerned with an individual who is not subordinate to state and society. Most contemporaries regard this as evil.
III. What is the economics of waste?
PS: A key theme of Batailles is not only the critique of collective, state, in favor of individual sovereignty, but also, as Jenny Kellner explained in her mentioned article, the critique of capitalist efficiency logic in favor of an “economy of waste.” This moment seems to me to play no role in comparatively ascetic existentialism. In fact, both motives seem to be found in Nietzsche — the apology of ecstasy and the critique of “ascetic ideals,” as well as the emphasis on individual responsibility. Here you quickly ask yourself what corresponds more to our current social reality: From the standpoint of the ecological movement, it is true that in the current capitalist economy, we are already dealing with an “economy of waste” and, in contrast, more individual and collective responsibility in the sense of asceticism is required. In this sense, could we perhaps speak of a certain obsolescence of Bataille's criticism? Don't we already live in an uninhibited economy and should, for the sake of the future of the planet, discover the joys of renunciation? What do you mean, Mrs. Kellner?
JK: That is a very good question! Bataille clears in the Inner experience a that asceticism can be a means of freeing oneself from the bondage of possession and materiality. However, according to Bataille, there is also a certain promise of salvation: It is about giving up a part of yourself in order to save another part (e.g. called a “soul”). Structurally, this certainly applies to the ecological ascetic ideal you mentioned. Bataille's wastefulness, however, is about a more radical rejection of property and materiality, which no longer implies salvation and salvation (and is therefore just as' evil 'as Professor Schönherr-Mann Bataille and the existentialist thinkers attested above). By the way, I don't think that Bataille's economic critique is outdated, but that this impression is created by a misunderstanding. Because, to put it in a nutshell, with Bataille, waste is not the same as waste. The basic thesis of his theory of economics states that it Definitely There are surpluses that must be spent without profit, but this waste can take a variety of forms. It can be chosen consciously and according to criteria of Fallen, that is, in the broadest sense after aesthetic Criteria are designed — that would be a active and glorious form the waste of excess money. But it can also suffered passively When its necessity is met with denial and repression — that is when it comes to us. Bataille speaks here of “catastrophic forms” of spending and cites modern war as an example of this4. But environmental disasters can of course also be explained in exactly this way. Benjamin Noys points out in the afterword to the new edition of Ostracized part from 2021 that this book, published for the first time in 1949, foresees the global crisis and that, precisely for this reason, there has been increased interest in it again today. Bataille's argument consists in this paradoxical phrase: Since we are unable to consciously gloriosis Practicing waste is the inevitable waste disastrous against ourselves and destroys us. Here it becomes clear that Bataille is really pursuing an enlightenment project with his economic critique:
Our ignorance has only one undeniable consequence: it leaves us sufferWhat we would do ourselves if we knew effect could. It deprives us of choosing the type of sweating that we like. Above all, however, it exposes people and their works to catastrophic destruction. Because if we do not have the power to destroy the excess energy ourselves, which cannot be used elsewhere, it destroys us like an untamable animal, and we ourselves are the victims of the inevitable explosion.5
This also means that ascetic principles, however well-intentioned they are with regard to the ecological crisis and as useful as they may seem, could possibly have the exact opposite effect of what they are intended to do. In any case, this risk exists when ascetic restraint is the only means to be used to avert the crisis. Especially when it's in the form of moral Drucks It remains unforeseeable where which boilers will explode and with what consequences. Here we are also experiencing quite a bit of bigotry today when capitalist production continues unabated with all its destructive consequences, but at the same time private individuals are encouraged not to shower for so long, to use electricity, gasoline, meat and packaging more sparingly, etc. I would also doubt that what we call “capitalist waste” here actually represents profitable expenditure in order to Bataille is doing. When huge amounts of electronic waste are generated every year because the mobile phone and computer industry is constantly launching new devices onto the market, or when buildings, billboards and shops are illuminated at night, then this is not done with the awareness that excess energy is being spent senselessly here — as a glorious gift without consideration, as Nietzsche's Zarathustra would say yes — but from completely rational economic calculation: There are people who benefit massively from this waste! These are therefore not useless expenses at all in a Bataille-Nietzschean sense. If you look at factory farming, for example, you are dealing with a highly efficient form of food production. From an economic point of view, it would be wasteful to give animals space and healthy food and time to live and grow. According to the criteria of increasing added value and maximizing profits, factory farming, production of more and more waste, exploitation of resources and the environment, etc. make perfect sense. Bataille's insight consists in saying: This rationalistic logic of increasing productive forces and the corresponding growth ideology will sooner or later be directed against ourselves! The excess of capitalism exists not in his wastes. Rather, these are an unwanted secondary disastrous Follow the capitalist (and Protestant!) Principle that Not at all It can be wasted that the last bit of added value that is possible must be squeezed out of every thing, every individual, every movement on the globe. We know the paradox of increasing efficiency: If more can suddenly be produced in a shorter period of time, this in no way means that production time is actually reduced, but on the contrary that more and more and more is produced. Basically, it is about the insight made in another context by Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer in the Dialectic of Enlightenment It was formulated: that excessive rationalism necessarily turns into irrationalism. Bataille's economic theory perspective uniquely sensitizes to the crazy paradoxes of rationalization principles. I therefore think it is more relevant than ever.
PS: Capitalism, born out of the spirit of intra-world asceticism, to say it with Max Weber, thus produces huge surpluses, which it is no longer able to channel precisely because of its totalising efficiency logic and which repeatedly lead to catastrophic explosions. This really seems to be an original synthesis of Marx's economic and Nietzsche's cultural crisis theory. We may be able to marvel at such 'fireworks' in Ukraine right now. It may indeed be time to focus on “glorious waste” instead of asceticism in order to save the planet — that would perhaps also make the ecological movement more attractive. Do you see a similar topicality in these thoughts, Professor Schönherr-Mann?
SM: Yes, Bataille's “general economy” is highly topical. The only question is whether anyone really wants to read this, not just among ecologists. Because strangeness is likely to increase with his understanding of nature, as it is said in The ostracized part: “I am starting from a fundamental fact: Thanks to the interplay of energy on the earth's surface, the living organism generally receives more energy than is necessary to sustain life” (1985, p. 45). It is not too little energy that is spread across the earth as a principle of life, but too much energy that nature must waste. This contradicts ecological notions of cycles, balances, and stabilities. For Bataille, on the other hand, nature does not have a constant state, but is in constant change. This comes closer to Darwin's theory of evolution than a self-image that searches for harmony with nature and likes to be based on supposedly naturally living groups of people in the jungle.
Bataille transfers this principle of natural waste to civilization. The law of economic movement is not growth, but waste — a principle that runs through history for bataille: temples and palaces, extensive festivals and excessive luxury, today at least widespread consumption in richer countries. For Bataille, on the other hand, it is a
The fact that, generally speaking, there is no growth, but only a luxurious waste of energy in various forms! The history of life on earth is primarily the effect of insane excess: the dominant event is the development of luxury, the production of ever more expensive forms of life.6
It is precisely this waste that is ostracized across the board in modern times — a phenomenon that did not exist before: The Christian poverty rule resulted in a church that developed pomp. Bataille refers to the Protestant work ethic, which, according to Max Weber, promoted the development of capitalism, which is concerned with efficiency and increased production. Bataille acknowledges this in Saint Eros 1957 with the words: “Producing at low costs is a pathetic human wish” (p. 56).
The Soviet Union admits to Bataille that it is concerned with the question of fair distribution of goods. In contemporary capitalism, he also notices a tendency towards waste, writing is created The ostracized part But in 1949 against the backdrop of the Marshall Plan, when the USA supported Europe with transfer payments to promote post-war reconstruction. But Bataille recognizes that this waste has ulterior motives to strengthen Europe vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and to create future sales markets. It is therefore not pure waste after all.
Nevertheless, the Marshall Plan comes close to another type of waste when Bataille remarks: “What prevents one in complete conflict from seeing war as inevitable is the idea — to reverse a Clausewitz formulation — that the economy under current conditions is its continuation by other means” (ibid., p. 210). The USA is thus waging an economic war against the Soviet Union. Waste then has a martial sense.
Bataille regards war itself as a waste. That is obvious. Because what monarchs primarily did up to the 18th century, the nation state continues. The Soviet Union is also consistently militarized under Stalin. Fascism in particular, with its belligerent orientation, is linked to monarchical waste. Does the battalion rate positively? Since the 19th century, people have hoped to achieve their goals with war and only with war: Hegel, Juan Donoso Cortés, Proudhon, Marx and Max Weber have relied on war.
At the same time, in contrast to the economized living conditions, he seems to have a lively character — this is how Carl Schmitt will see it. Bataille, however, is referring to another speaker:
War is one last game, it is a tragic game: a game in which you use everything you have, including your own life, and I think that is what Nietzsche loved about war; for him, life was essentially a game. Nietzsche has undoubtedly also had the experience that there is no game that is superior to war; it is the only game in which the bet is total.7
Peace-loving readers such as Arthur C. Danto would like Nietzsche to pull these martial teeth out. But Bataille lives in an extremely warlike period and is not one of the pacifists.
But he also does not count himself among the militarists, any more than among those who think they must save the world, with or without violence, and who also have a grand plan for this, including an appropriately dimensioned narrative. Instead, Bataille said in 1957: “I'm not taking responsibility for the world, in any sense. ”8 For Bataille, war has a certain sense as a waste, especially because it is ostracized, but nothing more, certainly not a cathartic or even a disastrous one. He has just survived the latter.
So waste, whether as a war or as a party, makes no sense. Seine general economics Rather, with waste, demonstrates the futility of the same, as Bataille said about his work in 1951: “My entire philosophy consists in saying that the most important goal in life is to get rid of the habit of always having a goal in mind” (ibid., p. 53). Who among the politically, socially or ecologically engaged people wants to make friends with such a statement? If you want to make battalions fruitful for the liberal economy and ecology, you would have to rethink these two, namely in the direction that there is no sense.
This brings us closer to Nietzsche, who, however, is more constructive, as he wants to create new value, and if you disregard his enthusiasm for war with Danto. Nevertheless, what Bataille remarked about herself in 1953 is all the more true for Nietzsche: “I would like to say that I am most proud of having caused confusion. That means having combined the most exuberant and shocking, the most scandalous way of laughing with the deepest religious spirit” (ibid., p. 132). What confusion Nietzsche has also created!
Is it surprising then when Maurice Blanchot, who is shocked by such provocations, rejects any spiritual commonality in his obituary for Bataille 1962, even in the face of Bataille's death: “Death thus has the false virtue of acting as if it gives back closeness to those who have separated serious differences.”9?
PS: I think we see that Bataille's interpretation is characterized by the fact that he emphasizes and affirms the destructive, 'nihilistic' aspects of Nietzsche to others. However, he is not satisfied with mere skepticism, but gains from this nihilism the freedom to create new concepts that have lost none of their fascination power, regardless of whether it concerns the conception of non-subjective sovereignty or conscious waste as an alternative to capitalist efficiency logic. Thank you for this extremely instructive conversation!
Sources
Battalile, Georges: Saint Eros. Berlin e. a. 1984.
Ders. : The ostracized part. Attempt at general economics. In: Ders. : The abolition of the economy. Munich 1985, pp. 33—234.
Ders. : The ostracized part. Attempt at a general economy. Berlin 2021.
Ders. : The tasks of the mind. Conversations and Interviews 1948-1961. Berlin 2012.
Ders. : Friendship and Hallelujah. Atheological sum II. Berlin 2002.
Ders. : The inner experience. Berlin 2017.
Ders. : Nietzsche in the light of Marxism. In: Werner Hamacher (ed.): Nietzsche from France. Hamburg 2007, pp. 19-26.
Ders. : Nietzsche and the desire for opportunity. Atheological sum III. Berlin 2005.
Blanchot, Maurice: Friendship. In: Ders. : The friendship. Matthes & Seitz, Berlin. P. 369—373.
Sartre, Jean-Paul: The paths of freedom, Vol. 3. Reinbek b. Hamburg 1987.
Footnotes
1: P. 56.
2: Ibid., p. 39.
3: P. 220.
4: Cf. Bataille, The ostracized part, First part, section 4: “War as a catastrophic expenditure of surplus energy” (1985, p. 48 ff.).
5: Ibid., p. 48.
6: Ibid., p. 56.
7: Nietzsche and the will for opportunity, P. 110.
8: The tasks of the mind, P. 98.
9: Blanchot, The friendship, P. 372.